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Chapter 1: Introduction iii 
Abstract 
Trespassing behaviour is a problem for railway operations and manifests itself 
through train-pedestrian collisions, incidents of theft and vandalism to rail 
infrastructure, as well as encroachment on railway property. The study has consisted 
of a quantitative and a qualitative part. The quantitative part analyses demographic, 
temporal and spatial data on train-pedestrian fatalities and injuries, as well as data on 
occurrences of theft and malicious damage to rail infrastructure in the Cape Town 
Functional Region between 2015 and 2018. The qualitative part presents the 
perspective from a diverse group of subject matter experts, having explored opinions 
on trespassing behaviours and preventative measures. Additionally, the trespassing 
behaviour at several sites was investigated and a case study evaluation of the efficacy 
of a pilot Rail Enforcement Unit was carried out.  There were 456 railway-related 
deaths during the study period with 330 of this being train-pedestrian collisions. 
There were 4715 occurrences of theft and malicious damage to railway assets over 
the period. Several hot-spot areas were identified via the data and interviews with 
experts and several sites chosen for further verification. Site visits confirmed 
widespread trespassing behaviours with the two worst locations recording an average 
of over 300 persons in a 15-minute period. The case study reviewing the 
effectiveness of the security and enforcement countermeasure revealed that 
occurrences of train-pedestrian incidents, as well as security occurrences have 
increased by 1.4% and 7.5% respectively. Evidence of geographical displacement of 
crime is evident, suggesting that enforcement countermeasures are temporarily 
effective and need to be considered in combination with other measures to ensure its 
durability. In conclusion, this research presents a detailed analysis of railway 
trespassing and its main effects in order to understand the problem locally. Different 
approaches are required to combat the various guises of railway trespassing. Certain 
countermeasures may well be within the rail operator's remit, but essentially, the 
nature of problems experienced by the rail operator is beyond a rail problem, and 
requires a systems approach involving multiple authorities.  
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2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
South Africa’s, Railway Safety Regulator (RSR) in its State of Safety Report 
for 2017/18, revealed that “people struck by trains on running lines contributes the 
most to the overall number of fatalities caused by rail operations”. The report 
continues to confirm that “the public accounted for 98.8% of the total fatalities and 
98.4% of the total injuries reported in 2017/18” (RSR, 2018). For the occurrence 
category People struck by trains during movement of rolling stock, 588 occurrences 
were recorded, of which 343 where fatal (RSR, 2018). Unfortunately, as far as 
railway trespassing is concerned, this only describes a fraction of the problem. 
Theft of railway assets and vandalism to railway property recorded a 
staggering 6701 occurrences nationally. Furthermore, the Rapid Rail Police (RRP) of 
the South African Police Services (SAPS) made 15 615 arrests for crimes labelled as 
“illegally crossing the railway line” during the period (RSR, 2018). 
If we wish to reduce the number of pedestrian-rail incidents, a thorough 
comprehension of current knowledge around railway trespassing needs to be 
undertaken, as well as the measures that have been used for the prevention of railway 
trespassing. Very little research exists in the specific area of railway trespassing, and 
especially in the South African social context, where inadequate knowledge of the 
motives and behaviour of pedestrians often affect the effectiveness of engineering 
solutions.  
The work presented in this dissertation will focus on the subject of railway 
trespassing within the Western Cape Region and specifically, within the commuter 
rail service area in the greater City of Cape Town functional region. 
This chapter outlines the current status quo of rail in the Western Cape (Section 
1.1); Section 1.2 defines the research problem and Section 1.3 lists the objectives of 
the research. Section 1.4 poses the research questions, Section 1.5 explains the 
deficiencies in the existing knowledge and Section 1.6 lists who would benefit from 
the research. Section 1.7 defines the scope of this research. Finally, Section 1.8 
summarises the structure of the entire report and includes an outline of the remaining 
chapters of the dissertation. 
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1.1 RAIL IN THE WESTERN CAPE – THE STATUS QUO 
In order to understand and contextualise rail in the region and to understand the 
challenges faced, it is important to acknowledge the role apartheid has played from a 
spatial planning perspective. The following section will provide a brief history of rail 
development in the Western Cape, after which the key rail institutions will be 
described, followed by a situational analysis of the current rail service offering in the 
region.  
1.1.1 The beginning of rail in the Western Cape 
The discovery of precious metals and stones in South Africa in the 1860’s saw 
rapid urban advancement along with an increased demand for transport and set the 
pace for rail development at the time (Fox, 2019). The 70-kilometer Cape Town to 
Wellington line was completed in 1863, led by William Brounger from the Cape 
Town Railway and Dock Company under the auspices of the Colonial Government 
at the time. This Northern Line connected Cape Town to Bellville via Eerste River en 
route to Wellington. 
The privately owned Wynberg Railway Company followed by opening the 
branch line between Cape Town and Wynberg in 1864 (Fox, 2019). What we now 
know as the Southern Line, was extended to Muizenberg in 1882, and reached 
Simon’s Town in 1890 (Boonzaaier, 2008). 
Fast forward several years to 1948 and the introduction of apartheid, by the 
then National Government, which enforced laws that required separate development 
for different racial groups. As far as urban development is concerned, the key 
legislation that would shape the lay of the land were the Group Areas Act, 1950 and 
the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959 (SAHO, 2019). These Acts 
combined, deemed that white, Coloured, Indian and Africans, should not only live in 
separate areas, but also called for the forced removal and relocation of communities 
to undeveloped areas far from the centre of Cape Town (Turok, 1994); (SAHO, 
2019). 
Apartheid urban planning saw Coloured and Black housing projects flourish on 
the urban fringes of the city and transformed the Cape Flats, so called because it 
consisted of a vast sheet of unconsolidated Aeolian sand, into a vast sprawl of 
settlements called townships. These townships consisted of both formal housing, as 
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well as informal housing, called Shantytowns (SAHO, 2019). This apartheid spatial 
engineering necessitated the rapid construction of new railway lines to ensure that 
the largely Coloured and black labour force were still able to reach places of work in 
the City (Pirie, 2002).  
The Cape Flats Line was constructed for this purpose, and later, in 2008, the 
rail line to Khayelitsha, where at the time it was believed that the population of 
Khayelitsha had more than one million inhabitants (Bray, 2019). 
1.1.2 Railway institutions 
Railway originally developed around the need for agricultural and industrial 
growth and all assets under the former Colonies were unified in 1910 by the 
establishment of the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H); (DoT, 2015). 
The strategic direction, enabled by the South Africa Act of 1909, was to support 
development in-line with business principles whilst at the same time supporting 
communities by increasing access to affordable and “cheap transport” (DoT, 2015). 
The South Africa Act was replaced by the Republic of South Africa 
Constitution Act 32 of 1961, and while it still focused on agricultural and industrial 
growth, it had less emphasis on social development. Rail development was still 
favoured during this time with a highly regulated road transport environment. This 
however, changed with the introduction of the Road Transport Act 74 of 1977, which 
introduced changes to start deregulating road transport. 
The South African Transport Services Act No.65 of 1981 (SATS) replaced the 
SAR&H, with a renewed focus on economic development and the transport system 
required to support this development. Rail continued to grow around major growth 
nodes but did not extend to the areas of high population growth. 
The De Villiers Report of 1986 then came at a time when rail transport was 
running at significant losses. According to De Villiers, “the only way to preserve the 
railway (as distinct from a railway company) as a viable commercial operation is to 
have it concentrate on fulfilling those transportation functions in which it has 
inherent cost advantage” (deVilliers, 1986). The adoption of this report by 
Parliament saw investment in rail severely curtailed and started the process which 
would restructure the rail (and transport) industry in its entirety (DoT, 2015). This 
period signalled the start of the decline in rail and was compounded by the complete 
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deregulation of road transport, with the promulgation of the Transport Deregulation 
Act No. 80 of 1988. Rail lost its market share to the road transport industry with 
significant impacts to the country as a whole.  
Little is written about the state of SATS management structures during this 
time, but it would be safe to assume that this was not unaffected. The relationship 
between organisation safety cultures and the executive leadership of those 
organisations are intrinsically linked. This would directly affect safe working 
processes, risk assessments and control, as well as the competence and training of 
staff during this time, all affecting railway safety. 
The Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 1989 
replaced SATS and was the primary instrument to differentiate between the 
economically viable freight rail sector and the uneconomic commuter rail sector 
(deVilliers, 1986); (RSA, 2019). 
The South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC) was thus formed to 
manage commuter rail services and Transnet, through its Spoornet division, would be 
responsible for freight services. Despite this separation, the formation of SARCC and 
Spoornet, could not change the fortunes of the rail industry and the decline 
continued. 
PRASA and Metrorail 
The SARCC consolidated Metrorail for urban commuter services, as well as 
Shosholoza Meyl catering for inter-city long-distance commuter travel. The 
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) was established in 2009 to 
“…ensure that, at the request of the Department of Transport, for rail commuter 
services are provided within, to and from the Republic in the public interest, and 
Provide, in accordance with the Department of Transport, for long-haul passenger 
rail and bus services within, to and from the Republic in terms of the principles set 
out in Section 4 of the National Land Transport Transition Act, 2000 [Act No. 22 of 
2000]” (PRASA, 2019). PRASA’s focus would be to promote rail as the preferred 
mode of travel in high-density corridors. This, despite, a legacy of now ageing and 
inadequate railway assets and infrastructure. 
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Metrorail is operational in the Western Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the 
Eastern Cape. Metrorail’s offering in the Western Cape will be dealt with in more 
detail in Section 1.1.3. 
Transnet Freight Rail 
The Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act, 1989, 
allowed Transnet to focus on its core business of freight. Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) 
became Transnet’s rail operating division; unlike commuter rail, TFR receives no 
government subsidy and funds. TFR owns all the ‘rail-and-below’ assets it operates 
and has agreements with PRASA to share rail infrastructure where mutually 
beneficial to both parties (DoT, 2015). 
The Railway Safety Regulator 
The Railway Safety Regulator (RSR) was established in 2002, by the passing 
of the National Railway Safety Regulator Act No 16 of 2002 by Parliament. 
The purpose of the RSR according to the Act is thus to: 
“(a) provide for and promote safe railway operations;  
  (b) encourage the collaboration and participation of interested and affected 
parties in improving railway safety;  
  (c) recognise the prime responsibility and accountability of operators in 
ensuring the safety of railway operations;  
  (d) facilitate a modern, flexible and efficient regulatory regime that ensures 
the continuing enhancement of safe railway operations;  
  (e) promote the harmonisation of the railway safety regime of the Republic 
with the objectives and requirements of the Southern African Development 
Community for the operation of railways; and  
  (f) further the achievement of such purpose by establishing a suitable 
regulatory institution.” (RSR, 2019). 
The South African Police Service and its Rapid Rail Police Unit 
With the consolidation and a focus on core business with the onset of SATS, a 
key goal was the reduction of staff. In 1986, this saw the South African Railway 
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Police Department separate from SATS and absorbed into the South African Police 
(SAPS, 2019). 
After South Africa's transition to democracy in 1994, the South African Police 
(SAP) was reorganised into the South African Police Service (SAPS). This transport 
policing function was lost until the Railway Police was re-established in 2004. The 
Railway Police or as it is now known, the Rapid Rail Police Unit (RRPU), has its 
mandate embedded within the mandate of SAPS which is derived from Section 205 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
The functions of the RRPU include the:  
“a) Rendering of a visible police service within the environment to 
address safety of commuters, passengers, freight and the rail 
transport system 
b) Conducting of preventative and reactive policing service within the 
rail environment 
c) Providing of a rapid rail policing service within the rail environment, 
and 
d) Executing of crime prevention and crime combating operations in the 
rail environment” (SAPS, 2019). 
1.1.3 Rail situational analysis 
This section will detail the current commuter rail offering in the Western Cape 
provided by Metrorail. 
Overview 
Metrorail Western Cape has the second largest commuter rail network in the 
country after Gauteng. The rail network consists of 610km of track owned by 
PRASA and Transnet and operated by Metrorail. The 2012 Rail Census Report for 
the Western Cape sets the number of passengers for all lines per day at 621 833 
(RHDHV, 2013). However, the service has seen a rapid decline since 2014 and it is 
estimated that the all-day boarding passenger numbers are now somewhere between 
360,000 (CoCT, 2018) and 500,000 (IOL, 2018). 
The rail system is characterised by grade-separated rights-of-way with several 
pedestrian and vehicular at-grade level crossings, high-level platforms and electric 
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multiple-unit cars. The system requires 88 train sets across the network but currently 
operate with around 48 train sets (ANA, 2019). The bulk of the fleet is made up of 
5M2A train types with combinations of Metro Plus and Metro coaches, with the 
number of coaches per train between five and 14. 
Traction power is received from overhead lines. The only exception is on 
limited, outlying sections of track which are serviced by diesel-powered locomotives. 
Operating environment 
The rail service operates from 4h30 in the morning, with the last service 
finishing around 21h30. The routes are fixed, and trains operate at set headways. 
Services operate daily, with weekday services operating 16 to 17h per day with 
frequencies typically between nine trains per hour at peak and three per hour during 
off-peak periods. Saturday services typically operate 15 hours a day, with service 
frequencies varying between one and three trains an hour. Sunday services also 
operate for approximately 15 hours a day, with services generally reduced to a single 
train an hour. The service has a fixed stopping pattern, with local and express 
services stopping at some 119 stations on the network. A total of 85 stations are 
owned by Metrorail and 34 stations are owned by Transnet (RHDHV, 2013). The 
service is very much geared towards peak commuting hours. 
Route network design 
The network is based on a trunk-and-branch design with Cape Town Station as the 
major attractor for all trip destinations and has a number of branches outwards to the 
South (Simon’s Town and the Cape Flats), Southeast (Kapteinsklip and Khayelitsha), 
and East (Bellville, Monte Vista, Wellington, Strand and Stellenbosch lines.) See 
Figure 1: Route Network Diagram.  
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Figure 1: Route Network Diagram 
Source: (Metrorail, 2010) 
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Khayelitsha / Kapteinsklip 
to Cape Town 
A High priority route.  
Wellington / Kraaifontein / Bellville – Cape 
Town via 
Monte Vista or Mutual 
A High priority route. 
Simonstown – Cape Town 
and Retreat via Southfield 
A High priority route. 
Strand – Cape Town via 
Bellville 
B Busy corridor with high 
forecasted growth.  
Muldersvlei – Cape Town 
via Bellville 
C Low demand route. 
Worcester - Wellington C Very low demand route. 
Malmesbury - Fisantekraal C Very low demand route. 
Source: (RHDHV, 2013) 
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1-10 10.50 80.00 250.00 7.50 47.00 140.00 
11-20 11.50 90.00 280.00 8.00 50.00 150.00 
21-30 13.50 110.00 340.00 9.00 59.00 175.00 
31-40 16.50 135.00 420.00 10.00 65.00 190.00 
41-135 19.50 160.00 500.00 13.00 80.00 250.00 
136-200 23.50 195.00 605.00 18.00 115.00 360.00 
Source: (GoMetro, 2019) 
Train fares (see Table 2: Metrorail Fares Western Cape) are based on a zonal 
charging system based on distance. Fares can be purchased on a single, weekly or 
monthly basis and for either Metro (lower cost), or MetroPlus services (higher cost). 
Tickets can be purchased from station ticket offices or from Metrorail Ticket 
Officials with a portable ticketing machine.  
Rail in crisis 
Historic underinvestment in commuter rail services has had a detrimental 
impact on those factors which are important parameters that affect railway quality of 
service. Reliability, availability, maintainability and safety have all have suffered 
with increasing operating costs, unreliable infrastructure and rolling stock, declining 
fare revenue aligned with a decrease in patronage and low customer satisfaction 
levels (PRASA, 2019).  
Compounding the rail crisis is operating in a challenging socio-economic 
environment, not only within the Western Cape but country-wide as well. High 
levels of unemployment, escalating crime levels and a general lack of government 
service delivery in other non-transport related areas have negatively affected rail 
operations. PRASA business performance has declined to an almost “total collapse” 
(PRASA, 2019).   
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Towards rail reform 
Recognising that immediate and drastic action is required to prevent a total 
collapse, PRASA is strategising (Rescue Plan and Modernisation) to arrest the 
current decline in the rail commuter service. Key focus areas from the PRASA 
Corporate Plan 2020-2022 are to:  
- Improve on-time performance,
- Reduce train cancellations,
- Ensure the safety of passengers, public and staff within the PRASA rail
system environment,
- Improve customer experience and level of service,
- Decrease crime and crime-related costs by protecting rail corridors, and
- Increase revenue collected by the fare box (PRASA, 2019).
A central tenet to recovering the rail service and relevant to this dissertation is 
the recognition of the importance of Corridor Protection and seeking to mitigate the 
open nature of the rail system.  In the Western Cape the focus will be on restoring a 
full service to the Central Line (PRASA, 2018). 
1.2 DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
The rail operator has identified the broader problem with the openness of the 
rail reserve and the ease with which it can be accessed. The main problems caused by 
this “openness” are fare evasion, high levels of vandalism and theft of railway 
infrastructure, and illegal trespassing leading to pedestrian fatalities. These issues 
will be dealt with next by using references from statistical trends to support the 
importance of this research topic, and to specifically develop the problem statement. 
1.2.1 Fare evasion 
As mentioned earlier, commuter rail is not an economically viable business 
enterprise. Revenue from the fare box is significantly less than Metrorail or 
PRASA’s operational expenditure, hence the requirement for a government subsidy. 
Fare revenue targets are consistently not being achieved with fare revenue declining 
from R2.3 billion to R1.8 billion for the 2017/18 financial period. (PRASA, 2018) 
This is mainly due to a number of reasons, some of which are: 
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- Service disruptions and high levels of train cancellation means 
commuters are unwilling to purchase tickets, as a form of protest 
against a poor-quality rail service; 
- Anticipated fare increases could not be implemented due to the ongoing 
poor quality of service provided; 
- Increase in fare evaders who do not see the need to purchase tickets due 
to the “openness” of the rail system.  
A fare evasion survey carried out in 2015 for the Western Cape determined that 
10.2% of trips are made without valid tickets. The annual loss of fare revenue was 
estimated to be in the region of R30 million (DelMistro & Khanye, 2015). It is likely 
that the actual level of fare evasion is much higher.  
1.2.2 Vandalism and theft 
In terms of SANS 3000-1:2009, safety incidents and security occurrence data 
are captured in relevant categories and sub-categories, with safety-related 
occurrences captured in nine categories, numbered 1-9 (SANS, 2009). 
Category 1 details the theft of assets impacting on operational safety; Category 
2 details malicious damage (vandalism) to property. The main categories are further 
broken down into sub-categories for the different affected rail systems.  
 
Figure 2: Category 1 Theft of assets 
A review of the Railway Safety Regulator’s, State of Safety Reports (National 
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2017/18 with 4984 reported occurrences (RSR, 2008-2018). Over the 10-year period, 
this equates to an 89% increase. See Figure 2: Category 1 Theft of assets. 
On review of the occurrences per sub-category, the most affected asset, 
consistently over the period, is train control equipment (in section) with               
2654 occurrences recorded in 2017-18. Cable theft related to train signalling 
equipment has a direct impact on rail safety and availability (delays and 
cancellations). 
 A review of the Category 2 occurrences, for malicious damage to property, 
(see Figure 3: Category 2 Malicious damage to property), shows a similar increasing 
trend in occurrences related to vandalism of rail property. In 2017/18, a total of 1717 
occurrences of vandalism were recorded. 
On review of the occurrences per sub-category, the most affected assets 
consistently over the period are rolling stock components (in section) with              
692 occurrences and train control equipment (in section) recording 528 occurrences. 
 
 




























































Category 2 Malicious damage (vandalism) to property
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Category 1 Theft of assets 
(impacting on operational safety) 
2633 3395 3993 3639 2900 3068 4213 3600 4379 4984 
a: rolling stock components - section 164 400 430 360 476 204 210 229 362 551 
b: rolling stock components - yard 199 332 196 78 46 168 227 131 174 326 
c: civil infras - section 760 586 960 1231 703 544 828 383 282 623 
d: civil infras - yard 9 18 55 110 45 53 66 14 19 36 
e: overhead traction - section 685 1007 775 411 188 213 321 298 212 559 
f: overhead traction - yard 4 5 4 6 2 5 9 14 2 32 
g: train control equip - section 767 1016 1488 1304 1329 1767 2413 2407 3140 2654 
h: train control equip - yard 28 22 75 52 23 4 14 12 9 65 
i: ancillary equip 17 9 10 87 88 110 125 112 179 138 
Category 2 Malicious damage 
(vandalism) to property 
661 967 1245 1091 789 1019 1094 1158 1162 1717 
a: rolling stock components - section 64 358 526 248 276 341 336 421 373 692 
b: rolling stock components - yard 75 121 129 111 20 63 94 100 90 152 
c: civil infras - section 160 138 184 194 145 146 131 125 82 148 
d: civil infras - yard 53 6 19 44 7 6 23 48 28 32 
e: overhead traction - section 139 96 89 16 31 22 34 52 39 110 
f: overhead traction - yard 0 0 6 41 2 1 2 3 2 3 
g: train control equip - section 159 238 263 340 289 417 447 384 519 528 
h: train control equip - yard 1 7 20 89 8 5 3 1 1 17 
i: ancillary equip 10 3 9 8 11 18 24 24 28 35 
Source: (RSR, 2008-2018) 
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1.2.3 Pedestrian-rail fatalities 
Continuing the review of the Railway Safety Regulator’s, State of Safety 
Reports (National data) between 2008 and 2018, pedestrian fatality statistics will be 
reviewed next. The information provided describes the problem at a National level. 
In terms of SANS 3000-1:2009, Category E, ‘People struck by trains during 
movement of rolling stock other than at a level crossing’, is the category most 
applicable to trespassing. Category E occurrences will be shown against Category D 
occurrences showing incidents at level crossings for context. See Figure 4: Category 
D & E occurrence comparison (RSR, 2008-2018). 
 
Figure 4: Category D & E occurrence comparison 
The number of Category E occurrences depicting pedestrian fatalities due to 
trespassing, far outweigh the Category D occurrences for level crossings. The 
number of people struck by trains over the 10-year period is consistently high, with 































Category D Level crossing
occurrences
169 181 161 123 128 119 109 87 119 126
Category E People struck by
trains during movement of
rolling stock other than at a
level crossing
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Category E 613 586 562 534 576 588 643 541 651 588 
Fatalities 341 400 364 354 355 394 410 370 414 343 
Injuries 230 202 199 183 231 201 250 180 240 244 
FWI 364 420.2 383.9 372.3 378.1 414.1 435 388 438 367 
Table 4: Category E Fatalities, Injuries and FWI, shows a breakdown of the 
RSR data for fatalities, injuries and FWI (fatalities and weighted injuries). Over the 
period, the average number of fatalities and injuries were 374 and 216, respectively. 
1.2.4 Operational impacts 
The impact of being involved in a single or multiple pedestrian-train fatality 
has been documented in a few studies with regards to the impact on train drivers. 
Limosin et al. (2005), confirms that train drivers who have been involved in a 
collision resulting in a pedestrian fatality, experience acute psychological 
disturbances (Limosin, et al., 2005).  
A study in Norway determined a plausible causal relationship between 
traumatic on-the-track experiences and long-term health problems in train drivers 
(Vatshelle & Moen, 1997). Having been involved in a fatality, the stress about 
worrying about being involved in a fatality, and its consequences, have far reaching 
effects beyond train drivers, and impacts other railway staff, rescue and clean-up 
teams as well as those witnessing the events.  
Railway incidents could also impact train operations in other ways. Costs 
related to property and railway asset damage, rolling stock availability, delays and 
cancellations of service, emergency services costs, insurance and legal implications, 
as well as the over-arching cost of the loss of a human life, are all applicable factors 
impacted. 
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1.2.5 Problem statement 
The scale of railway trespass related fatalities and crime has shown 
consistently high figures over the years and is currently at its highest levels, showing 
no signs of abating. It is clear that existing strategies are not working and there is a 
need for more research on railway trespassing in order to inform the development of 
effective countermeasures.   
1.3 OBJECTIVES 
Silla and Luoma (2012) confirms the importance of investigating the problem 
from a local perspective to develop a better understanding (Silla & Luoma, 2012). 
Rabdo et al, (2012) suggests that railway suicide and trespassing behaviour is 
specific to a location and/or area (Radbo et al., 2012). Skládaná et al, (2016) in 
reviewing typologies of trespassing risk localities encourages more research, due to 
the great variety of trespassing forms and how they can be influenced by 
sociocultural patterns and local conditions (Skládaná et al., 2016). With this in mind, 
the primary objective of this research is to broaden the knowledge related to 
trespassing within a local context. 
The primary objectives are to:  
- Carry out a demographic analysis of railway fatality data 
- Carry out a detailed temporal analysis on and occurrences of railway theft 
and vandalism 
- Carry out a detailed spatial analysis on pedestrian-rail occurrences, and 
occurrences of railway theft and vandalism. 
Havârneanu et al. (2015) in a review of the literature on safety measures to 
prevent trespassing accidents, found only 22 studies with empirical evidence for the 
effectiveness of countermeasures with hardly any evaluations for combinations of 
measures (Havârneanu, et al., 2015). As part of this research, a case study will be 
investigated, evaluating the effectiveness of a specific trespass countermeasure.    
The secondary objectives are therefore to: 
- Evaluate the effectiveness of the Rail Enforcement Unit (REU), a project to 
reduce incidents of theft and vandalism with additional security personnel. 
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- Carry out interviews with subject matter experts and site visits at selected 
locations to validate and verify findings from the analysis. 
In summary, it is the aim of this research to carry out a detailed analysis of 
trespassing and its main effects, to understand the problem locally, to develop 
tailored and effective responses. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following research questions (Q) and hypotheses (H) will be answered as 
part of this research. 
Research question / hypothesis 
FPS Q1: What are the demographic characteristics of rail related fatalities in the 
operating region? 
FPS H01: No significant difference exists between genders of the victim for recorded 
deaths due to rail injury. 
FPS H02: No significant difference exists between the age of the victim for recorded 
deaths due to rail injury. 
FPS H03: No significant difference exists between the race of the victim and 
recorded deaths due to rail injury. 
FPS H04: No significant difference exists between the gender of the victim for 
suicides. 
RSR Q2: What are the temporal characteristics of Category E-a occurrences relating 
to pedestrian-rail related fatalities and injuries in the operating region? 
RSR H06: No significant difference exists between the months of the year for the 
number of Category E-a occurrences. 
RSR H07: No significant difference exists between the days of the week for Category 
E-a occurrences. 
RSR H08: No significant difference exists between the hours of the day and Category 
E-a occurrences. 
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Research question / hypothesis 
RSR H09: Zero correlation exists between the number of trains scheduled and E-a 
occurrences. 
RSR Q3: What are the temporal characteristics of railway theft and vandalism 
occurrences in the operating region? 
RSR H010: No significant differences exist between the months of the year for 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
RSR H011: No significant differences exist between the days of the week and 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
RSR H012: No significant differences exist between the time of day and Category 1 
and 2 occurrences. 
RSR Q4: What effect do incidents of theft and vandalism have on train operations? 
RSR H013: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences and trains 
scheduled. 
RSR H014: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences and trains 
cancelled. 
RSR H015: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences and trains 
delayed. 
RSR Q5: Where are the spatial concentrations of Category E-a occurrences in the 
operating region? 
RSR Q6: Where are the spatial concentrations of fatalities and injury occurrences in 
the operating region? 
RSR Q7: Where are the spatial concentrations of Category 1 and category 2 
occurrences in the operating region? 
RSR Q8: What are the characteristics of the combined Category E-a, 1 and 2 Spatial 
concentrations in the operating region? 
CASE Q9: How effective is the specific countermeasure strategy? 
CASE H016: No significant difference exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences 
before and after implementation of the countermeasure. 
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Research question / hypothesis 
CASE H017: No significant difference exists between Category E-a occurrences 
before and after implementation of the countermeasure. 
1.5 DEFICIENCIES IN EXISTING KNOWLEDGE 
A study on the literature currently available on railway suicides and trespassing 
incidents by Havârneanu et al. (2015) found 139 relevant publications of which only 
five could be attributed to South Africa (Havârneanu, et al., 2015). Most notable of 
the research carried out in South Africa, was that carried out by the Medical 
Research Council in 1996 and 1998 by Lerer and Matzopoulos. Considering the 
pedestrian-rail fatality rate in South Africa compared to that in Europe, there is a 
distinct lack of relevant research on this subject local to South Africa. 
The importance of corridor protection as a means to ensure safe rail operations 
has been acknowledged by the railway operator in the Western Cape and supported 
on a number of projects by the local and provincial authorities. These include walling 
projects, pedestrian bridges, improved lighting and several measures to enhance 
security using both technology and personnel. To the researcher’s knowledge, no 
studies have been completed evaluating the efficiency of any of the installed 
measures.   
The City of Cape Town has also completed a number of studies, most notably a 
study looking into informal pedestrian movement along and across railway lines, 
(2014) and at the time of writing, a feasibility study looking into city-wide 
pedestrian-rail hot-spot locations. The major deficiency in both these studies is that 
they cover only the City of Cape Town region and excludes the portion of the 
Metrorail network through the neighbouring municipalities. The studies also propose 
remedial actions only within the mandate of the local authority and do not 
recommend any actions for the rail operator. A more holistic approach is required 
which also considers all stakeholders as well as other manifestations of trespassing, 
such as theft and vandalism on the rail network. 
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1.6 WHO WILL THE RESEARCH BENEFIT? 
This research will benefit rail infrastructure managers, rail operators, rail 
regulatory bodies and government organisations at provincial and local municipal 
level. The research will also add to the general body of knowledge relating to railway 
trespassing research. 
1.7 SCOPE AND DELIMITATIONS 
Scope and boundary 
The scope of this research is limited to the extent of the commuter rail service 
area in the Western Cape, provided by the rail operator, Metrorail. This includes the 
local municipalities of Cape Town, Stellenbosch, Swartland, Drakenstein and Breede 
Valley. 
The research is specific to trespassing and access and egress gained to track 
and stations from along line sections and end-of-platform areas. Excluded are 
passenger-rail fatalities related to the platform-train interface and at formalised level-
crossings, which deserve separate research.  
The research also excludes security incidents related to personal injury at 
stations and on trains. 
Hot-spot mapping 
The production of hot-spot maps is a useful technique to visualise the problem 
being investigated, but care should be taken to acknowledge the underlying factors 
that contribute to the creation of the hot-spots. This involves the collection and 
analyses of additional data which could be held by numerous other stakeholders. The 
gathering of this data, which may include, micro-economic and social information 
was beyond the scope of this research.  
Geolocation of incidents 
A key limitation is the degree of uncertainty regarding the actual geographical 
location of events. Locations are based on rail station geographic locations and points 
between stations to determine problem “areas”. The use of technology in recording 
railway incidents needs to be encouraged to improve this. 
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1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT 












The chapter presents the basis for the dissertation. It provides background 
and context needed to understand the intentions of the research, defines the 
research problem, lists the objectives and the research questions, and 






















The main body of the chapter gives the theoretical foundation and review 
of current understanding regarding railway trespassing, as well as matters 
associated with railway trespassing. 
Chapter 3 
A review of the Railway Safety Regulator’s State of Safety Reports is 
presented from 2008/09 till 2017/18 and describes the problem in detail at 



















 Chapter 4 
This chapter presents the scientific approach used in this dissertation: 
methodology and research design, the participants, instruments, research 























s Chapter 5 
The results of the quantitative analysis is presented in this chapter. 
Answers to the research questions are presented along with the findings of 
the various hypotheses tests.  
This chapter provides a full interpretation and evaluation of the 
quantitative analysis.  



















This chapter provides an evaluation of the efficacy of an implemented 

























The outcome of the interviews with the subject matter experts are 
discussed as well as the findings from the site visits. The chapter 
includes an analysis and interpretation of the findings from the 


















This chapter summarises the key findings in this dissertation and makes 
recommendations for further research.  










The following appendices are included: 
Interview protocol 
Site inspection protocol 
Case study protocol 
Incident and occurrence maps 
Interview records 
Site inspection field notes 
Ethics clearance 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A two-part literature review was completed. Firstly, a search through the main 
publication databases was carried out using the keywords (singularly and in various 
combinations) railway, trespassing, rail, pedestrian, fatalities, suicide and 
countermeasures. A number of smaller, more limited, literature reviews were carried 
out in relevant themes as it pertained to railway trespassing. These included the 
keywords metal theft, graffiti, transport and spatial planning, police crime analysis, 
apartheid, injury, accident analysis and human behaviour. 
This search resulted in the discovery of about 173 documents including mainly 
journal submissions, conference papers, reports and ongoing project reviews of 
which 154 papers were selected for inclusion in this dissertation. 
Secondly, the suite of State of Safety Reports as produced by the Railway 
Safety Regulator (RSR) from the reporting year 2008/09 till 2017/18 was reviewed. 
This second part is documented in 0 South African Rail State of Safety Reports. 
The purpose of the literature review is to provide a comprehensive overview of 
current knowledge on all aspects as they relate to railway trespassing. The chapter 
begins with a historical background (Section 2.1) summarising the impact of 
apartheid on spatial planning and broader socio-issues followed by literature reviews 
on the following sub-headings: Defining railway trespassing (Section 2.2), 
developing an understanding of the definition of railway trespassing; Characteristics 
of trespassing accidents (Section 2.3), answering the When? Where? Who? Why? 
How? exploratory questions; and Trespass countermeasures (Section 2.4) reviews 
strategies and measures to combat trespassing. Section 2.6 discusses the implications 
of the literature review and provides a rationale for the need for and importance of 
the research problem. 
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Matzopoulos and Lerer (1998), suggest that the level of poverty of 
communities adjacent to railway lines is a major factor of railway injury occurrences 
(Matzopoulos & Lerer, 1998). In the Western Cape, apartheid urban planning 
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uprooted the poorest communities and relocated them to the urban fringes with little 
regard to the travelling needs of these communities. Coloured and black townships 
flourished on the fringes and in rural areas, maximising the need for public transport, 
with townships located some 15-30km from the city centre (Pirie, 2002; Turok, 
1994). Railways developed around the need to provide public transport to these, the 
poorest areas, to enable them to reach places of work, which in turn would then keep 
the economy of the region going. These distorted land-use patterns, often between 
transport trunks such as railway lines and major roads, required that pedestrians and 
those commuters using public transport, walk long distances and navigate across 
busy transport trunks as part of their journey. 
Fatalities, due to pedestrians being struck by a train, has been an issue even 
before they were officially recorded in 1924. For the period between 1930 and 1970, 
1264 railway fatalities have been recorded nationally, although it is acknowledged 
that incident records of fatalities of Blacks and Coloureds may be under-reported 
(Matzopoulos & Lerer, 1998). 
Along with pedestrian-rail fatalities, crime and violence had also gradually 
been increasing since the 80s, but saw a significant spike at the start of the next 
decade, due to a combination of factors, including transition to a democracy, political 
violence and a faltering criminal justice system (Louw, 1997). Railways are 
described as a socio-technical system (Wilson et al., 2007), because of its symbiotic 
relationship with its environment and therefore it is no surprise that safety issues on 
trains, violent crime, theft and overcrowding became synonymous with the railways. 
Since apartheid, the rail system served as a tool to facilitate discriminatory 
practices, and it remains in the sub-conscious of people, leading to a general culture 
of disregard for the law in general and acceptance of illegal practices, which 
inevitably also affects the railway. This may display itself as fare evasion, where 
large numbers of people refuse to pay fares for the perceived lack of a quality service 
and poor infrastructure. Alternatively, it results in people developing mutual 
relationships with those involved in crime, which leads to the levels of security 
occurrences seen on the railways today; an example of this is rampant signal cable 
theft. 
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The current South African situation of high levels of poverty, unemployment 
and inequality will continue to feed into people’s attitudes and behaviour towards 
and with the rail system.     
2.2 DEFINING RAILWAY TRESPASSING 
The legal definition of trespassing is provided in the South African Trespass 
Act 6 of 1959 as: 
(1) Any person who without the permission -
(a) of the lawful occupier of any land or any building or part of a building; or
(b) of the owner or person in charge of any land or any building or part of a
building that is not lawfully occupied by any person, 
enters or is upon such land or enters or is in such building or part of a 
building, shall be guilty of an offence unless he has lawful reason to enter or be upon 
such land or enter or be in such building or part of a building. (Trespass Act, 1959) 
Considering the above, railway trespassing can then be defined as any person, 
who without permission or lawful reason, enters any non-public side of railway 
property. Further to this, railway trespassers are people who are illegally in the 
railway reserve (Lobb, 2006) and using railway property for reasons not related to 
railway operations (Silla & Luoma, 2011). 
Persons illegally in the railway reserve include those crossing railway lines at 
all informal locations (outside formal level crossings) and, walking or loitering on 
the railway tracks or in non-public railway areas where pedestrians are prohibited. 
Trespassers exclude passengers, railway staff, level crossing users or persons 
attempting suicide (Radbo et al., 2012). Trespassers do not expect to come to harm 
(Mills, 2019) and trespassing accidents are events which occur without will or 
conscious control, often resulting in death or injury. 
Suicide differs then in that although it still involves entering the track area, and 
thereby trespassing, the intent is fundamentally different, with the victim 
purposefully initiating actions that lead to self-harm (Mishara & Bardon, 2015). In 
further work by Mishara and Bardon, they propose that the analysis of accidents and 
suicides be separated to gain better understanding (Mishara & Bardon, 2016). 
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Other authors argue that a pedestrian-train collision can occur only when one 
or more persons have entered the railway reserve whether it be intentionally or 
unintentionally (Radbo et al., 2012).  Several authors have motivated considering 
countermeasures for both suicide and trespassing incidents together as it can be 
difficult in most circumstances to correctly identify a suicide because of a lack of 
information, in order to classify the death correctly (Radbo et al., 2012; Havârneanu 
et al., 2015; Lobb, 2006). Trespassing accidents and suicides, therefore, share 
common traits, but are different. 
Someone contemplating suicide, may consider jumping or lying in front of a 
moving train (ICD10, 2019); they could, however, access railway property either as a 
pedestrian (i.e. trespassing) along line sections or as a passenger, from the station 
platform.  For this literature review, suicide will be discussed as a sub-set of 
trespassing. 
2.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF TRESPASSING ACCIDENTS 
This section will present current knowledge of railway trespassing and 
trespassers. The act of trespassing does not always result in a fatality or serious 
injury and trespassing is more common than fatality statistics would suggest (Silla & 
Kallberg, 2015; Savage, 2007). Trespassing is, therefore, analysed in terms of 
statistics on railway fatalities as well as specific observed behaviours associated with 
trespassing. 
2.3.1 Time of trespassing accidents 
Hourly variations 
In general, trespassing related incidents occur throughout the day (Ozdogan et 
al., 2006; Lerer & Matzopoulos, 1996). Radbo (2005) confirms an even distribution 
of occurrences throughout the day but with a higher frequency in the evening period. 
Savage (2015), found that trespassing fatalities occurred mostly during the 
morning and evening peak hours of 07h00 to 09h00 and 15h00 to 19h00. This is 
supported by the earlier study carried out in South Africa, which found that both fatal 
and non-fatal injuries occurred between the hours of 05h00 to 09h00 and 16h00 to 
20h00 (Lerer & Matzopoulos, 1996). 
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The results from a study carried out by Silla (2012) showed that suicides were 
concentrated in the afternoon-to-night period between 15h00 to 18h00. These 
findings are contradicted by Radbo et al. (2005), which shows more suicides during 
daylight hours. There is a strong likelihood that the hourly pattern has less to do with 
a fixed hour but rather with the seasonal changes of the time of sunset (Mishara & 
Bardon, 2015). 
Actual trespassing counts carried out over a period of 19 days in Finland 
showed that the period 11h00 to 19h00 was the busiest (Silla & Luoma, 2008). 
Further work by Silla and Luoma (2011) where the opinions of people living close to 
the railway line were gauged, could not define a specific hourly period and 
respondents observed the busiest periods for trespassing from highest to lowest as 
afternoon, morning, evening and noon, with no significant differences between the 
different periods. 
Weekly variations 
An early study by Savage (2007), reviewing national railway fatality incidents 
across the United States, showed that the risk of a railway fatality was higher on 
Friday and Saturday evenings. Another study in the United States, in North Carolina, 
would seem to corroborate this, reporting that fatalities typically occurred on Friday, 
Saturday and Sunday nights (Pelletier, 1997). In comparison, an analysis of railway 
fatalities in Chicago showed that fatalities occurred at all times of the day, 
throughout the week, with an apparent increase in suicides on Fridays (Savage, 
2015). 
Mishara and Bardon Silla (2015) found that in general there are less suicides 
on weekends. In a study in Canada, this was true (Mishara & Bardon, 2016), and 
supported by Rabdo et al. (2005). 
Monthly variations 
Most of the literature reviewed, originated from countries in the northern 
hemisphere, with winter, comprising the months December, January and February, 
and summer comprising the months of June, July and August. In countries with harsh 
winters, both intentional and unintentional deaths are unlikely. Fatal crashes peak 
from the start of spring, coinciding with March till around August (Savage, 2015; 
Pelletier, 1997; Radbo et al., 2005).  A Turkish study on the epidemiology of railway 
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related casualties found that fatalities occurred throughout the year, but more 
frequently in summer (Ozdogan et al., 2006). 
Silla (2012) found rail-pedestrian fatalities evenly distributed throughout the 
year, with no discernible peak. The months of May, July, August, November and 
December recorded the most suicides; the most accidents were recorded in March, 
July and November (Silla, 2012). 
2.3.2 Location detail 
Trespassing and related pedestrian-rail collisions occur more frequently in 
densely populated areas (Radbo et al., 2005; Silla & Luoma, 2012) and more so in 
areas that are spatially divided by railway lines (Silla & Luoma, 2008). 
Savage (2015) found that commuter trains account for 60% of fatalities, with 
67% of those recorded as suicides. He also found that more unintentional deaths 
(60%) were recorded at grade crossings and stations, compared to unintentional 
deaths along line-sections (48%). 
Higher train traffic densities are not necessarily associated with an increase in 
trespassing fatalities and lines with infrequent services are more problematic 
(Savage, 2015), however train traffic densities do show a relationship with railway 
suicide rates (Mishara & Bardon, 2015). 
Location in the railway reserve 
Studies on railway fatality statistics have shown that incidents are more likely 
to occur at and close to railway stations (Silla & Luoma, 2012; Savage, 2015; Lerer 
& Matzopoulos, 1996) Although the rail tracks can be accessed anywhere along its 
length if no fencing is in place, a common access to the tracks are via station 
platform-end ramps (RSSB, 2018). 
Informal pedestrian pathways across rail tracks were the location for 87% of 
pedestrian-rail incidents in a study on rail-pedestrian trespassing crash severity, with 
13% of incidents occurring at formal level-crossings (Zhang et al., 2018). 
Suicides follow a similar pattern, with 41% (Savage, 2015) and 58% (Silla, 
2012) of intentional deaths occurring on open rail track areas, between stations 
(Lerer & Matzopoulos, 1996; Mishara & Bardon, 2016), with victims waiting on the 
tracks for a train to arrive or walking along the tracks. Patterns differ considerably 
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with (Mishara & Bardon, 2015) finding that female suicides are more likely to 
happen in station areas and male suicides on open rail track areas.  
Source: (Mvinjelwa, et al., 2019) 
A study in Cape Town (Mvinjelwa et al., 2019) carried out at trespassing hot-
spots identified three main movement patterns, namely i) Street-to-street, ii) Access 
via the platform ends, and iii) Longitudinal travel along pathways parallel to the 
tracks. See Figure 5: Categories of pedestrian movement within the rail reserve at 
hot-spots. 
In the Czech Republic, trespassing locations with a high accident risk were 
classified into six categories (Skládaná et al., 2016): stations, shortcuts of everyday 
use, touristic paths, level crossings, places of meeting or lodging, and unclassified 
localities. 
Ultimately, trespassing behaviour is specific to a certain location, (Savage, 
2007) area, region or country, and influenced by a number of motives, sociocultural 
patterns, geographical and landscape conditions (Skládaná et al., 2016) which 
indicate that the characteristics of trespass locations could vary greatly, and the 
relationship between fatalities and variables cannot be generalised from one location 
to the other (Wang et al., 2016). 
Street-to-street movement 












Figure 5: Categories of pedestrian movement within the rail reserve at hot-spots 
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2.3.3 Gender and age 
Trespass-related fatalities are rare for children under the age of 10 (Savage, 
2007; Savage, 2015; Silla & Luoma, 2008). 
There is a general consensus that the age group most at risk are adults between 
16 and 45 years (Savage, 2007), 20 and 49 years (Pelletier, 1997), 20 and 59 years 
(Radbo et al., 2005).   Savage (2015), found people in their 40s most at risk, followed 
by those in their 20s and 30s with those aged 60 and over having the lowest risk. In 
Turkey, those aged 60 and over had the highest fatality rate (Ozdogan et al., 2006). 
Suicides are similarly, spread over a wide age band, with research suggesting 
that the most affected groups are the groups 13 to 19 years (Savage, 2015), 10 to 29 
years (Silla, 2012) and 25 to 60 years (Mishara & Bardon, 2016). 
From trespassing observations, Silla and Luoma (2008), found that majority of 
trespassers were adults (54%) followed by youngsters in the 12 to 20 years age group 
(35.6%). In Cape Town, at hot-spot locations, children accounted for approximately 
40% of all trespassers (Venter & Shirley, 2014). 
Many studies indicate that most victims of both trespassing and suicide 
fatalities are males (Savage, 2007; Pelletier, 1997; Radbo et al., 2005; Savage, 2015; 
Silla & Luoma, 2012; Mishara & Bardon, 2015; Ozdogan, et al., 2006). 
2.3.4 Trespassing motives  
In general, trespassing on railway property is an act carried out without evil 
intent (Havarneanu, 2017), with the main reason being to take a shortcut, using 
existing well-trodden paths (Skládaná et al., 2018; Silla & Luoma, 2008; Ryan, 2012; 
Savage, 2007; RSSB, 2018). Informal routes across railway lines are chosen by 
pedestrians as the shortest and fastest alternative (Silla & Luoma, 2008), and as a 
matter of convenience where the grade-separated crossing alternative is not suitably 
located (Lobb, et al., 2001; Skládaná et al., 2016). Skládaná et al (2016) further noted 
“illegal but justifiable” informal pedestrian routes across railway tracks used as 
shortcuts where the legal crossing was situated too far from pedestrian desire lines. 
Railways commonly intersect communities and settlement structures, 
becoming obstacles to pedestrians travelling to regular trip attractors, such as 
schools, places of work, sports activities, shopping centres or just walking from one 
neighbourhood to another (Skládaná et al., 2018; Silla & Luoma, 2008; Mvinjelwa et 
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al., 2019). Other non-malicious motives for trespassing include pedestrian routes 
connecting tourism and recreation activities (Skládaná et al., 2016), children using 
the railway as a play area (Savage, 2007), people recovering lost property (Ryan, 
2012) and people that are unfamiliar or confused about the railway environment 
(RSSB, 2018).  
 The motives specifically around platform-end trespassing are found to be risk-
taking by children and youths, and last-minute platform changes to avoid the longer 
more formal route (RSSB, 2018; Mvinjelwa et al., 2019; Ryan, 2012) and rushing to 
catch the next train (Matzopoulos & Lerer, 1998).  
Fare evasion and avoiding ticket control is listed as a motive for trespassing by 
the RSSB (2018), Matzopoulos and Lerer (1998) and Mvinjelwa and Kiewiet (2019). 
In a study on fare evasion in the Western Cape Metrorail region (DelMistro & 
Khanye, 2015), it was estimated that the average fare evasion rate was 10.2% with a 
95% level of significance from a sample of 1658 respondents. From this, it was 
shown that, 7.23% of passengers travelled without a train ticket.  
The other significant grouping of motives of railway trespassing are those 
carried out with criminal intent, including theft from rolling stock or line-side 
equipment, vandalism and graffiti (Havarneanu, 2017; Savage, 2007; Ryan, 2012).  
Cable theft as a motive for trespassing 
It is estimated that metal theft costs South Africa billions of Rands per annum 
(Yorke-Smith, 2010; Georgiannis, 2017). Metal theft is not only a local phenomenon 
but is a problem world-wide, with copper being the most sought-after metal 
(Arendse, 2010). Rising copper prices have had a direct influence in the increase in 
copper theft since 2003 (Arendse, 2010; Sidebottom et al., 2011; Sidebottom et al., 
2014) and especially the desirability of “live” copper cable. See Figure 6: Copper 
price 2004-2017. 
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 Figure 6: Copper price 2004-2017 
 Source: (InfoMine, 2019) 
 
Copper prices, combined with a largely unguarded metal supply in the railway 
environment together with a low risk of being caught and prosecuted, have seen a 
marked increase in metal theft in the railways (UIC, 2013).  
The primary targets are signalling cables, telecommunication cables, electric 
substations, overhead power lines, signalling boxes (known as live equipment) and 
metal non-live equipment such as metal fences to sell for scrap (Network Rail, 2019; 
UIC, 2013). (See Figure 7: Rail networks metal theft triangle.) 
It is believed that cable theft is carried out by small-time opportunistic thieves 
as well organised crime syndicates (GRR, 2018; UIC, 2013).  
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Figure 7: Rail networks metal theft triangle 
Source: (UIC, 2013) 
 
Since the link between the theft of metal and its market value has been 
confirmed, the role of the scrap metal industry is, therefore, significant. Ashby and 
Bowers (2015) have shown that metal theft from railway lines was significantly more 
common in areas within close proximity to one or more scrap-metal dealers, areas 
easily accessed by the existing road network and in densely populated areas.  
In South Africa, the scrap-metal industry is legislated by the Second-Hand 
Goods Act 6 of 2009 (Second Hand Goods Act, 2009). The Criminal Matters 
Amendment Act of 2015 determines bail and imposes minimum offences for 
essential infrastructure-related offences. This Act recommends a minimum sentence 
of three years for first-time offenders, whilst for career criminals caught instigating 
or causing damage to rail infrastructure, the maximum sentence is 30 years (Criminal 
Matters Amendment Act, 2015). Convictions are, however, scarce and still more 
needs to be done to educate the judiciary on the significant consequences of the 
actual crime committed (Arendse, 2010).  
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Suicides 
While crime related to theft and vandalism of railway infrastructure constitute 
the majority of trespass incidents, they are the minority of those killed as a victim of 
a pedestrian-rail incident (Savage, 2007). Most railway trespassers and those killed 
as a result of a pedestrian-rail collision, do not intend to put themselves in harm’s 
way. 
Railway suicides are, then, instances where persons trespass onto railway 
property with the deliberate intent to be struck by a train (Silla, 2012; Radbo et al., 
2012). Mishara and Bardon (2015) include other means of railway suicide than by 
train, such as being electrocuted by intentionally making contact with high-voltage 
traction feeds. 
Railway suicides are more prominent in Europe, with up to 3000 incidents annually 
representing 72% of all railway fatalities (Ryan et al., 2018). Suicide victims choose 
rail as a means of suicide because of the predictability that running on a timetable 
presents (Mishara & Bardon, 2015) and because it is believed to be a fast, easy and 
foolproof method (Botha et al., 2014). In Canada, a survey amongst people with 
suicide intentions showed that more than half of those surveyed thought that the 
metro was an effective way to kill themselves, and a significant portion chose rail 
because other suicide methods had failed them in the past (Mishara & Bardon, 2016). 
2.3.5 Trespass behaviour and attitudes 
Interviews with trespassers in Finland revealed that most thought trespassing to 
be fairly or completely safe as long as they were careful, and many believed 
trespassing to be legal (Silla & Luoma, 2008). In later work by Silla and Luoma 
(2011) on seeking the opinion of those living close to railways, 40.2% believed 
trespassing to be only slightly dangerous and 18.2% believed that crossing the tracks 
at informal locations was legal. Similarly, Skládaná et al. (2016), found that half of 
trespassers regarded trespassing as safe, but most considered it to be illegal. 
A number of studies point to the role of alcohol in pedestrian-rail casualties. 
Savage (2007) found that two-thirds of trespasser casualties were adult males under 
the influence of alcohol. Pelletier (1997) found that 78% of trespassers were killed 
while intoxicated, and Silla (2012) found that 48.1% were under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or medication, with males more likely to be intoxicated than females. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 37 
In Cape Town, the blood alcohol level of victims of railway injury were all above the 
legal limit for drunk driving in all categories of railway injury including pedestrian-
rail incidents (39%) and suicides (27%) (Lerer & Matzopoulos, 1996). 
Accidental deaths are more likely to involve alcohol and drugs and suicide 
victims are more likely to have histories of mental health problems (Mishara & 
Bardon, 2016; Silla, 2012).  
Pre-crash behaviour 
The literature presents a number of pre-crash behaviours associated with 
unintentional and intentional railway casualties. 
In the United States, the most prominent pre-crash behaviours are walking and 
running (29.8%) and lying down or sleeping (22.9%) (Savage, 2007).  A separate 
study in the United States researching trespassing injury severity between highway-
rail grade crossings and non-crossings, found the most prominent pre-crash 
behaviour to be running or walking (44%) at non-crossings with lying or sleeping 
second at 29% for non-crossing sites (Zhang et al., 2018). Wang et al. (2016) report 
that accidents are more likely when trespassers are lying or sleeping on the tracks, 
accounting for 23.4% of crashes. Besides walking, running, sitting and lying, there 
are isolated cases of trespassers driving and riding on the tracks (Wang et al., 2016). 
Similarly, in Canada, trespassers were lying, sitting or walking on the tracks 
(Safe_Kids_Canada, 2004).  
In Finland, walking across or along the tracks (34.4%) and lying or sitting on 
the tracks (28.1%) were the most common pre-crash behaviours (Silla, 2012). Lobb 
(2006), similarly, found that pedestrian-rail fatalities involved people walking across 
or along the tracks or sitting and lying on the tracks. 
Suicides follow a similar behaviour pattern, with only a few jumping right in 
front of an oncoming train. Varying figures of 75% (Radbo et al., 2005) and 60% 
(Silla & Luoma, 2012) of suicide victims were seen loitering close to or on the 
tracks, waiting for a train. Underground railway suicides are slightly different in that 
victims are more likely to jump on the rails (66%) or jump in the path of an 
oncoming train (18%). Potential suicides are also likely to seek out station staff to 
speak about their distress and could display agitated, erratic behaviour and could also 
be crying (Mishara & Bardon, 2016). 
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Silla and Luoma (2008) found that trespassers seldom do so in large groups, 
with 69% being alone and 23% in pairs. A third of trespassers were carrying bicycles 
and over half were not carrying anything at all (Silla & Luoma, 2008). 
2.3.6 Quantifying trespass numbers 
Not much is written about actual numbers of trespassers. In Finland, during 
19 days of measurement at three locations, a total of 1954 trespasses were counted, 
amounting to approximately 40 trespassers per day (Silla & Luoma, 2008).  
In stark contrast, at a location at Nomzamo in Cape Town, 3000 trespassers 
were counted during a morning peak period (Venter et al., 2014) and at the same 
location 4578 trespassers in a peak hour (Moosa, 2014). Pedestrian counts carried out 
at three locations along the Nomzamo section of rail track during a morning peak 
period resulted in 3879 pedestrians and 310 cyclists (Kok, 2016).  
Venter et al. (2014), in a study of pedestrian movements along and across 
railway lines in Cape Town, identified 16 hot-spot locations where pedestrian 
volume counts were carried out. The results of the pedestrian counts found that the 
highest peak hour volume across the railway was 1858 persons; the highest peak 
hour volume along the railway was 2312 persons (Venter et al., 2014).   
In a feasibility study for the location of a pedestrian bridge near Nyanga, in 
Cape Town, total two-way flows at three locations in close proximity of each other 
measured 834 persons in a three-hour morning peak period and 733 persons in a 
three-hour afternoon peak period (HHO, 2016). 
In another feasibility study looking into remedial measures for trespassing hot-
spot locations in Cape Town, both manual counts were completed to record 
pedestrian volumes as well as drone footage. The same sites were visited as in the 
2014 study by Venter et al. and the pedestrian numbers at all locations differed 
significantly. The highest peak period volume across the railway was 875; the 
highest peak period volume along the railway was 921, and both were at different 
locations to the 2014 study. Counts were also carried out at illegal station platform 
accesses, with a high of 2545 pedestrians during a three-hour morning peak period, 
counted at Brackenfell Station (Mvinjelwa et al., 2019). 
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2.4 TRESPASS COUNTERMEASURES 
As illustrated thus far in the literature available, the motives, behaviour and 
various characteristics relating to railway trespassing is varied. In a similar fashion, 
the measures available to prevent trespassing and trespassing incidents cover a broad 
range of approaches. The following section will report on current literature available 
on trespass countermeasures.  
2.4.1 Theoretical approaches 
In most cases, the main driver of trespassing behaviour is to get from ‘point A 
to point B’, without any criminal intent. However, the type of trespassing behaviour 
which has a significant impact of rail operations include those with the intent of theft 
and vandalism of railway infrastructure, as well as those trespassing, resulting in 
intentional and unintentional deaths.  
Havârneanu (2017) proposes that trespassing and vandalism be treated 
concurrently as part of a “comprehensive protection” approach. Combining different 
countermeasures and developing collaborative partnerships with various stakeholders 
seeks synergies to address railway issues in one approach, thereby saving on limited 
resources available to railway operators and enforcement agencies (Havarneanu, 
2017). In the same research, looking at countermeasures against trespassing and 
graffiti vandalism, Havârneanu (2017) also distinguishes between anti-social 
(enforcement, dissuasion, surveillance, detection and prosecution) and pro-social 
(mural projects, free walls, open galleries and arts-led regeneration activities) 
measures (Havarneanu, 2017).  
In developing measures to limit trespassing via platform ends at stations, the 
RSSB (2018) links measures to the five crime reduction strategies, that is, Enabling, 
Education, Engineering, Enforcement and Evaluation. Havârneanu et al. (2015) 
suggests a simpler model of engineering measures and behavioural measures or 
“hard” and “soft” measures. Engineering measures include physical means to prevent 
trespassing and behavioural measures seek to influence the persons knowledge and 
attitude. Bosher et al. (2017) similarly refer to infrastructure or non-infrastructure 
treatments. Rabdo et al. (2012) use the categories technical and non-technical 
measures. 
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Although not specifically directed at railway trespassing, in a study looking at 
assessing the risk at railway level crossings in New Zealand, a risk hierarchy of 
controls is considered as an approach (Bosher et al., 2017). If one control is not 
achievable, then the sequential control in the hierarchy is chosen. See Table 5: Risk 
hierarchy of control.  
Table 5: Risk hierarchy of control 





Elimination: remove the hazard completely (e.g. grade separation) 
Substitution: replace a hazard with a less dangerous alternative 
Isolation: separate users from the hazard (e.g. fence) 
Engineering Controls: making changes to infrastructure or physical 
environment that reduces the likelihood and severity of the hazard 
Administration: putting policies, rules, signage or training in place 
to inform users of the hazard 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Protective clothing and 
equipment (e.g. gloves, hats) 
Source: Adapted from (Bosher, et al., 2017) 
With regards to suicides and trespassing, there are two divergent approaches. 
Radbo et al. (2005) determined that intentional and accidental train-pedestrian 
collisions were similar enough in character to not warrant separate strategies for 
suicides and trespassing (Radbo, et al., 2005).   Mishara and Bardo (2016) suggest 
that the analysis of accidental and intentional deaths be separated to allow for 
targeted preventative measures depending on the motive of the trespasser. 
Sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 will discuss the literature on countermeasures 
under three broad categories of educational, organisational and engineering 
measures. 
2.4.2 Educational measures 
Educational measures include awareness campaigns, media campaigns, posters, 
signs, education drives in and out of schools and training. Educational measures are 
based primarily on two theories; the first, to highlight the dangers of walking along 
and across the railway tracks and to encourage use of designated crossing points, and 
secondly, to emphasise the illegality of crossing the tracks. 
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Educational campaigns 
Plaza et al., (2014), emphasise the key role schools can play at communicating 
railway safety messages. A railway safety education programme aimed at primary 
school children and teachers across Spain proved useful in improving knowledge, 
safe attitudes towards railway crossings and an improvement in the awareness of 
dangers of crossing the railway at informal locations. The study results indicate that 
schools located close to railway lines would especially benefit from such educational 
campaigns, as risky behaviour may be normalised due to the perception that crossing 
the railway tracks is “normal” behaviour. 
Silla and Kallberg (2015) found that educational campaigns at schools may 
reduce railway trespassing but their effects are limited and therefore not the most 
effective and cost-efficient measure. Overall, education campaigns are supported, if 
they are well designed, and combined with combinations of other measures (Edquist 
et al., 2011; Silla & Kallberg, 2015; Silla & Luoma, 2011; Lobb et al., 2003). It is 
further necessary to adjust the content of the educational material to suit local 
characteristics, cultural differences, language, age etc. (Plaza, et al., 2014).  
Lobb et al. (2001) evaluated a programme of educational and access prevention 
measures at a rail station in Auckland and found that when used in conjunction with 
other hard measures, educational campaigns are successful at encouraging the use of 
formal rail crossing points. The education campaign was successful in creating 
awareness about the illegality of crossing the railway but did little to influence the 
pedestrian’s perception of risk, i.e. most still believed it to be safe to cross the 
railway. 
A study on a programme of interventions at a rail station close to a boys’ 
school, incorporating a communication programme, an education programme, 
“continuous punishment and intermittent reinforcement” and “intermittent 
punishment and intermittent reinforcement” was carried out by Lobb et al. (2003). 
The findings from this study were that the communications programme had little 
effect on unsafe crossings and that a targeted education programme may achieve 
better results in reducing the practice of unsafe crossings. Punishment, and 
specifically intermittent punishment, was deemed to be most effective at reducing 
and sustaining safe crossing practices and more practical to implement. 
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Communication campaigns 
The ‘You Vs Train’ initiative, championed by Network Rail and the British 
Transport Police in the United Kingdom, is a targeted campaign to reduce the 
number of train incidents involving young people under 18 years of age 
(You_vs_Train, 2019). The campaign includes safety videos based on the 
experiences of trespassing incident survivors based on real-life story events. Social 
media, influencer outreach messaging, local media engagement, and working with 
schools and local businesses, are some of the strategies used by the campaign, with 
information and support available on-line and free for anyone to use. ‘You vs Train’ 
launched in July 2018 and managed over 2.4million views, 360 media articles and 
reached an estimated 174million in its first four months. The RSSB claim that 
independent research results showed that 92% of children and 95% of adults are now 
more rail safety conscious and would, therefore, display safer behaviour. Trespass 
incidents involving young people reduced by 6% and youth fatalities reduced from 
six in 2017/18 to one fatality in 2018/19 (Mills, 2019).  
Savage (2007) suggests that the behaviour of trespassers are uncommon or 
unusual to normal society and, therefore, mainstream communication campaigns 
would be ineffective as a medium to communicate the dangers of crossing the rail 
tracks. Targeted interventions at community forums, homeless shelters, soup 
kitchens and pubs that are located close to the railway may be more effective 
(Savage, 2007). 
Signage 
An evaluation of warning signs seeking to reduce trespassing on railway 
property in Valladolid, Spain, showed that the implementation of warning signage as 
well as signage indicating the possibility of being fined, reduced trespassing numbers 
from 128 to 77 (Plaza et al., 2014). The number of people using broken-fence areas 
to access the tracks also reduced from 26 to four persons. This study would suggest 
that signage may be effective in reducing trespassing and unsafe behaviours and 
could be effective elsewhere if the content and information on the signs are relevant, 
are adapted to suit the context and country, avoiding overuse of signage and ensuring 
that signage is refreshed on a regular basis.  
An alternate view is that many pedestrians would ignore or refuse to comply 
with warning signals or signs (Edquist et al., 2011). Due to the openness of railway 
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networks, the ability of signs to influence behaviour and covering all entry points to 
the rail network is not practical. Signage should therefore be placed at strategic 
locations such as platform ends and at known trespassing hot-spots, with clear and 
relevant messaging which would ideally include a graphic image or pictogram 
(Woods, 2006). Signage is appropriate where other measures are not practical and is 
a low-cost measure, both to install and maintain its effectiveness (Silla & Luoma, 
2011).  
In the United Kingdom, Wilson (2007) suggests that the wording "Keep out - 
private property. You are trespassing." is more appropriate to use than signs that read 
"Trespassers will be prosecuted". Wilson further cautions that property owners have 
a duty of care to trespassers to ensure they do not come to any harm, by putting up 
fencing and warning of possible danger. However, children may not yet be able to 
read and understand warning notices (Wilson, 2007). 
2.4.3 Organisational measures 
Organisational measures include collaboration between organisations, risk 
assessments, patrols and enforcement, risk assessments, police cooperation and 
judiciary assistance. 
Cross-organisation collaboration 
RESTRAIL:  REduction of suicides and trespasses on RAILway 
The RESTRAIL project was a three-year project coordinated by the 
International Union of Railways (UIC) with the aim of reducing the occurrences of 
suicides and trespassing on railway property. The project involves a consortium of 17 
partners from 12 countries. The project collected and analysed data on 
countermeasure strategies and the assessment of countermeasures which resulted in a 
list of 25 recommended countermeasures (Havârneanu et al., 2016). (See Table 6: 
RESTRAIL family of countermeasures). A total of 11 pilot tests were also carried 
out to evaluate innovative new measures.  
44 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Table 6: RESTRAIL family of countermeasures 
Source: (Havârneanu, et al., 2016) 




1 Risk assessments 
2 Learning from best practice 
3 Collaboration between organisations 
4 Societal collaboration to prevent railway suicide 
5 Information sharing at regional level 
6 Patrols and enforcement 




8 Fences at stations 
9 Fences outside stations 
10 Landscaping 
11 Detection and surveillance systems 
12 Lighting devices to influence behaviour 
13 Lighting to increase visibility at hot-spots 
14 Safety and emergency devices at stations 
15 Incident management and information platform 





17 Campaigns to raise awareness 
18 Mass media campaigns 
19 Media guidelines 
20 Posters and warning signs 
21 Prohibitive signs 
22 Education in and outside schools 
23 Training to prevent suicide 
24 Training to prevent trespass 
25 Training and exercises to mitigate the consequences 
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RESTRAIL additionally provides a toolbox that provides a practical problem-
solving tool and a structured research framework to guide users on best practice 
implementation of various countermeasures. Each countermeasure is described under 
the following headings: description, recommendations, warning points, observations, 
study results, and is accompanied by a number of photographic examples. 
Havârneanu et al. (2016) describes the benefits of the RESTRAIL project as 
having achieved the following:  
• Improving safety by reducing fatalities and injuries,
• Improved train availability and return-to-service time after a pedestrian-
train incident, and
• Reduced rail industry direct and indirect costs arising from pedestrian-
rail incidents.
RSSB Trespass Improvement Programme 
The Trespass Improvement Programme was launched in January 2018 and is a 
cross-industry initiative including the RSSB, British Transport Police, Office of the 
Rail Regulator, Department for Transport, and Train and Freight Operating 
Companies (Mills, 2019). The programme provides guidance on frameworks and 
best practice to encourage safe public behaviour in the rail environment. The 
programme is based on four streams i) innovation and technology, ii) co-ordination 
within and externally to rail organisations, iii) documents and data and 
iv) behavioural change. See Figure 8: RSSB Traspass Improvement Programme.
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Figure 8: RSSB Trespass Improvement Programme 
Source: (Mills, 2019)  
Legal and non-legal sanctions 
Freeman and Rakotonirainy (2017), investigated deterrence-based approaches 
to reducing railway trespassing. Deterrence theory centres around three elements: the 
perceived certainty of being caught, the severity of the penalties and the swiftness 
with which the penalties are imposed. From a survey, including 636 respondents, it 
was found that 48% were not aware that trespassing was a fineable offence. In order 
to maximise the effectiveness of a deterrence-based approach, pedestrians need to be 
aware and warned of possible monetary penalties. Regarding non-legal sanctions, the 
study confirmed that trespassing behaviour can be influenced by informal sanctions 
such as fear of injury and peer stigma. An increase in police visibility was deemed to 
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be most effective at preventing trespassing violations. In a study of pedestrian non-
compliance at railway level crossing gates, Edquist et al., (2011) supports this 
finding, stating increased visibility of police, coupled with an increase in the 
certainty of receiving a warning or fine for non-compliant crossing have been shown 
to reduce incidents of trespassing. 
Police interventions 
The Rapid Rail Police Unit is briefly described in Section 1.1.2, The South 
African Police Service and its Rapid Rail Police Unit (RRPU).  The function of the 
RRPU essentially is to prevent crime in the railway environment.  
Research by January and Mofokeng (2017) into the operational aspects of the 
RRPU in the Western Cape, found that the RRPU did not properly apply crime 
prevention operations; the RRPU does not implement any structured, known, crime 
prevention theories; the RRPU does not cooperate with the PRASA Protection 
Services, the public or communities through a community-oriented approach and due 
to the high levels of railway crime, they are failing at the most basic duties (January 
& Mofokeng, 2017). This puts the onus of protecting the railway environment 
heavily on the shoulders of the railway operators’ own in-house security. 
2.4.4 Engineering measures 
Engineering measures include fencing, landscaping, lighting, CCTV, drones, 
audio announcements, under and over-passes and other physical measures. 
Physical barriers 
Simply put, for a pedestrian-train collision to occur, two elements are required, 
a pedestrian and a train. It is no surprise then that a common countermeasure to 
prevent trespassing-related fatalities and suicides is fencing or a physical barrier to 
prevent pedestrian access to the rail reserve (Havârneanu et al., 2015); (Silla & 
Luoma, 2011); (RSSB, 2018). Train drivers also support appropriate fencing that is 
high, strong and long when used as part of a combination of measures (Silla & 
Luoma, 2008).  
Despite its popularity as a recommended countermeasure, there are very few 
studies providing specifics about its effectiveness and recommended details for 
implementation (Havârneanu et al., 2015).  A design guide for pedestrian rail 
crossings suggests secure fencing is an important barrier to keeping people out of the 
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rail reserve and encourage the use of formal crossing points. In New Zealand, a 1.2-
1.8m high mesh fence is specified as a barrier between any pedestrian pathway and 
the rail reserve. More secure palisade fencing is recommended where trespassing or 
vandalism is more common (Koorey et al., 2017). 
In Auckland, a safety programme included fencing repairs, where people had 
cut holes in the fence and the installation of new high-security fencing. The new 
fencing was almost immediately vandalised and new access holes cut. The new holes 
were immediately smeared with heavy grease that would make it impossible to climb 
through without heavily soiling ones’s clothes and then had the desired effect of 
deterring would-be trespassers. Trespassing behaviour at this specific location 
reduced from 59% to 36% (Lobb et al., 2001). 
In Finland, 1.0m-high fencing was installed on both sides of the track and 
restricted access for approximately 100m on both sides of a formal crossing point. 
This measure saw trespassing reduce by 94.6%. In the same study, at a different 
location, physical barriers in the form of landscaping were trialled, involving 
steepening the shoulders of the railway reserve and creating a natural barrier using 
vegetation interspersed with large stones. The landscaping was roughly 1.5m in 
height and 200m long, and reduced trespassing by 91.3% (Silla & Luoma, 2011). 
Landscaping measures such as planting trees and bushes may also provide 
refuge to those wishing to hide from public view in order to commit suicide or 
participate in criminal activities and should not be used as a barrier on its own 
(Koorey et al., 2017). Savage (2007) supports this view and suggests that vegetation 
be trimmed to aid visibility. 
Mid-platform fencing is also recommended for island platforms to discourage 
suicide by jumping in front of trains, but these have limited use (Plaza et al., 2014). 
In another location in Cape Town, fencing at selected stations had a limited 
effect on reducing pedestrian-rail injury rates and the fencing was commonly 
vandalised and the material used to build informal dwellings (Lerer & Matzopoulos, 
1996). Nomzamo, Cape Town, is another example of where fencing and dedicated 
pedestrian routes have failed to limit trespassing (Venter et al., 2014). 
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CCTV and video surveillance systems 
CCTV surveillance is one of the most practical and widely used trespass 
detection systems. Many rail networks already extensively covered by CCTV, are 
adapting existing CCTV capability to automatically detect trespassing (RSSB, 2018). 
Integrating image analysis capability of existing systems as well as extending the 
coverage of existing systems and improving the image quality is a cost-effective way 
to improve the efficiency of current CCTV systems (RSSB, 2018). 
A three-year pilot of a video-based trespass monitoring and deterrent system 
consisting of video cameras, motion detectors, infrared illuminators, speakers, and 
central processing units was trialled on a railway bridge in New York in 2001 
(daSilva et al., 2012).  The system provided real-time surveillance of the bridge and a 
control room attendant would warn trespassers of oncoming trains, saving at least 
five lives during its period of operation. The system provided real-time video 
surveillance of the bridge and a control room attendant would respond by sounding 
out warnings via pole-mounted speakers near the bridge and would call law 
enforcement if required. Considering that the trial ended in 2004, considerable 
advances have been made since in detection technology. Key learning points from 
this pilot were that the assets were installed off railway property and therefore not 
reliant only on railway operators to install. The system also showed potential benefits 
for railway asset monitoring (daSilva et al., 2012). 
Drones 
Drones provide mobile, aerial CCTV capability and their use in the rail 
environment is still in development. Drones have been used to carry out surveys at 
trespassing hot-spot sites, providing video footage of pedestrian desire lines where 
the number of pedestrians and their movements were too complex to count manually 
(Mvinjelwa et al., 2019). 
Drones are also being used as part of a combination of measures to combat 
theft from freight trains in Poland. In six months, the number of incidents of theft 
declined by 44% and the total value of stolen goods declined by almost 60% 
(PKP_Cargo, 2019). 
In Germany, on the Deutsche Bahn (DB), 14 000 graffiti incidents were 
recorded in a single year, costing the rail company €7m to remove.  DB tested the 
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use of mini-drone’s which were equipped with a high-resolution infrared camera able 
to spot trespassers at train depots and maintenance yards. Strict privacy laws in 
Germany limited the drone surveillance to daylight hours only, severely curtailing 
the effectiveness of the countermeasure (Lo, 2013). 
The RSSB report, Drones and the railways, (2016), cautions that “hobby” 
drone operators would enter the rail reserve to retrieve grounded machines and this 
therefore, would inadvertently be a motive for trespassing. 
Lighting 
Lighting and improved lighting, either on its own or as part of a combination of 
measures, is recommended by the literature (Savage, 2007); (Havârneanu et al., 
2015), to increase visibility at railway crossings, tunnels and trespassing hot-spots 
(Ryan & Kallberg, 2013). 
Poor lighting of pedestrian rail subways and over-bridges could influence a 
pedestrian’s decision on whether to use the facility or choose a “safer” option by 
crossing the tracks. The user’s perception of safety and comfort is influenced by 
good lighting quality and is an important element of subway design (Burnett & Pang, 
2004) 
Addressing pedestrian treatments across railway tracks 
This group of measures include the most expensive to implement and involves 
the construction of pedestrian grade-separated rail crossings, also known as 
pedestrian underpasses/subways and pedestrian over-bridges. It also includes 
treatments at informal at-grade pedestrian rail crossings. 
  As a train has full right-of-way in the railway environment, pedestrians are 
obliged to use formal railway crossing points where they have been provided. In 
theory then, the implementation of a means to isolate pedestrians from moving trains 
by using grade separated crossing points is very effective; should pedestrians decide 
to use them. The best countermeasure would be good planning for non-motorised 
transport (Koorey et al., 2017) and eliminating the need to cross railway lines in the 
first place. However, pedestrians frequently need to cross railway lines and should be 
provided with safe means to do so (Fitzpatrick et al., 2015). 
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In Cape Town, in a study addressing non-motorised transport movements along 
and across railway lines, pedestrian bridges and subways are proposed as part of 
combinations of interventions at a number of hot-spot locations (Venter & Shirley, 
2014). Pedestrians will use the shortest most direct route to reach their destination, 
irrespective of formal pathways or crossing points and the siting of pedestrian 
bridges should have minimum deviation as is practical from a direct pathway 
(Boucher et al., 2008). Issues of personal safety are the greatest deterrent for 
pedestrians using pedestrian overbridges and subways, particularly at night, and 
should be a key factor in the design thereof (Burnett & Pang, 2004). 
With regards to replacing an unused grade-separated pedestrian rail crossing 
with an at-grade crossing or formalising an informal at-grade pedestrian rail crossing, 
this is a measure that is strongly discouraged by many. In New Zealand, any new 
crossing must be designed with risks as low as reasonably possible from the outset, 
usually requiring grade separation. At existing crossings, this may also require grade 
separation or result in the closure of the crossing altogether (Koorey, et al., 2017). In 
South Africa, PRASA, the state-owned entity responsible for commuter rail 
operations, has a policy that no new level crossings, including pedestrian level 
crossings, be implemented (Venter et al., 2014). 
The reluctance by rail companies and operators to view formalising informal 
at-grade crossings as a viable measure is not clearly defined in the literature 
available. There are a number of guidelines and documentation available dealing 
with pedestrian grade crossings, all providing best practice and procedures to ensure 
pedestrian safety, such as the Guidebook on Pedestrian Crossings of Public Transit 
Rail Services (Fitzpatrick et al., 2015), the UDOT Pedestrian Grade Crossing Manual 
(UDOT, 2013) and the Kiwi Rail Design Guidance for Pedestrian and Cycle Rail 
Crossings (Koorey et al., 2017). 
In Nomzamo, Cape Town, one of the proposed measures to limit trespassing 
includes formalising the existing informal crossing. Venter et al. (2014) believe the 
at-grade crossing is warranted because there is only a single rail line at this location 
with low train frequencies and an exceptionally high number of pedestrians, as 
discussed earlier in this paper (Venter et al., 2014). It is, however doubtful, that this 
option would be considered by the rail operator. 
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2.4.5 Countermeasure effectiveness 
Thus far, a number of countermeasures have been presented with evidence 
from literature on suggestions for their use and effectiveness.  Numerous other 
potential countermeasures are suggested in the literature with no definitive measure 
of their effectiveness.  
 Many studies argue that trespassing characteristics are unique to specific 
locations (e.g. Law, 2004; Rail Safety and Standards Board, 2007; Savage, 2007). 
Therefore, countermeasures should be developed according to each location’s 
specific characteristics, with a thorough understanding of the type and motives for 
trespassing (Silla & Luoma, 2011), understanding that the relationships between 
various variables will differ between locations (Wang et al., 2016). Havârneanu et al. 
(2015) supports this by advocating that measures be adopted to the problem and 
characteristics of the problem site and the intended and unintended consequences be 
thoroughly understood of the selected measures.  
Researchers agree that combinations of measures are required (RSSB, 2018), 
using a systems approach (Silla & Luoma, 2012), to ensure the desired outcomes are 
achieved; emphasis should be placed on the monitoring and evaluation of measures 
to understand how they interact, singly and in combination (Ryan et al., 2018). 
Havârneanu et al. (2015) found empirical support for the effectiveness of measures in 
only 22 studies, with the evaluations of combinations of measures even more rare. 
Whilst better evaluation of measures requires adequate recorded examples over a 
long period, in the interim the experience of experts could be used to fill gaps in the 
current knowledge, as done by Ryan et al. (2018). 
Importantly, irrespective of the countermeasure installed, an asset management 
programme ensuring a preventative and corrective maintenance regime is essential to 
retain the effectiveness (Silla & Luoma, 2011) of the measure over its whole life.     
2.4.6 Lessons from crime science 
Hot-spot policing 
The literature commonly refer to trespassing and suicide “hot-spot’s” 
(Havârneanu et al., 2015; Freeman & Rakotonirainy, 2017; Silla & Luoma, 2011; 
Ryan & Kallberg, 2013; Ryan, 2012; RSSB, 2018; Havarneanu, 2017; Venter et al., 
2014). Hot-spots are typically locations with high trespassing accident rates, high 
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trespassing rates or locations with high rates of railway crime. Rail operators usually 
focus their attention on hot-spots, which is the most natural and cost-effective 
strategy; however, it may not be the ideal strategy when there are large numbers of 
incidents spread across a broad network (Havârneanu et al., 2016).  
With reference then to crime analysis literature, hot-spots are commonly those 
areas with the highest concentrations of crime in general or clusters of specific crime 
types (Braga et al., 2012). Hot-spot policing is thus a strategy that allows targeted 
police interventions to deal with majority of the crime efficiently at the most 
worrisome locations (Telep & Weisburd, 2012). 
The effectiveness of hot-spot policing is widely evidenced. Braga et al. (2012) 
provides evidence of the effectiveness of the approach in a review of 19 studies 
investigating 25 hot-spot locations and the effect of police action on crime. A total of 
80% of the sites showed significant crime control benefits directly attributed to hot-
spot policing programmes. The typical crimes at the various sites varied greatly, 
from violent crime to property crime, drug offences, and disorder offences, showing 
the great versatility in the approach. One shortfall of the research carried out is the 
lack of a financial or cost assessment with which to assess the cost-benefit analysis 
of the hot-spot policing method versus conventional policing (Braga et al., 2012). 
Clarke and Eck (2005), explain hot-spot areas as follows: i) Crime generators; 
places which attract large numbers of people for non-crime related reasons, such as 
rail stations; ii) Crime attractors are places known to criminals with many 
opportunities for crime, rail depots and yards, rail trackside assets and rolling stock 
would fall in this category and iii) Crime enablers are places where barriers have 
failed and order is lost, for example vandalised or no fencing allowing unrestricted 
access to the rail reserve, and stations void of staff (Clarke & Eck, 2005). 
Once hot-spots have been identified, there are a number of interventions and 
measures, which can then be targeted at the problem. The most deployed tactic is to 
increase patrol time in the targeted hot-spot locations by carrying out random, 
intermittent stops and not spending more than 15 minutes in one location (Telep & 
Weisburd, 2012) before moving to the next location in a completely haphazard 
manner. Another measure is reducing the attractiveness of potential targets called 
“situational strategies”, by making it more difficult for potential criminals or 
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increasing the risk of being apprehended (Telep & Weisburd, 2012). Limiting access 
and target hardening are examples of such measures. 
Care should be taken to conduct a detailed situational analysis after the 
discovery of a hot-spot to understand what environmental and social factors are 
contributing to the hot-spot and why other areas are free of crime (Clarke & Eck, 
2005). The discovery alone of a hot-spot is not enough on which to base an effective 
countermeasure response. Additionally, it is essential that a hot-spot analysis include 
a detailed spatial analysis (Clarke & Eck, 2005). 
Problem-oriented policing 
Problem-oriented policing (POP) combines diverse approaches to solving 
crime with a focused action, usually in conjunction with other affected stakeholders 
(Clarke & Eck, 2005) in order to address the root causes responsible for generating 
recurring crime problems at hot-spots (Braga et al., 2012). Through this approach, 
the SARA model for problem solving was developed: i) Scanning: identifying and 
prioritising potential problems; ii) Analysis: developing an appropriate response to 
the problem with detailed analysis; iii) Response: is the measured response rightly 
guided to solve the problem? and iv) Assessment: assessing the impact of the 
response (Clarke & Eck, 2005). 
The literature confirms that it is critical to fully analyse a larger problem of 
crime into more manageable categories in order to design tailor-made responses 
(Clarke & Eck, 2005; Telep & Weisburd, 2012). 
2.4.7 Unlawful occupation 
Trespassing, irrespective of the intent of the trespasser, is usually a temporary 
occurrence, i.e. the trespasser will be in the rail reserve for a short period of time till 
their desired objective is achieved, before they would then leave the area. The time 
spent in the rail reserve could range from a few seconds, to take a short-cut to a few 
hours to steal a length of buried cable. An extension of trespassing is the occurrence 
of encroachment or unlawful occupation for the purpose of setting up an informal 
shelter or dwelling in the rail reserve.  The definition of encroachment could also be 
used to include those dumping waste, defecating (Srivastava, 2015) or running 
services (such as illegal electrical connections and water pipes) through, in and 
across the railway reserve. 
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The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 
1998 (PAIE Act) defines an unlawful occupier as: “a person who occupies land 
without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in charge, or without any 
other right in law to occupy such land, ...” (PAIE, 1998)  
In research carried out by Poya and Mathebula (2013), a survey was carried out 
in communities in informal settlements at locations of unlawful settlement hot-spots 
within the rail reserve. The survey found that the community was unwilling to 
relocate away from the railway line with the hope that they would be provided with a 
government-funded house free of charge. Some lived close to the railway because it 
made access to the rail public transport system easier for them. The areas were 
characterised by pollution and sewage, illegal electrical connections affecting the rail 
signalling system, fencing vandalised and removed, animals roaming on the tracks, 
children playing on the tracks and numerous pedestrian pathways crossing the tracks 
(Poya & Mathebula, 2013). 
Controlling unlawful occupations and encroachments are challenging for 
railway organisations and governments. Influencing factors such as rapid 
urbanisation, weak urban governance, housing shortages, lack of political will, poor 
laws and weak implementation of bye-laws, compensation for affected parties and a 
lack of consequences for transgressors (Srivastava, 2015) are not easily overcome. If 
not managed, the removal of transgressors can often lead to unrest and retaliation 
(Charbonneau, 2016), or re-encroachment (Srivastava, 2015). 
In Delhi, India, the government introduced legislation to try and curb the 
increasing growth of encroachments on all public land. The Bill was widely criticised 
as discriminatory against the poorest and was unable to control the thousands of 
people migrating to cities and occupying land unlawful to them (Ghose, 1984).   In 
Delhi, a massive project is currently underway to fence off critical areas of the 
railway to prevent encroachment. Concrete fences are used to secure the railway 
reserve along a 15m safety zone where 27500 structures were removed. Elsewhere, 
over 43000 structures have been identified in the railway reserve (Gandhiok, 2019). 
A local example of encroachment can be found at the Eyadini informal 
settlement on sections of disused track in Philippi, as reported by Lali (2019).  The 
disused area has been identified as the location for the construction of a new rail 
staging yard and depot, but since it carries no live traffic at present, more than 
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1000 (Lali, 2019) informal dwellings have been erected on the site as recently as 
April 2019. At the time of writing, no long-term solution has been found yet and the 
shacks are now spreading along the railway lines towards Nyanga station. 
Prosecuting trespassers 
In South Africa, trespassing is an offence known as a contravention of Section 
1 of the Trespass Act 6 of 1959. If the person “trespassing” is an occupier, erects a 
structure on the property with the intention to live there, that person will be protected 
by the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 
1998 (PAIE). In this case, the complainant would need to seek legal advice to obtain 
an eviction order in terms of the PAIE legislation. An occupier may only be evicted 
under the authority of an eviction order issued by a competent court (SAPS, 2016). 
According to PAIE, an organ of state, such as a rail company, “may institute 
proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier from land which falls within its 
area of jurisdiction, if it is in the public interest to grant such an order”, in which 
case it would be if rail health and safety is a concern both for the travelling 
passengers and the unlawful occupiers. The law does not allow persons to unlawfully 
occupy property; however, the rail company should act as soon as they become 
aware of any unlawful occupation, i.e. they should act to obtain the necessary 
eviction order within a six-month window (PAIE, 1998). 
Resettlement Action Plans 
Resettlement Action Plans (RAP) have been used to manage large-scale 
relocation projects in Kibera, Kenya (Charbonneau, 2016) and Karachi, Pakistan 
(KUTC, 2015). The main purpose of a RAP is to minimise the negative social 
impacts of relocating already impoverished communities by providing criteria for 
fair compensation for loss of assets and livelihood, as well ensuring basic levels of 
service is maintained at the resettlement site. Critical to the success of these RAP’s 
are community liaison structures, constant awareness campaigns, continuous 
dialogue between community and political stakeholders and critically, strict criteria 
on those who are eligible to be included as an affected person (Charbonneau, 2016). 
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2.5 SECONDARY CONSEQUENCES OF RAILWAY TRESPASSING 
Train drivers are a select group of people, specially trained, and require a high 
degree of concentration and the ability to focus on multiple aspects simultaneously. 
Track incidents, normally occur without warning and the train driver is almost never 
able to avoid an accident, considering that a light rail train can require a distance of 
two soccer fields to come to a complete stop. 
Train driving is a safety critical occupation and drivers are not only faced with 
numerous hazards on the track, but are also faced with a demanding physical 
environment, irregular work hours, sleeplessness, and fatigue. The combination of 
these factors, with the continuous risk of pedestrian-rail incidents, can have a 
deteriorating effect on the well-being of train drivers. 
Various studies have documented the psychological distress caused to train 
drivers (Limosin, et al., 2005). Actual events, as well as near-misses has been shown 
to be equally distressing, and studies suggest a relationship between track incidents 
and long-term somatic and psychological complaints (Vatshelle & Moen, 1997). In a 
study on 76 train drivers on the London Underground, 17% of drivers displayed 
symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and 31% presented with 
neurotic depression, when interviewed one month after the event (Tranah & Farmer, 
1994). Other studies have concluded that most of the psycho-behavioural disorders 
were observed immediately after the event and disappeared within a 12-month period 
(Cothereau, et al., 2004). 
Pedestrian-rail incidents also impacts other railway staff besides train drivers, 
such as clean-up crews, rescue workers and those that witness the event (Silla & 
Luoma, 2011; Mishara & Bardon, 2015). Other impacts include property damage, 
railway infrastructure damage, delays to the rail service, legal costs and insurance 
costs. The societal costs involved with the loss of a human life, medical and burial 
costs, loss of income are also considerable (Havârneanu, et al., 2015). Although 
controversial, there is an increased demand for information on the value society is 
willing to put on a human life. Various methodologies exist to calculate the value of 
a life and the estimated range for a statistical life year is between $7 - $12 million 
(UK, 2016). 
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2.6 LITERATURE REVIEW IMPLICATIONS 
The purpose of the literature review was to provide a comprehensive overview 
of current knowledge on all aspects pertaining to railway trespassing, as well as the 
methods and tools that are in use for the prevention of railway trespassing. 
The literature suggests that railway trespassing behaviour is specific to a 
location and/or area and stresses the importance of investigating the problem from a 
local perspective to develop a better understanding. More research is encouraged due 
to the great variety of trespassing forms and how they can be influenced by 
sociocultural patterns and local conditions. 
The literature review revealed several limitations: 
i. Most of the literature and studies carried out has been in European and
Northern American countries. Very little research has been carried out in developing 
or newly industrialised countries, with only a few studies conducted in South Africa. 
ii. The City of Cape Town Municipality must be commended for the work
carried out recently in trying to better understand pedestrian movements along and 
within the rail reserve. The study is, however, limited to the City of Cape Town, and 
the commuter rail network extends beyond the city’s borders into four neighbouring 
municipalities. The studies were also focused on non-motorised transport movements 
within rail corridors without considering other manifestations of trespassing. 
iii. The motives for trespassing in the literature has a strong emphasis on
suicides, with it representing 72% of railway fatalities in Europe. Other motives for 
trespassing, such as those related to criminal activities, are seldom discussed in 
detail. 
iv. Only a few studies, have studied actual trespass behaviour with several
studies based solely on fatality statistics. As most trespassers do not intend to get 
harmed, the act of trespassing does not always result in an injury or fatality. Fatality 
statistics alone are therefore not adequate to describe trespassing. 
v. The literature is unanimous in agreeing that there is not enough published
research evaluating the efficiency of installed countermeasures to mitigate for 
trespassing-related incidents. 
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The limitations highlight the need to carry out a detailed analysis of trespassing 
and its main effects in a local context in order to develop tailored and effective 
responses. There is also a need for more documented evidence to support the current 
knowledge base around the effectiveness of installed and implemented 
countermeasures. 
………………………………………………………………………. 
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Chapter 3: Railway Safety Regulator State 
of Safety Reports 
This chapter continues the review of available literature and will discuss the 
South African Railway Safety Regulator’s (RSR) annual State of Safety Reports 
from 2008/09 till 2017/18. The aim of this chapter is to show national trends in rail 
safety data and to provide a review of the general safety performance of rail in South 
Africa over the period of 10 years. 
3.1 STATE OF SAFETY REPORTS 
The State of Safety Report is produced in compliance with Section 20 of the 
National Railway Safety Regulator (RSR) Act, 2002 (Act No. 16 of 2002, as 
amended), which mandates “the Regulator to submit to the Minister of Transport, an 
annual report on the safety of workers, the public and the environment associated 
with railway operations” (RSA, 2019). The reports are produced annually to cover a 
“financial” year from April of the previous year till end of March of the current, 
known as the reporting period. 
Occurrence data is submitted to the RSR daily and on a quarterly basis. With 
regards to the security-related data, these are collected independently from those 
collected by the SAPS and its RRPU. The police collect their data from the Case 
Administration System (CAS) while the RSR gathers data directly from railway 
operators (RSR, 2015). It is commonly found that passengers who are victims of 
personal security occurrences will report those to the railway operator’s security 
personnel but not to the police. Similarly, some cases of theft and vandalism are 
generally reported to the RSR but not to the police (RSR, 2012). Data from the RSR 
and SAPS will therefore, always differ, and the SAPS data is seldom in a format that 
is compatible with that required by the RSR to incorporate into the reports. 
Safety reporting before the 2008/09 financial year proved inadequate with 
regards to the detail railway operators were required to provide in order to make 
meaningful analysis. Revisions were subsequently made to SANS 3000-1 (2005), 
with new requirements that called for a more detailed account of occurrence data. 
Railway occurrences have since been captured in 12 categories, lettered A-L and 
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security incidents in nine categories, numbered 1-9 (RSR, 2009). See Table 7: SANS 
Description summaries for Categories A-L and 1-9. The main categories listed below 
are then further broken down into sub-categories. 
Table 7: SANS Description summaries for Categories A-L and 1-9 
Operational Occurrence Categories 
Category Category Description 
Category A Collisions during movement of rolling stock 
Category B Derailments during movement of rolling stock 
Category C Unauthorised movements (rolling stock movements exceeding limit of authority) 
Category D Level crossing occurrences 
Category E People struck by trains during movement of rolling stock 
Category F People-related occurrences: trains outside station platform areas or in section 
Category G Passenger-related occurrences: travelling outside designated area of train 
Category H People related occurrences: platform- train interchange 
Category I People related occurrences: station infrastructure 
Category J Electric shock 
Category K Spillage/leakage, explosion or loss of dangerous goods 
Category L Fires 
Security-Related Incident Categories 
Category 1 Theft of assets (impacting on operational safety) 
Category 2 Malicious damage (vandalism) to property 
Category 3 Threats (to operational safety) 
Category 4 Hijacking of trains 
Category 5 Crowd-related occurrences 
Category 6 Industrial action 
Category 7 Personal safety on trains 
Category 8 Personal safety on stations 
Category 9 Personal safety outside station platform area (including yards, sidings and depots) 
Source: (RSR, 2014) 
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The 2017/18 State of Safety Report is the first to report on harm to persons (the 
public, passengers and rail staff), described by the term, “fatalities and weighted 
injuries” (FWI). The combination of these two variables can be calculated using the 
formula (RSR, 2018): 
FWI = [number of fatalities] + 0.1 x [number of injuries] 
The challenge of theft and vandalism of railway infrastructure (Category 1 and 
Category 2 occurrences), as well as the number of fatalities and injuries to people 
struck by trains (Category E) is a recurring theme throughout the suite of reports to 
date and these will be expanded on next. 
3.2 CATEGORY “E” – PERSONS STRUCK BY ROLLING STOCK 
Occurrences where persons are struck during movement of rolling stock (other 
than at level crossings) are classified in terms of Category E (SANS 3000-1:2009). 
The sub-categories are as follows: 
E-a Occurrence where a member of the public is struck by rolling stock on 
a running line 
E-b Occurrence where an employee is struck by rolling stock on a running 
line 
E-c Occurrence where a contractor or contractor’s employee is struck by 
rolling stock on a running line 
E-d Occurrence where a member of the public struck by rolling stock on a 
line other than a running line 
E-e Occurrence where an employee is struck by rolling stock on a line 
other than a running line 
E-f Occurrence where a contractor or contractor’s employee is struck by 
rolling stock on a line other than a running line 
The number of Category E occurrences or people struck by trains during 
movement of rolling stock other than at a level crossing are provided in Table 8: 
Category E Occurrences, Fatalities and Injuries. The average number of occurrences 
of people struck by trains for the 10-year period is 588.2, i.e. a mean of 
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11.3 occurrences per week.  The highest number of occurrences was recorded in 
2016/17 with 651 events. The highest number of fatalities (414) was recorded in the 
same reporting period. Fatalities make up more than 60% of Category E occurrences 
with a mean of 7.2 deaths per week between 2008 and 2018. 
Table 8: Category E Occurrences, Fatalities and Injuries 
 Year Category E 




other than at a 
level crossing 
Fatalities Injuries FWI 
2008-2009 613 341 230 364 
2009-2010 586 400 202 420.2 
2010-2011 562 364 199 383.9 
2011-2012 534 354 183 372.3 
2012-2013 576 355 231 378.1 
2013-2014 588 394 201 414.1 
2014-2015 643 410 250 435 
2015-2016 541 370 180 388 
2016-2017 651 414 240 438 
2017-2018 588 343 244 367.4 
TOTALS 5882 3745 2160 3961 
Source: (RSR, 2008-2018) 
The sub-category most applicable to trespassing is ‘Category E-a: Occurrence where 
a member of the public is struck by rolling stock on a running line’. 
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Figure 9: Category E Occurrences, Fatalities and Injuries 
 
As can be seen graphically on Figure 9: Category E Occurrences, Fatalities and 
Injuries, the number of incidents remain consistent throughout the 10-year period. 
People struck by trains on running lines contribute the most to the overall number of 
fatalities caused by rail operations (RSR, 2018). The reports consistently repeat the 
same contributing issues year-on-year, including: 
- the growing rate of informal settlements along railway lines 
- the lack of formal crossing points 
- disobedience in using formal crossing points when they are available 
- openness of the railway system and inadequate fencing 
- public ignorance of the risks associated with the rail environment 
- fare evasion 
- entering the station areas via illegal platform accesses 
- lack of cooperation between rail operators, municipalities and 
communities 
- railway security personnel not adequately performing their duties 
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3.2.1 International comparisons 
Using 2016 data, comparing South Africa to the top European Union member 
states for which data was available, for the passenger-kilometres-per-fatality, shows 
South Africa performing poorly in comparison to the other countries. See Table 9: 
International comparison for fatalities caused by persons struck by trains. Statistics 
on other African countries were not found. 
Table 9: International comparison for fatalities caused by persons struck by trains 
  Passenger-kilometers 
(in million) 
Total number of 





Macedonia 83 14  5.92 
Montenegro 84  9  9.32 
Lithuania 280  22  12.71 
South Africa 9,872  *414  23.85 
Romania 4,731  187  25.30 
Bulgaria 1,455  54  26.94 
Turkey 4,325  153  28.27 
Croatia 827  24  34.45 
Hungary 7,626  151  50.50 
Slovakia 3,484  59  59.05 
Slovenia 611  9  67.88 
Poland 18,753  259  72.41 
Greece 1,192  14  85.18 
Czech Republic 8,738  89  98.18 
Portugal 4,266  31  137.62 
Austria 12,021  84  143.11 
Finland 3,868  13  297.52 
Germany 95,465  295  323.61 
Italy 51,132  127  402.62 
Luxembourg 417  1  417.34 
Spain 26,532  50  530.63 
Sweden 12,800  24  533.33 
France 90,324  131  689.49 
Switzerland 19,602  28  700.06 
Netherlands 17,980  19  946.32 
Norway 3,695  3  1231.72 
United Kingdom 68,010  40  1700.25 
Denmark 6,209  2  3104.33 
Source: Adapted from (Eurostat, 2018); (RSR, 2017) 
*Data used from the 2016/17 reporting year for fatalities 
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3.3 CATEGORY 1 OCCURRENCES - THEFT 
Data extracted from the suite of State of Safety Reports for Category 1 
occurrences are presented in Table 10: Category 1 Theft of assets (impacting on 
operational safety). 
Table 10: Category 1 Theft of assets (impacting on operational safety) 





































































































































28 22 75 52 23 4 14 12 9 65 304 
i: ancillary 
equip 
17 9 10 87 88 110 125 112 179 138 875 
TOTALS 2633 3395 3993 3639 2900 3068 4213 3600 4379 4984 36804 
Source: (RSR, 2008-2018) 
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The sub-categories as taken from SANS 3000-1:2009 are as follows:  
1-a  Theft of rolling stock components in section 
1-b  Theft of rolling stock components in yards (staged) 
1-c  Theft of civil infrastructure components in section 
1-d  Theft of civil infrastructure components in yards and sidings 
1-e  Theft of overhead traction equipment in section 
1-f  Theft of overhead traction equipment in yards and sidings 
1-g  Theft of train control equipment (signalling) in section 
1-h  Theft of train control equipment (signalling) in yards and sidings 
1-i  Theft of ancillary equipment including public address systems, 
information boards, CCTV. 
Category 1 occurrences have increased by nearly 90% between 2008 and 2018, 
reaching a high of 4984 events in the 2017/18 reporting period.  
Train signalling equipment (Category 1-g) is the most sought-after commodity 
by thieves and has a direct impact on safe rail operations. Together, cable theft and 
theft of rolling stock infrastructure components have been identified as root causes 
for collisions between rolling stock as well as derailments on running lines (RSR, 
2018). It is also apparent from the data that the assets in section are more at risk than 
those in yards and depots. 
3.4 CATEGORY 2 OCCURRENCES – MALICIOUS DAMAGE 
Data extracted from the suite of State of Safety Reports for Category 2 
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Table 11: Category 2 Malicious damage (vandalism) to property 















































































































160 138 184 194 145 146 131 125 82 148 1453 
d: civil 
infras - yard 













159 238 263 340 289 417 447 384 519 528 3584 
h: train 
control 
equip - yard 
1 7 20 89 8 5 3 1 1 17 152 
i: ancillary 
equip 
10 3 9 8 11 18 24 24 28 35 170 
TOTALS 661 967 1245 1091 789 1019 1094 1158 1162 1717 10903 
Source: (RSR, 2008-2018) 
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The sub-categories as taken from SANS 3000-1:2009 are as follows: 
2-a  Malicious damage (vandalism) of rolling stock components in section 
2-b  Malicious damage (vandalism) of rolling stock components in yards 
and sidings (staged) 
2-c  Malicious damage (vandalism) of civil infrastructure components in 
section 
2-d  Malicious damage (vandalism) of civil infrastructure components in 
yards and sidings 
2-e  Malicious damage (vandalism) of overhead traction equipment in 
section 
2-f  Malicious damage (vandalism) of overhead traction equipment in 
yards and sidings 
2-g  Malicious damage (vandalism) of train control equipment (signalling) 
in section 
2-h  Malicious damage (vandalism) of train control equipment (signalling) 
in yards and sidings 
2-i  Malicious damage (vandalism) of ancillary equipment including 
public address systems, information boards, CCTV. 
 
Category 1 occurrences have increased by nearly 160% between 2008 and 
2018, reaching a high of 1717 events in the 2017/18 reporting period. The most 
affected asset is Category 2-a, vandalism to rolling stock in section with 3635 events 
over the period. Category 1-g, train signalling equipment in section, is the second 
most vandalised asset (3584 events).  
The theft of signalling equipment and the vandalising thereof may be related, 
as thieves may unsuccessfully attempt to steal cable and leave them damaged in the 
process. The 2012/13 report goes as far as suggesting that criminals purposely 
sabotage train signal cables to force trains to a halt, so the trains can be boarded 
between stations and the passengers robbed (RSR, 2013). 
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3.5 COUNTERMEASURES PROPOSED 
Some of the suggested countermeasures in the State of Safety Reports to 
reduce the number of pedestrian fatalities and incidents of crime and theft on the rail 
network are listed below. See Table 12: Suggested countermeasures from the State of 
Safety Reports. 
Table 12: Suggested countermeasures from the State of Safety Reports 
Countermeasure Trespass Crime 
Coordinate with key stakeholders to develop an integrated plan to 
reduce pedestrian fatalities and address the unique challenges 
faced by the rail operators 
✓ ✓ 
All key stakeholders to be consulted and approve any new rail 
side developments or settlements 
✓  
TFR and PRASA to close the system (fencing)  ✓ ✓ 
TFR and PRASA to consult with Municipalities to provide street 
to street access (pedestrian bridges) 
✓  
RSR to engage with SAPS / RRP to address suicide ✓  
Enhance education and awareness through partnership with key 
role players 
✓  
Exercise enforcement mandate ✓ ✓ 
Visible security and improved intelligence to deter and address 
vandalism and theft 
✓ ✓ 
Active partnerships with Community Policing Forum, Rapid Rail 
Police and other law enforcement agencies 
✓ ✓ 
Utilisation of technology to combat crime (e.g. drones)  ✓ 
Improved Law Enforcement (punitive measures to be increased) ✓ ✓ 
Early detection systems & target hardening  ✓ 
Use a low theft/resale value material  ✓ 
Participation in the Non-Ferrous Theft Combating Committee  ✓ 
Source: (RSR, 2008-2018) 
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At first glance, the countermeasures suggested would seem rightly guided but 
no evidence on the effectiveness of any of the measures are evident, or the extent to 
which the measures have been implemented, or not.  
Additionally, the RSR undertakes numerous education and awareness 
programmes at stations, level crossings, schools, community groups and sports 
tournaments with no evidence provided of its effectiveness.  
3.6 IMPLICATIONS 
A review of the rail safety record for South Africa provides a very bleak 
outlook on the current state of affairs nationally. Although the nature of the problem 
seems to be understood, and several countermeasures identified, the number of safety 
and security occurrences show no sign of abating, which would indicate that existing 
strategies to combat trespass-related incidents are failing. 
The State of Safety Reports presents an overview of the situation country-wide 
and does not provide a detailed account of the local situation specific to the operating 
regions.  
This chapter, along with the literature review completed in Chapter 2, confirms 
that no recent research has been carried out on the subject of railway trespassing for 
the Western Cape Region in enough detail to be able to understand the problem fully. 
72 Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 
Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 
This chapter describes the scientific methodology adopted in this study to 
achieve the aims and objectives stated in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1. Section 4.1 
discusses the methodology and research design used in the study; Section 4.2 details 
the participants in the study; Section 4.3 lists all the instruments used in the study 
and justifies their use; Section 4.4 outlines the research procedure used; Section 4.5 
discusses how the data was analysed; and finally, Section 4.6 discusses the ethical 
considerations of the research and its problems and limitations. 
4.1 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1.1 Research approach 
For a long time, the two dominant research methods have been Qualitative 
Research and Quantitative Research. 
Qualitative research, using data collection methods such as interviews, 
observation, and review of documents, provides insight into emerging processes and 
elicits the knowledge and experience of participants in providing detailed 
information about settings and contexts. Qualitative approaches may include case 
studies, grounded theory, ethnography, and phenomenology (Creswell et al., 2010). 
Quantitative research involves the statistical analysis of numeric data to test 
hypothesis, specific research questions and theories. A problem will be defined in 
depth with as much information as possible and the relationships between 
measurable variables will be closely examined. Quantitative data provides evidence 
to enable inferences to be applied generally to a population. Some quantitative 
methods include descriptive surveys, observational studies, and controlled trials 
(Creswell et al., 2010). 
A third methodology began emerging in the late 80s and early 90s known as 
Mixed Method Research (Clark, 2013). The mixed method approach can be defined 
as a methodology that (Creswell et al., 2010): 
i.) “focuses on research questions that call for real-life contextual 
understandings, multi-level perspectives, and cultural influences;  
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ii.) employs rigorous quantitative research assessing magnitude and 
frequency of constructs and rigorous qualitative research exploring 
the meaning and understanding of constructs; 
iii.) utilises multiple methods (e.g., intervention trials and in-depth 
interviews); 
iv.) intentionally integrates or combines methods to draw on the 
strengths of each; and  
v.) frames the investigation within philosophical and theoretical 
positions”. 
The research approach adopted for this study can be described as one that 
attempts to enhance current understanding of a particular problem in order to 
facilitate the development of effective, practical strategies. This can be theoretically 
categorised as a “pragmatic world view”, that seeks to use methods that “work” and 
incorporate as many different techniques as required when investigating a research 
problem (Creswell, 2012). 
Table 13: Research approaches, adapted from Morgan (2007), suggests a 
framework for the various approaches to conducting research. While each approach 
has its own strengths and weaknesses, the pragmatic approach is more than just a 
bridge between the two primary perspectives of quantitative and qualitative research 
and may find itself moving back and forth between theories (Morgan, 2007) and 
appreciating both objective and subjective knowledge (Creswell et al., 2010). 
The principal tenet of the mixed method approach is that the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches can: 
- provide a more complete understanding of a research topic (Creswell, 2014),
- obtain a greater validity and increased credibility of findings, and
- provide richer understanding of quantitative results and aid understanding of
unexpected results (Clark, 2013).
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Source: Adapted from (Morgan, 2007) 
Why mixed method for this research? 
The decision to use a mixed method approach for this particular research are 
twofold:  
The research problem 
The topic of railway trespassing and the specific nature of the various 
characteristics of the phenomena is complex. Trespassing manifests itself from non-
malevolent pedestrian actions to organised crime targeting rail assets to illegal 
occupation by the homeless. The problem is not one-dimensional, so the solutions 
would equally require a multi-faceted approach.   
Creswell (2012) proposes a mixed method approach when either of a 
qualitative or quantitative research methods is not enough to address the research 
problem and when more data is required to elaborate on the subject matter. For this 
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research, a quantitative analysis will be followed up with a smaller qualitative one to 
obtain more detailed, specific information to expand on the findings of the first set of 
data.  
The personal experiences of the researcher 
Some believe that to be able to use a mixed method methodology; the 
researcher must be competent in both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
to be able to determine the best path to take (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012).  Since 
this researcher’s own research experience is limited and he is a single researcher, he 
decided on a method that would not only suit the problem but also his training and 
experience. Having worked as a project manager at a nuclear power station and as a 
project engineer on an underground metro, I regularly had to solve engineering 
problems by following a process of defining the problem, gathering information, 
generating solutions, evaluating solutions and then determining the optimal solution. 
The solution would always have to be both cost-effective as well as implementable 
resulting in the least disruption to power or train operations. His belief is that an 
engineering approach to problem solving naturally tends to be “pragmatic”, with a 
focus on developing solutions that work the best.  
4.1.2 Research design 
The logic of a mixed method design is based on whether the quantitative and 
qualitative elements are combined into one analysis or whether the quantitative 
follows the qualitative analysis, or vice versa.  The three basic designs can be 
grouped as Concurrent Parallel, Sequential Explanatory and Sequential Exploratory 
designs. 
Concurrent (or convergent or parallel) designs 
A concurrent mixed method design [see Figure 10: Concurrent mixed method 
design, adapted from Clark, (2013)] is when the researcher simultaneously combines 
both quantitative and qualitative elements, thereby merging the data sets (Creswell et 
al., 2010).  The main idea with this approach is that the quantitative and qualitative 
elements provide unique elements of information (Creswell, 2014) whereby the two 
sets of data together, offset each other’s weaknesses to provide a better 
understanding of the research problem. Once merged, the datasets are compared and 
analysed, and the researcher can determine whether the results contradict or support 
each other (Creswell, 2012). 
 








Figure 10: Concurrent mixed method design 
 
Sequential exploratory designs 
A sequential exploratory mixed method design starts with a qualitative phase 
followed by a quantitative phase (Creswell, 2012). See Figure 11: Sequential 
exploratory mixed method design. 
The earlier qualitative phase is used to investigate a problem, using the 
findings to explain relationships in the second, quantitative phase. The second phase, 
therefore, builds on the first phase. Researchers often develop survey instruments 
from the qualitative phase which are then used to provide more detailed results in the 
second quantitative phase (Creswell, 2012).  The researcher could use an approach 
involving a number of phases, with the first being exploratory, followed by an 
instrument development phase and finally, using the instrument to gather further data 

























Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 77 
Sequential explanatory designs 
The third basic design, and the one used for this research is the sequential 
explanatory mixed method design. (See Figure 12: Sequential explanatory mixed 
method design). As opposed to the exploratory design, the qualitative phase is 
preceded by the quantitative phase. The quantitative phase provides the general 
context and background of the research problem, identifies 
relationships/differences/trends and guides the selection of participants for the 
second phase as well as the type of questions needed to provide more detail to the 
first phase (Creswell, 2014). 
The sequential exploratory design places greater emphasis on the quantitative 
data (QUAN) analysis than on the qualitative data (qual) analysis. In a phased 
approach, the quantitative data is clearly identified and presented early in the work 
with the qualitative data providing further refinement by exploring a few typical 
cases, probing specific findings in more detail, or investigating anomalies (Creswell, 
2012). 
The challenges with this design are determining which elements of the 
quantitative results to elaborate on, i.e. significant or non-significant differences or 
outliers or extreme/typical cases (Clark, 2013). Only once the focus area is decided 
on, can the questions to ask in the follow-up phase be confirmed, in order to add 
more value to the first quantitative phase. Sequential exploratory designs can also be 
labour-intensive, with implications for informed consent approvals (Clark, 2013) and 
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The selected research design 
A sequential exploratory design was deemed suitable for this research because 
there exists a rich database of information that would form the major part of this 
work. The quantitative analysis element would, therefore, be the focus of the 
research.  
To supplement the quantitative analysis, a smaller qualitative element will be 
incorporated to confirm the initial findings from the quantitative analysis as well as 
probe deeper into specific traits which cannot be fully explained with data.  
Additionally, a case study looking into the effectiveness of a specific 
countermeasure was completed. The design of the research was thus as shown in 





Figure 13: Modified sequential explanatory mixed method design 
 
4.2 PARTICIPANTS 
The participants in this research are detailed in Table 14: Primary research 
participants. 
Participants for the qualitative element of the research were chosen specifically 
for their knowledge and experience on the subject matter, who would best add to the 







Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 79 
Table 14: Primary research participants  
Participant Organisation Basis for Selection 
Metrorail / PRASA Railway operational staff - knowledge of day-to-day issues on the 
network, its effect on rail operations and on rail staff 
Railway technical staff – knowledge of trespass countermeasures, 
countermeasure effectiveness, affected rail assets, costs 
Railway security personnel – knowledge of day-to-day- issues on 
the network, crime trends, hot-spots, countermeasures, 
countermeasure effectiveness 
Train performance data – train availability and reliability, delays 
and cancellations, fare box performance 
Railway Safety Regulator Rail safety and security occurrence data – central collector of all 
rail data for all rail operators in the Western Cape 
Rail safety inspectors – knowledge of safety and security issues 
and trends, education and awareness countermeasures 
Forensic Pathology 
Services 
Recorded deaths and mortality data – information on all official 
recorded deaths where the cause of death has been attributed to a 
railway occurrence, the only source of demographic data on 
railway fatalities 
City of Cape Town Metro security personnel - knowledge of day-to-day- issues on the 
network, crime trends, hot-spots, countermeasures, 
countermeasure effectiveness, neighborhood crime trends, metals 
theft unit, rail enforcement unit 
NMT specialists – research on pedestrian movements in the rail 
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4.3 INSTRUMENTS 
4.3.1 Quantitative analysis instruments 
Microsoft Excel was used for all the data analysis carried out. 
Since “hot-spots” are commonly referred to for rail fatalities and security 
incidents, the question must be asked if the current analysis for determining hot-spot 
locations is accurate. As trespassing can be classified as a minor offence and one 
which may lead to other more serious crime on the rail network, it may be useful 
applying crime analysis techniques to the current situation; specifically, the spatial 
analysis of crime, to be able to better understand the nature of the crimes to be able 
to respond adequately. The rise in popularity in using hot-spot analysis in order to 
detect high-density crime areas is a technique used by crime analysts to visually 
display crime patterns by using a combination of database statistical technology and 
computerised mapping (Eck et al., 2005; Braga et al., 2012; Gill et al., 2015; Harries, 
1999). 
QGIS, an open-source GIS, was used to create, edit, visualise and analyse the 
geospatial information. A process was followed whereby the incident and occurrence 
data was geocoded and used to create maps with which to visualise the data, as “hot-
spots”. The process followed, is explained in more detail later in the document, in 
Section 4.5.4. 
4.3.2 Qualitative instruments 
Discussion guide and questionnaire 
Although the qualitative survey element was carried out encouraging free, and 
open-speech, a questionnaire was developed to ensure the salient issues were 
addressed and used as a prompt to initiate discussion. The instrument titled 
“Investigating Rail Trespassing Occurrences Discussion Guide and Questionnaire” 
was designed specifically for this research and is attached as Appendix A. The form 
contains both closed and open-ended questions so that information could be gathered 
that would support theoretical concepts in the literature and the earlier quantitative 
analysis phase. The open-ended questions allowed the responder to speak more 
freely about the prior issue providing an opportunity to expand on the earlier 
response. 
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For example, a closed-ended question was followed by an open-ended 
question: 
Is there a specific time of day in which trespassing is more prevalent? (Please 
tick as appropriate). 
04h30 – 06h00 
06h00 – 09h00 
09h00 – 16h00 
16h00 – 19h00 
19h00 – 22h00 
Do you wish to comment specifically about this? 
In this example, a closed-ended question was asked with a number of pre-
determined responses. This was followed up with an open-ended question in which 
the respondent could elaborate on his earlier response. 
The form was consulted on with rail staff to confirm the validity of the 
questions and thereafter, updated to improve the content before conducting the 
formal interviews. 
4.3.3 Case study 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of a specific countermeasure was carried out 
as a case study. The evaluation criteria for the case study were taken from 
RESTRAIL, which has adopted the criteria based on previous rail research in the 
European Union (Ryan & Kallberg, 2013). The evaluation criteria provide a proven, 
practical structure for the collection of evidence about the effectiveness and use of 
the countermeasure. 
A three-step scoring system can be used to rate the various criteria with values 
2, 1 and 0 used, with 2 being the best and 0, the worst. The criterion can also be 
weighted to reflect its relative importance with reference to the characteristics of the 
specific site (Kallberg et al., 2012). 
The researcher has chosen to omit the scoring element for this case study as 
only one countermeasure will be evaluated. 
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Some of the evaluation criteria, taken from RESTRAIL include: 
- Description of the measure
- Definition of target incidents
- Size of the problem
- Effect on incidents
- Additional information
The instrument capturing these criteria has been adapted from the RESTRAIL 
version and named the “Trespass Countermeasure Evaluation Form”. 
(See Appendix C). The form was used as a guide to collect the best information 
available to carry out the evaluation. 
4.3.4 Site visits 
The Site Inspection Protocol can be found in Appendix B. The form was 
developed to standardise the recording of field observations. 
The form includes some of the following headings: date, time, location, 
weather, describe nature of problem, describe surrounding area, define area and 
it includes a count of the frequency of trespassing per 15-minute interval. 
4.4 RESEARCH PROCEDURE 
4.4.1 Research framework 
In order to structure the research, the following framework was used: See 
Table 15: Research framework.  
The study can be broken down into five main phases: 
- Phase 1 contains the main, quantitative element;
- Phase 2 lists the preparation elements for the following phase;
- Phase 3 contains the qualitative element of the work;
- Phase 4 continues with the selection of the case study, as well as the
site visits; and
- Phase 5 interprets the results of all the subsequent phases.
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- Determine research questions and data required
- Obtain permissions
- Acquire data
- Analyse data: descriptive statistics
- Analyse data: demographics
- Analyse data: temporal
- Analyse data: spatial







- Determine which results require further investigation
- Develop qualitative questions
- Determine participants







- Collect open-ended qualitative data
- Analyse qualitative data
- Determine requirements for next phase
- Select case study






 - Evaluate case study







- Summarise and interpret quantitative results
- Summarise and interpret qualitative results and site visit
results
- Summarise and interpret case study
- Discuss the connected results
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4.4.2 Research questions 
The research questions (Q) and hypotheses (H) have been listed in Section 1.4. 
4.4.3 Variables 
The variables in this research study were as follows: 
Table 16: Research variables 
Dataset Variables 
FPS dataset Fatalities, year, month, day, time, suicides, age, race, gender 
RSR dataset Operator, year, month, day, time, place, occurrence category, 
fatalities, injuries 
Metrorail dataset Year, month, trains scheduled, trains cancelled, trains delayed 
4.4.4 Permissions and data acquisitions 
Requests were made to Western Cape Department of Health for access to the 
Forensic Pathology Services data. A Data-user Agreement is required for anyone 
wishing to access health-related data from Western Cape Department of Health. Data 
for all rail-related casualties for the Western Cape were received for the period 2012 
till 2018 for the full calendar years. 
The second request for access to the data held by the Railway Safety regulator 
was made via the General Manager for Media and Communications. Incident and 
occurrence data were received for the financial year period of 2015/16 till 2018/19. 
Permission to carry out research within Metrorail/Prasa was granted by the 
Acting Senior Manager for Human Resources for Prasa Western Cape. Metrorail 
train performance data was received for the financial year period 2009/10 till 
2018/19. 
On review of the various overlapping datasets, a combined database was 
established using the RSR and Metrorail data for safety incidents and security 
occurrences to provide a dataset covering four full calendar years including 2015 - 
2018. (See Figure 14: Dataset timespans). The data for this four-year period was used 
for all the railway safety incident and security occurrence analysis. 
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4-year dataset
Figure 14: Dataset timespans 
The FPS data, as well as the Metrorail train performance data were used for the 
full calendar years including 2014 - 2018. These datasets could not be combined with 
the incident and occurrence data but was used to specifically compliment the analysis 
over the period 2015-2018. 
4.5 ANALYSIS 
4.5.1 Data description, cleaning and formatting 
The cleaning of data involved formatting and editing the data to ensure 
uniformity across all inputs. Data presented on separate tabs were combined into one 
spreadsheet. This would be required for the later, spatial analysis where the Excel 
spreadsheet would need to be converted to a CVS file in order to use the database in 
QGIS. Additional columns were added to calculate the actual day and month from 
the officially recorded “day” of the incident. 
The final FPS database was compiled in one tab in an Excel spreadsheet and 
included the years 2012 till 2018. The database was compiled with the following 
variables: forensic lab, police station, date, month, day, time, race, sex, age, official 
code description, official code category, suburb and scene of injury. The blood 
alcohol levels of victims were only available for one year and was therefore excluded 
from the analysis. 
Although the FPS database contains location information related to the forensic 
laboratory the body was taken to, the police station where the death was reported as 
well as the town, suburb and scene and street of injury. On review of the level of 
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minimum amount of accuracy. The FPS dataset was, therefore, used only for a 
demographic analysis, which would provide important insights which the RSR 
dataset lacked, i.e. the RSR dataset does not contain information on gender, age or 
race. Detailed location analysis was not carried out on the FPS dataset. 
The RSR dataset was similarly combined into one Excel spreadsheet in a single 
tab. The RSR data was originally presented in financial years, where a new financial 
year would start on 1 April and end on 31March of the following year. The data was 
combined and analysed as a January to December calendar year for the years 2015 
till 2018. 
The RSR data contained a number of “unknown” entries without a SANS 
category. Each “unknown” entry was reviewed and where the incident had an 
adequate description that could be related to a trespassing event, that incident was 
placed into a logical category. 
An example of this would be where the description read: “The body of a male 
person was found with stab wounds next to the railway line. The body of the 
deceased person was taken to Tygerberg Morgue.” Although this person could be 
classified as a trespasser, the death could not be attributed to a train incident. This 
would, therefore, remain as an unclassified SANS category and would be analysed as 
such. Where the description of an incident read: “Body parts were found next to the 
railway line. No identification could be made on scene and the body parts were taken 
to Paarl Morgue”, this incident was classified as a Category E-a fatality. 
With regards to the RSR data, the following steps were followed: 
All Category E-a incidents and Category 1 and 2 occurrences were combined 
into one spreadsheet for the years 2015 – 2018. The “place of occurrence “location 
data was then reviewed, and the following process followed: - 
- Spelling mistakes were corrected, and the full station name was 
inserted. 
- Places that referred to “staging yard”, “yard”, “terminals”, “substation”
locations were assigned to the nearest main station in order to simplify
the geocoding step.
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- Incidents and occurrences are not geocoded as part of the incident
recording / reporting process by any of the rail operators. It is therefore
not possible to know the exact location of incidents unless the
occurrence description provided more detail. It was not possible to
manually geocode the locations as part of this study due to time
constraints. Where the location is described as a point between two
stations, an approximate mid-point location was manually selected.
- The Excel file was saved as a CSV file (UTF-8).
- The latitude and longitude of all occurrences were added manually to
the CSV sheet. The addresses for the station locations were taken from
Google Maps and a sample cross-checked for correctness on
Nominatim, which is the search engine for OpenStreetMap data.
- Once all the locations were manually geocoded, they were loaded into
QGIS by adding the CSV file as a delimited text layer.
- Any errors made whilst inputting the X and Y coordinates were then
highlighted and fixed in the source CSV file.
Both the FPS and RSR databases were now ready for the next step in the 
analysis process. 
4.5.2 FPS data analysis 
A demographic analysis was carried out on the FPS dataset which contained 
information on the gender, race and age of all rail related deaths. The analysis 
includes rail-related deaths officially classified as suicides. 
Descriptive statistics on the demographic variables describing the mean, 
standard deviation, frequency and percent as appropriate have been completed. The 
descriptive statistics are supported by a number of graphic representations including 
bar charts, pie charts, and histograms in order to adequately describe the data. 
Analysis of the data was made for recorded deaths due to railway injury, as well as 
suicides by gender (male or female), race (black, Coloured, white), and age (0-11yrs, 
12-19yrs, 20-59yrs, 60yrs+).
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Statistical hypothesis testing 
Human judgement or a researcher’s “previous experience” cannot be solely 
relied on to make scientific decisions. Statistical significance tests are thus employed 
to conclude that something has or hasn’t achieved “statistical significance”. A 
“statistically significant difference” simply means there is statistical evidence that 
there is a difference; it does not present absolute, conclusive proof that a relationship 
exists, but rather provides one piece of evidence in support of the research 
hypothesis.  
The null hypothesis (𝐻0) is thus a claim about a population trait that is treated 
as valid unless the evidence strongly suggests that 𝐻0 is false, in favour of the 
competing claim, the alternative hypothesis (Peck, et al., 2016). Statistical tests, test 
the null hypothesis only. The null hypothesis test takes the form of: “There is no 
difference among the groups” for difference tests and “There is no association” for 
correlation tests. A statistical hypothesis test can only determine if there is strong 
support for the alternative hypothesis (by rejection of the null hypothesis). When the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, it does not mean strong support for H0—only lack of 
strong evidence against it.  
General Steps taken 
i. The statement of the research null alternative hypotheses to be tested is
made.
ii. The significance level (α - alpha) of 5%, corresponding to a value of
0.05 is used. This empirically corresponds to a confidence level of 95%.
iii. Excel was used to perform all statistical and mathematical calculations
to compute the relevant test statistics (S) and obtain the relevant “P
value”.
iv. Decision made to either “reject” or “not reject” the null hypothesis in
favour of the alternative hypothesis. The decision rule is to reject the
null hypothesis (H0) if P ≤ α. If the P > than 0.05, the null hypothesis is
not rejected.
v. If the null hypothesis was rejected, further post hoc tests were carried
out to determine which groups of data differed.
Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 89 
Statistical tests employed 
- T-tests: Used to test the differences between two group means for the
same variables. These tests were used in the case study evaluation.
- ANOVA: Used to test differences between three or more groups to
determine if the means are statistically different from each other. The
results of all ANOVA calculations in Excel are shown in ANOVA
tables.
- Correlation: The Covariance and Coefficient of Correlation was used to
measure the strength and direction of possible linear relationships
between two numerical variables. A correlation is an indication of
whether the variables increase together in a perfect positive correlation
or go in opposite directions in a perfect negative correlation or in fact if
there is no correlation at all (Levine, et al., 2010). The coefficient of
correlation (r) is a value between -1, 0 and 1. As the value gets closer to
-1 and 1, the linear relationship between the two variables will be a
strong one. Values close to 0 are an indication of no or little linear 
relationship. A weak correlation doesn’t necessarily indicate that a 
linear relationship does not exist, but rather that some other type of 
non-linear relationship may be in effect (Rumsey, 2011). 
- Scatterplots: Scatterplots was used to graphically display the strength of
the correlation, between the two variables is. The closer the data points
fall along a straight line, the higher the correlation.
- Standardisation: Z Scores were calculated in some instances in order to
facilitate comparisons when the null hypothesis was rejected. Z scores
indicate how many standard deviations a value is above or below the
mean.
- Tukey: If the ANOVA determined that there was a significant F-
statistic, Tukey was used to calculate the confidence intervals for the
difference for each pairwise comparisons, i.e. which specific groups
differed. Tukey controls the confidence level at approximately 95%
when the procedure is computed on multiple data sets (Peck, et al.,
2016).
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4.5.3 RSR data analysis 
Descriptive statistics on the RSR dataset was carried out where relevant to 
adequately describe the data. Variables describing the mean, standard deviation, 
frequency and percent as appropriate were completed. The descriptive statistics were 
supported by a number of graphic representations including bar charts, pie charts, 
stem-and-leaf displays, and histograms in order to further describe the data.    
A temporal analysis was also completed for the RSR dataset. Only the SANS 
Categories relevant to this research were analysed in detail. These were Category E-a 
(Occurrence where a member of the public is struck by rolling stock on a running 
line), Category 1 (Theft of assets impacting on operational safety) and Category 2 
(Malicious damage/vandalism to property) occurrences. Data was analysed over a 
four-year period including years 2015 to 2018. Data were analysed by year (2015-
2018), month (January-December), day of the week (Monday – Sunday), and time of 
day (in 2hr slots). 
Detailed analyses were made of Category E-a sub-categories for fatalities and 
injuries as well as Category 1 sub-categories a-i and Category 2 sub-categories a-i.  
The RSR data was also analysed in relation to train operational performance 
data. 
4.5.4 Spatial analysis 
The following section details the approach taken in the spatial analysis of 
incidents and occurrences used in this research applicable to the following research 
questions: RSR Q5, Q6, Q7 and Q8.  
As established in the earlier literature review section of this document, 
trespassing could be considered as a criminal act, even in its most innocent guise as a 
“short-cut”. Trespassing could also be the lesser of a more sinister criminal intent 
when it comes to theft and vandalism damage to rail property.  
Incidents of fatalities, theft and vandalism occur in both space and time. Spatial 
analysis is the science of investigating the geographic aspects of events, through 
analytic mapping of the geographic database (Rayment, 1995). Temporal analysis 
recognises that the spatial footprints of incidents are clustered together during short 
time periods (Levine, 2013) and examines the time components of variables, such as 
year, month, day and hour. With regards to the RSR dataset, incidents of theft and 
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vandalism are mainly crimes against property, the exact times are therefore not 
definite.  
The appeal of hot-spot crime strategies and their effectiveness has been 
explained earlier in this document. An effective hot-spot strategy will allow railway 
operators and police to focus limited resources on a small number of high-crime 
locations (Braga et al., 2012). Developments in GIS capability continue to improve 
and provide numerous options to analysts for carrying out a hot-spot spatial analysis. 
However, which spatial analysis tools are most useful for identifying hot-spots? 
The most common form of crime mapping using a GIS is the act of assigning 
points to a map, called “point mapping” (Eck et al., 2005). Using built-in GIS 
capabilities, this task is made easy by using graduated symbols and colour gradient 
dots (Rayment, 1995). Eck et al. (2005) list point mapping, spatial ellipses using 
hierarchical and K-means clustering, thematic area mapping, quadrant mapping, 
interpolation and continuous smoothing as recognised methods of crime mapping. 
Rayment (1995) applies a method of contour mapping to carry out a spatial-temporal 
analysis of crime in Boston. 
Harries (1999) identified five common methods of hot-spot analysis including 
visual interpretation, choropleth mapping, grid cell analysis, cluster analysis and 
spatial autocorrelation. 
Newton (2004) goes further and discusses the complexities around examining 
crime hot-spots on public transport networks. Newton states that traditional crime 
analysis focuses on ‘static’ crime events and argues that for the purposes of crime 
analyses, the differences between static and non-static crimes are arbitrary, and 
therefore it is possible to capture non-static crimes as static. Essentially then, a static 
crime occurs at a specific point, whilst a non-static crime occurs between two points 
and between a set of times and could be depicted as a ‘line’ representing a specific 
event (Newton, 2004). 
Tompson et al. (2008) developed the “Hot Route” method specifically to 
visualise crime patterns occurring in a linear pattern. Tompson et al. (2008) states 
that the main limitation of other hot-spot techniques is that it cannot provide a 
localised street level view to pin-point the exact location of the crime. The Hot Route 
92 Chapter 4: Scientific Methodology 
method calculates the rate of crime per linear metre of a network route and presents a 
thematically shaded map of risk distribution along the network.  
A number of specific crime analysis tools have been developed to assist in 
detecting whether meaningful patterns and clusters exist. One such is SANET 
(Spatial Analysis on a NETwork), which was specifically developed to analyse 
events on a network. SANET provides a GIS toolbox to perform network spatial 
analysis with the aim of avoiding false interpretations of hot-spots which may be 
produced by traditional planar spatial analysis. A detailed explanation of the 
capabilities of SANET is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but some of the tools 
available include the production of Voronoi diagrams, Delaunay diagrams, Kernel 
density estimation, Interpolation, Point clustering method, Random points generator, 
and Shortest-path distances between points in a point set (Okabe, 2006).  
CrimeStat is another spatial analysis tool developed to analyse crime incident 
location data. A stand-alone Windows program, CrimeStat provides analysts with 
spatial statistical procedures that can be linked to a GIS. It is especially useful for the 
analysis of point pattern data and provides various levels of analysis to cater for 
simple distributions of spatial data to more complex tools to develop temporal-spatial 
theories (Levine, 2013). CrimeStat’s statistical methods include: i) hierarchical 
clustering - based on the nearest neighbour analysis technique; this method groups 
incidents into first-order clusters and then creates second order clusters, grouping the 
closest first order clusters, continuing in this manner till all clustering possibilities 
are exhausted. ii) K-means clustering – groups crime incidents into a defined number 
of clusters as specified by the user. The analysis seeks out the best centre location for 
each cluster and then groups each crime incident to the centre location points (Levine 
et al., 2010).  
GeoDa is an open source and cross-platform tool that analysis geospatial data 
and like CrimeStat, provides a functionality allowing for simple description and 
visualisation of data to more complex exploration and modelling (Anselin, 2016). 
GeoDa uses either point coordinate data to carry out spatial data analysis but is 
especially suited to analysis of area data patterns. GeoDa’s functionality includes 
mapping and geovisualisation, exploratory data analysis, spatial autocorrelation 
analysis, space-time analysis and spatial regression analysis (Anselin, 2016). 
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The adopted spatial analysis methodology 
The approach used as a methodology for this research is explained next. 
Stage 1 
The RSR data in Excel format was used to analyse whether the Iron Law of 
Troublesome Places or more practically known as the 80-20 Rule applies. This rule 
suggests that majority of crime will take place in only a few places (Wilcox & Eck, 
2011; Clarke & Eck, 2005).   
Stage 2 
The next stage of the analysis involved using a GIS to visually analyse the 
data. The main steps followed will be explained next.   
- The RSR Excel sheet was saved as a Comma Separated Values (CSV) file
and loaded into QGIS as a Delimited Text Layer. This projected all the data
as points on the QGIS canvas.
- The rail network shape file was sourced from Geofabrik (Geofabrik, 2019).
Other shape files were sourced from UCT - City of Cape Town databases and
Western Cape Government databases for the rail station names, roads and
municipal boundaries shape files. These were all added as separate layers to
QGIS. (See Screenshot 1).
Screenshot 1 
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- The rail network was then portioned into 1km sections using the Grass
plugin’s v.split function and the length of each section was then added to the
attribute table.
- A buffer was created around the now split rail section using the MMQGIS
(Minn, 2019) plugin and the function Create Buffers. (See Screenshot 2).
Screenshot 2 
- A choropleth map was created for each occurrence category using a
weighting to prioritise the individual sub-categories. This allowed the point
density in each buffered 1km section of railway to be calculated with the
added weighting and coloured according to the number of occurrences in
each section. This produced a network hot-spot map for each occurrence
category which could be overlayed on to each other. (See Screenshot 3).
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Screenshot 3 
4.5.5 Qualitative analysis 
The qualitative part of this research comprised of three phases: an interview 
phase, a case study analysis and a site inspection phase. The core characteristics that 
define a qualitative research study were met as follows: 
- Data was collected up-front and with face-to-face direct interaction in the
respondents own natural setting.
- The interviews, case study and site visits were conducted by this researcher.
Survey protocols for the interviews were developed by the researcher and
utilised as a guide but not solely relied on.
- Multiple sources of data were used.
- An emergent approach was used, where the primary quantitative analysis, as
well as the interview phase were used to select the case study example and
site visits.
Expert interviews 
A select number of interviews were completed with individuals chosen for 
their specific, expert knowledge on the subject matter, from their respective 
viewpoints. All interviews were conducted per individual apart from the railway 
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safety inspectors which consisted of a three person focus group. The interview record 
can be found in Appendix E. 
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews were conducted and only one of 
the interviews was recorded. Transcribing the audio from the one interview was very 
time-consuming and, due to time constraints, the researcher decided against this 
approach.  Interviews were captured by taking interview notes and consolidating the 
information afterwards. 
A thematic content analysis was carried out on the interview information. The 
interviews were re-read, reviewed and divided into themes. The most useful 
information was selected and written on including quotes from the interviewees.   
The final step was selecting several sites for validating the information 
discovered during the interviews.   
Case study analysis 
The research question relating to the case study is CASE Q9. 
The case study was selected based on the following: 
- The researcher’s own personal experience and involvement in the project.
- The availability of data and information to quantitatively and qualitatively
assess the effectiveness of the countermeasure.
- Feedback from interviews.
The protocol adapted from RESTRAIL and named the “Trespass
Countermeasure Evaluation Form” was completed by the researcher with 
information gathered from the interviews, occurrence data analysis, review of project 
reports, as well as the researchers own personal experience of being involved on the 
project as well as a similar project in the past. 
The quantitative element of the case study evaluated the impact on safety and 
security occurrences data over a 6-month period.  The hypothesis, CASE H016 and 
H017 were tested using the statistical evaluation techniques described earlier in this 
document.  
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Site visit observations 
Based on the feedback from interviews the following sites were selected for 
further investigation and validation of some of the information gathered during the 
interviews. (See Table 17: Site visit locations). Site visits were carried out during 
daylight operational hours and during weekdays. Due to the risky nature of some of 
the locations, the researcher enlisted the help of two colleagues to accompany me on 
the site visits. One person always remained in the vehicle and the other assisted in 
note and photograph taking. 
Table 17: Site visit locations 
Sites visited 
Elsies River Station Line section between Nyanga and 
Philippi Stations 
Line section between Parow and Elsies 
River Station  
Line section between Strand and Van der 
Stel Stations 
Line section between Parow and 
Tygerburg Station 
Line section between Du Tooit and 
Koelenhof Stations 
Parow Station Line section between Heideveld and 
Netreg Stations 
Mbekweni Station Bonteheuwel Station 
Line section between Mbekweni and Dal 
Josafat Stations 
Kraaifontein Station 
Klapmuts Station (north side) Klapmuts Station (south side) 
Field notes were captured on the site visit protocol developed for this purpose. 
(See Appendix B).  
The field notes were reviewed and catalogued in an Excel spreadsheet. The 
main themes from the site visits are discussed in Section 7.2. Photographs were taken 
at all locations visited, and the full list of field notes and photographs are catalogued 
in Appendix F. 
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4.6 ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
Ethics clearance for this study was granted by the UCT, Faculty of Engineering 
and the Built Environment Ethics Committee. (See Appendix G).  
The ethical framework for this research is discussed under the following 
headings: a) data collection, b) data processing, and c) data storage. 
4.6.1 Data collection 
The following general principles have applied throughout this research: 
- No private identification or personal sensitive data is used or was required for
this research.
- Some personal data was used such as gender and age, but no identifiable
information has been included.
- No sensitive personal data, such as names, has been required or used, and will
not be published as part of this research.
- Data on racial or ethnic origin has not been used or included.
- The research contains no sensitive personal data on:
political opinion, religious beliefs, physical health, mental health, sexual
orientation, or any criminal records.
- Interviews were performed on a voluntary basis, with the respondents fully
briefed on the purpose and nature of the research. Interviews were conducted
with personnel who are considered to have expert knowledge on the subject
matter and no personal sensitive data is concerned.
- Certain photographs taken on site needed to incorporate persons in the act of
trespassing to demonstrate evidence of a certain behaviour. The identity of
the individuals in the photographs was obscured where their facial features
were clearly identifiable.
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4.6.2 Data processing 
The data used in this research has been: 
- Fairly processed
- Only processed for the intended purpose of this research and once the
required data base has been formed, all private identification data was
discarded
- Only processed in a manner that is relevant and shall not reveal
anything about individual persons
- Verified for accuracy.
4.6.3 Data storage 
The data shall: 
- Not be kept for longer than is required.
- Not be shared or transferred to any other party or with any other
researchers.
- At a minimum the database must have user-level security, may not be
housed on laptops or external media unless these are encrypted.
4.7 PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN METHODOLOGY 
Surveys and interviews 
The trespassing questionnaire was originally designed to be distributed by hand 
or e-mail or completed on-line via Google Forms but due to a very low response rate 
from respondents, this was abandoned. Instead, one-on-one interviews were 
conducted with purposefully selected subject matter experts and hard copies of the 
form completed during the interview. The interviews were recorded by means of 
written notes. 
Forensic Pathology Services data 
A number of studies point to the role of alcohol in pedestrian-rail casualties. 
The alcohol blood level for fatalities and recorded deaths were requested as part of 
the mortuary dataset but the request was not approved for the following reasons: 
i.) Many the records were considered as sub judice and the potential leakage of 
such information may negatively impact the outcome of any judicial review 
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of the case. It was believed that the identity of the deceased could be obtained 
indirectly through linkages with other information sources. 
ii.) The presence of alcohol in the decedent’s blood does not necessarily indicate 
that it was the cause of the incident. As such it was believed that the 
provision of these results may lead to an incorrect inference as to the potential 
role that alcohol may or may not have had leading up to the cause of death. 
iii.) Not all fatalities were analysed for the presence of alcohol; and if an analysis 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis & Results 
This chapter contains a full discussion, interpretation and evaluation of the 
results of the quantitative analysis carried out and describes the results from the 
research to answer the questions (Q1-Q8) and hypothesis (H01-H015) listed in 
Chapter 1. The relevant research hypotheses applicable to the main chapter section 
are listed as sub-headings. Section 5.1 provides an analysis of the demographic data, 
Section 5.2 and 5.3 discusses the temporal analysis of occurrences and Section 5.4 
discusses the effect of theft and vandalism on train operations. Sections 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 
and 5.8 details the spatial analysis. Finally, Section 5.9 summarises the chapter. 
5.1 THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RAIL RELATED 
FATALITIES 
Answering research question FPS Q1. 
The FPS data was analysed as it was the only source of data providing 
consistent, demographic information on victims, where the primary cause of death 
was attributed to railway injury. The FPS data is also the only official classification 
of intentional deaths by railway injury, i.e. suicides, as well the only classification by 
race. The race of the victims is deemed relevant as they could assist in ensuring that 
communication or education countermeasures are rightly pitched. The importance of 
analysing the racial demographics was corroborated by the expert interviews carried 
out. 
5.1.1 By gender 
The number of deaths attributed to railway injury as the main cause of death is 
shown in Table 18: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per year by gender, and 
graphically in Figure 15: FPS recorded deaths by rail per year and gender. The 
maximum number of fatalities was recorded in 2013 (n=138) and the lowest in 2018 
(n=73). The total number of fatalities over the seven-year period is 845, at an average 
of 121 fatalities per annum. (See Table 19: Descriptive statistics). The standard 
deviation is large at 21.74 and this can be attributed to the low number of fatalities 
recorded for 2018. The total annual number of fatalities are constant over the period 
apart from only 73 (n=73) deaths in 2018. 
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Table 18: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per year by gender 
Recorded Deaths Attributed to Rail per Year by Gender 
Gender 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Grand Total 
Male 104 116 105 104 111 111 61 712 
Female 27 22 15 23 19 15 12 133 
Grand Total 131 138 120 127 130 126 73 845 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics 
Statistic Value 
Mean 120.7142857 











 Figure 15: FPS recorded deaths by rail per year and gender 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Recorded Deaths Attributed to Rail per Year
Female 27 22 15 23 19 15 12
Male 104 116 105 104 111 111 61
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Males make up most of the fatalities at 84% (n=712). This is consistent with 
the findings of (Savage, 2007; Pelletier, 1997; Radbo et al., 2005; Savage, 2015; 
Silla & Luoma, 2012; Mishara & Bardon, 2015 and Ozdogan et al., 2006).  
Females accounted for 16% of fatalities (n=133) over the period. See Figure 
16: % Recorded deaths by gender. 
 
Figure 16: % Recorded deaths by gender 
5.1.2 By age 
The most vulnerable of pedestrians, those under the age of 11 years (n=11) and 
the elderly, those 60 years and older (n=47), combined make up 7% of the fatalities 
(n=58), supporting the findings of Savage, (2007); Savage, (2015) and Silla and 
Luoma, (2008) that trespass related fatalities are rare for these age groups.  
Adults between 20 and 59 years make up the largest demographic at 86% of 
recorded fatalities (n=726), as found by Savage, (2007); Savage, (2015); Pelletier, 
(1997) and Radbo et al., (2005). (See Table 20: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per 









104 Chapter 5: Data Analysis & Results 
Table 20: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per year by age 
Recorded Deaths Attributed to Rail per Year by Age 
Age Group 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TOTAL 
0-11yrs 4 2 2 1 1 0 1 11 
12-19yrs 6 14 9 7 10 9 6 61 
20-59yrs 111 116 104 112 110 112 61 726 
60yrs+ 10 5 5 7 9 5 6 47 
Total 131 137 120 127 130 126 74 845 
 
5.1.3 By age and gender 
A closer look at the fatalities by age group and gender shows that 86.9% and 
79.7% of fatalities can be attributed to the 20-59 years age group for both males and 
females respectively. (See Table 21: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per year by 
gender and age). 
Table 21: Recorded deaths attributed to rail per year by gender and age 
Recorded Deaths Attributed to Rail per Year by Gender and Age 
Age Group Male % Female % 
0-11yrs 6 0.8% 5 3.8% 
12-19yrs 52 7.3% 9 6.8% 
20-59yrs 619 86.9% 106 79.7% 
60yrs+ 35 4.9% 13 9.8% 
Total 712 100.0% 133 100.0% 
  
Age distribution 
Figure 17: Distribution of fatalities by age, provides more insight into the 
breakdown of age groups, with a clear peak between the ages of 20 to 35-year olds. 
The result shows a slightly right skewed plot. The transition from adolescent to 
adulthood would be a focus for any educational interventions, targeting school 
children. 
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Figure 17: Distribution of fatalities by age 
 
5.1.4 By race 
Figure 18: % Fatalities by race, displays the breakdown of deaths by racial 
demographics. 61.5% of deaths (n=520) can be attributed to Blacks, with Coloureds 
making up 35.6% (n=301) and Whites, 2.7% (n=23) of fatalities. No separate 
classification is made in the data for Indians. 
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By race and gender 
Table 22: Recorded deaths by race and gender, show that black males are more 
at risk of death than for all the other race groups (n=448). Notably more Coloured 
females (n=57), making up 19% of all Coloured deaths is apparent. White females 
make up the lowest demographic accounting for only four (n=4) deaths over the 
study period.  
Table 22: Recorded deaths by race and gender 
Gender Black Coloured White Grand Total % 
Male 448 244 19 712 84.2 
Female 72 57 4 133 15.7 
Grand Total 520 301 23 845 100 
 
5.1.5 Suicides 
Suicides make up 3.7% (n=31) of all recorded deaths attributed to rail 
casualties.  (See Table 23: Recorded deaths by category per year). The low numbers 
could indicate that suicides-by-rail is not a popular choice for those wanting to take 
their own life. Alternatively, the low figures could indicate a degree of under-
reporting, as a result of the uncertainty with regards to the classification of suicides.     
Table 23: Recorded deaths by category per year 




122 131 109 123 123 119 66 1 794 
Suicide 7 5 7 2 5 2 3 0 31 
Grand 
Total 
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Suicides by gender 
68% of all suicides (n=21) are by males and 32% (n=10) by females. See 
Figure 19: Suicides by gender.  
 
Figure 19: Suicides by gender 
Suicides by race 
Suicides by train casualty have been recorded as the official cause of death in 
58.1% (n=18) of blacks, 35.5% (n=11) of Coloured and 6.5% (n=2) of whites. See 
Figure 20: Suicides by race. 
 
Figure 20: Suicides by race 
Male, 68%
Female, 32%
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Suicides by gender and race 
Black males have the most deaths formally classified as a suicide (n=14) with 
more Coloured females (n=6) than in any other race group. (See Table 24: Suicides 
by gender and race). 
Table 24: Suicides by gender and race 
Suicides by Gender and Race 
Suicide Black Coloured White Grand Total % 
Male 14 5 2 21 67.7% 
Female 4 6 0 10 32.3% 
Grand Total 18 11 2 31 100.0% 
Suicides by age interval 
The distribution of suicides over the age intervals can be seen in the histogram 
in Figure 21: Suicide – age distribution. More suicides fall into the 18-33-year-old 
age group than any other. 
Figure 21: Suicide – age distribution 
18,33 34, 48 49, 63 
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5.1.6 Hypothesis tests H01 – H04 
FPS H01: No significant difference exists between genders of the victim for 
recorded deaths due to rail injury. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of deaths between the two gender categories, split into the variable’s “males” and 
“females” for the variable “years”.  
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between recorded 
deaths and the gender of the victim. 







2012 104 27 131 
2013 116 22 138 
2014 105 15 120 
2015 104 23 127 
2016 111 19 130 
2017 111 15 126 
2018 61 12 73 
Total 712 133 845 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 23,945.7857 1 23,945.7857 129.1209 8.8574e-08 
Error 2,225.4286 12 185.4524 
Total 26,171.2143 13 
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Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is lower than 
0.05, suggesting that the one or more categories are significantly different. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS REJECTED 
It is concluded that the number of deaths for males is statistically significant. 
FPS H02: No significant difference exists between the age of the victim for 
recorded deaths due to rail injury. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of deaths for the four age categories, split into the variables “0-11yrs”, “12-19yrs”, 
“20-59yrs” and “+60yrs” for the variable “years”.  
The null hypothesis is that no significant difference exists between recorded 
deaths and the age of the victim.  













2012 4 6 111 10 131 
2013 2 14 116 5 137 
2014 2 9 104 5 120 
2015 1 7 112 7 127 
2016 1 10 110 9 130 
2017 0 9 112 5 126 
2018 1 6 61 6 74 
Total 11 61 726 47 845 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 50,660.1071 3 16,886.7024 177.1332 2.2204e-16 
Error 2,288.0000 24 95.3333 
Total 52,948.1071 27 
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Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is lower than 
0.05, suggesting that the one or more categories are significantly different. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS REJECTED 









A vs B 1.9355 0.5276790 insignificant 
A vs C 27.6780 0.0010053 p<0.01 
A vs D 1.3936 0.7378850 insignificant 
B vs C 25.7425 0.0010053 p<0.01 
B vs D 0.5419 0.8999947 insignificant 
C vs D 26.2844 0.0010053 p<0.01 
It is concluded that the number of deaths in the age-group 20-59 years for 
victims is statistically significant. 
FPS H03: No significant difference exists between the race of the victim and 
recorded deaths due to rail injury. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of deaths for the four race categories, split into the variables “black”, “Coloured”, 
“white” and “unknown” for the variables “male” and “female”.  
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between recorded 
deaths and the race of the victim.  
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05: 












Male 448 244 19 1 712 
Female 72 57 4 0 133 
Grand Total 520 301 23 1 845 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 91,512.3750 3 30,504.1250 1.3821 0.3694 
Error 88,285.5000 4 22,071.3750 
Total 179,797.8750 7 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the categories are not significantly different for that level of 
significance. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
It is concluded that no statistically significant difference exists between 
recorded deaths and the race of the victims. 
FPS H04: No significant difference exists between the gender of the victim 
for suicides. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of suicides for the two gender categories, split into the variables “male” and “female” 
for the variable “years”.  
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between suicides and 
the gender of the victim.  
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2012 2 5 7 
2013 4 1 5 
2014 7 0 7 
2015 1 1 2 
2016 4 1 5 
2017 0 2 2 
2018 3 0 3 
Total 21 10 31 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 8.6429 1 8.6429 2.0862 0.1742 
Error 49.7143 12 4.1429 
Total 58.3571 13 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the treatments are not significantly different for that level of 
significance. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
No statistical difference exists between suicides and the gender of the victim. 
The number of males involved in fatalities recorded as suicides, is statistically 
insignificant. 
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5.2 THE TEMPORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CATEGORY E-A 
OCCURRENCES RELATING TO PEDESTRIAN-RAIL RELATED 
FATALITIES AND INJURIES 
Answering research question RSR Q2. 
5.2.1 By year 
The total number of Category E-a occurrences over the 4-year period is 596 
(n=596), with Prasa accounting for 94.1% of all occurrences (n=561). (See Table 25: 
No. of E-a occurrences by operator per year). The number of E-a occurrences has 
dropped by 8.7% since the high of 185 (n=185) in 2016 to 133 (n=133) in 2018.  
Table 25: No. of E-a occurrences by operator per year 
No. of E-a Occurrences by Operator per Year 
2015 2016 2017 2018 Grand 
Total 
% 
PRASA RAIL 112 180 147 122 561 94.1% 
Transnet Freight Rail 9 5 9 9 32 5.4% 
Shosholoza Meyl 1 0 0 1 2 0.3% 
Other 0 0 0 1 1 0.2% 
Totals 122 185 156 133 596 100.0% 
A total of 330 fatalities due to a member of public being struck by a train was 
recorded over the period, at an average of 82.5 fatalities per year. The highest 
number of fatalities was recorded in 2016 (n=105), decreasing to 61 (n=61) fatalities 
in 2018. Prasa accounts for 94.2% of all fatalities (n=311) over the period and 
Transnet Freight Rail (TFR) 5.2% (n=17). (See Figure 22: E-a fatalities by major 
operator per year). 
Figure 22: E-a fatalities by major operator per year 
PRASA RAIL Transnet Freight Rail Grand Total
2015 Fatalities 73 3 76
2016 Fatalities 103 2 105
2017 Fatalities 81 7 88
























E-a: Fatalities by Major Operator per Year
2015 Fatalities 2016 Fatalities 2017 Fatalities 2018 Fatalities
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A total of 247 injuries, due to a member of public being struck by a train were 
recorded over the period, at an average of 61.8 injuries per year. The highest number 
of injuries was recorded in 2016 (n=80), the lowest in 2015 (n=44). Prasa accounts 
for 94.3% of all injuries (n=233) over the period and TFR 5.3% (n=13). 
(See Figure 23: E-a injuries by major operator). 
Figure 23: E-a injuries by major operator 
5.2.2 By month 
The number of E-a occurrences, fatalities and injuries have been grouped into 
the month in which they took place in Figure 24: E-a occurrences, fatalities & 
injuries per month. More E-a occurrences and fatalities have been recorded in 
October than any other month. More incidents have been recorded in the months 
which fall in the second half of the year from July-December (n=339) as opposed to 
the first half the year (n=257). However, occurrences don’t show a seasonal trend 
corresponding with the start of spring or summer as it does in the Northern 
hemisphere (Savage, 2015; Pelletier, 1997; Radbo et al., 2005). The winter months of 
June and July show a consistent number of occurrences with the rest of the year 
where one might have thought visibility would be poorer with extended hours of 
darkness in the morning and afternoon peaks, leading to more incidents. However, 
this is not the case in Cape Town. 
PRASA RAIL Transnet Freight Rail Grand Total
2015 Injuries 37 6 44
2016 Injuries 77 3 80
2017 Injuries 56 1 57






















E-a: Injuries by Major Operator
2015 Injuries 2016 Injuries 2017 Injuries 2018 Injuries
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Figure 24: E-a occurrences, fatalities & injuries per month 
There were on average nearly 50 pedestrian-train incidents per month over the 
period, which results in an average of 27.5 fatalities and 20.6 injuries per month. The 
standard deviation is large which mean the values are widely spread from the mean. 
See Table 26: Category E-a, fatalities and injuries descriptive statistics. 
Table 26: Category E-a, fatalities and injuries descriptive statistics 
E-a Occurrences Fatalities Injuries 
Mean 49.66666667 27.5 20.58333333 
Standard Error 3.285259395 1.994310088 1.742770058 
Median 49 25 18.5 
Mode 42 25 18 
Standard Deviation 11.38047238 6.908492797 6.037132572 
Range 43 25 17 
Minimum 28 15 13 
Maximum 71 40 30 
Sum 596 330 247 
Count 12 12 12 
5.2.3 By day of the week 
The number of E-a occurrences, fatalities and injuries per day of the week are shown 
in Figure 25: E-a occurrences, fatalities & injuries by day of the week. More E-a 
occurrences have been recorded on a Wednesday (n=100) and Thursday (n=102) 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
E-a Occurrences 28 42 41 48 56 42 45 63 53 71 57 50
Fatalities 15 25 23 31 37 24 23 32 24 40 25 31




















E-a Occurrences, Fatalities & Injuries per Month
E-a Occurrences Fatalities Injuries
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than any other day of the week over the period. Thursdays have the most fatalities 
(n=63) and 129 (n=129) fatalities in total have been recorded over a Friday, 
Saturday, Sunday-weekend period. Sundays, generally, have lower figures under all 
cases which is likely due to a reduced service being operated on the day.  
Figure 25: E-a occurrences, fatalities & injuries by day of the week 
5.2.4 By time of the day 
Figure 26: E-a occurrences, fatalities & injuries by time of day, clearly 
illustrates the concentration of incidents around the morning and afternoon peak 
periods, supporting research carried out by Savage, (2015) and Lerer & 
Matzopoulos, (1996). A particularly acute morning peak between 6AM and 8AM has 
103 (n=103) E-a occurrences, 57 (n=57) fatalities and 42 (n=42) injuries recorded in 
similar time periods over the analysis period. The afternoon peak period is a bit 
wider, from 4PM till 8PM, with a combined 206 (n=206) E-a occurrences, 103 
(n=103) fatalities and 99 (n=99) injuries. Pedestrian-rail occurrences outside of 
normal train operating hours were because of out-of-service-trains returning to rail 
siding areas or staging yards. These would occur after 23h00 in the evenings at a 
time when trespassers would least expect trains to be moving around. 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
E-a 48 87 91 100 102 91 77
Fatalities 33 47 42 49 63 48 48





























E-a Occurrences, Fatalities & Injuries by Day of the Week
E-a Fatalities Injuries
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Figure 26: E-a occurrences, fatalities & injuries by time of day 
5.2.5 Other results 
a.) There were 34 recorded E-a occurrences that have no fatalities or injuries, 
in other words, the person involved with a train collision escaped 
unscathed.  
b.) There were 115 records that were not assigned SANS categories. In this 
group, 40 fatalities were recorded and 48 injuries. With regards to the 
fatalities, in most cases, the cause of death was not apparent, and the bodies 































E-a 1 1 41 103 63 35 46 59 97 109 38 3
Fatalities 1 1 28 57 39 18 17 36 43 60 28 2


















E-a Occurrences, Fatalities & Injuries by Time of Day
E-a Fatalities Injuries 2 per. Mov. Avg. (E-a)
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5.2.6 Hypothesis tests H06 – H09 
RSR H06: No significant difference exists between the months of the year for 
the number of Category E-a occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the numbers 
of pedestrian-train incidents over the 12 months of the year, split into the variables 
for the study year periods (2015-2018) and the months of the year (January – 
December).   
The null hypothesis is that no significant difference exists between the months 
of the year and the number of E-a occurrences. 
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05: 
Observed values: 
E-a 2015 2016 2017 2018 Grand Total 
Month 
Jan 0 9 13 6 28 
Feb 0 17 17 8 42 
Mar 0 11 24 6 41 
Apr 15 13 8 12 48 
May 11 20 14 11 56 
Jun 7 19 7 9 42 
Jul 12 14 8 11 45 
Aug 17 19 19 8 63 
Sep 15 15 10 13 53 
Oct 21 25 10 15 71 
Nov 11 14 13 19 57 
Dec 13 9 13 15 50 
Grand Total 122 185 156 133 596 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 194.1667 3 64.7222 2.2828 0.0922 
Error 1,247.5000 44 28.3523 
Total 1,441.6667 47 
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Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the treatments are not significantly different for that level of 
significance. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
A statistically insignificant difference exists between the months of the year 
and the number of E-a occurrences. 
A standardisation exercise was carried out to calculate the Z scores for each 
month to allow an alternative comparison. (See Table 27: Standardising with Z 
scores). The months scoring above the mean are highlighted in red. The two months 
that have a total Z score adding up to more than two standard deviations above the 
mean are August (2.4329) and October (3.8927). 
Table 27: Standardising with Z scores 
2015 Z 2016 Z 2017 Z 2018 Z Sum of Z 
E-a
Jan 0 -2.3 9 -0.6 13 0.1064 6 -1.1708 -3.9535
Feb 0 -2.3 17 0.84 17 0.8363 8 -0.8059 -1.3989
Mar 0 -2.3 11 -0.3 24 2.1136 6 -1.1708 -1.5814
Apr 15 0.47 13 0.11 8 -0.8059 12 -0.0760 -0.3041
May 11 -0.3 20 1.38 14 0.2889 11 -0.2585 1.1556 
Jun 7 -1 19 1.2 7 -0.9884 9 -0.6234 -1.3989
Jul 12 -0.1 14 0.29 8 -0.8059 11 -0.2585 -0.8515
Aug 17 0.84 19 1.2 19 1.2013 8 -0.8059 2.4329 
Sep 15 0.47 15 0.47 10 -0.4410 13 0.1064 0.6082 
Oct 21 1.57 25 2.3 10 -0.4410 15 0.4714 3.8927 
Nov 11 -0.3 14 0.29 13 0.1064 19 1.2013 1.3381 
Dec 13 0.11 9 -0.6 13 0.1064 15 0.4714 0.0608 
Total 122 185 156 133 
Mean 
10.2 
Stand Dev P 
6.73 
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RSR H07: No significant difference exists between the days of the week for 
Category E-a occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the numbers 
of pedestrian-train incidents over the days of the week, split into the variables for the 
study year periods (2015-2018) and the days of the week (Sunday – Saturday).   
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the days of the 
week and the number of E-a occurrences. 
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05. 




Sunday Mon Tues Wed Thurs Friday Sat Totals 
2015 8 21 16 22 20 16 19 122 
2016 12 32 28 28 40 21 24 185 
2017 17 17 27 27 22 24 22 156 
2018 11 17 20 23 20 30 12 133 
Totals 48 87 91 100 102 91 77 596 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 505.7143 6 84.2857 2.2519 0.0780 
Error 786.0000 21 37.4286 
Total 1,291.7143 27 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the categories are not significantly different for that level of 
significance.  
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
No statistically significant difference exists between the days of the week for 
the number of E-a occurrences. 
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RSR H08: No significant difference exists between the hours of the day and 
Category E-a occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the numbers 
of pedestrian-train incidents over the course of a day, split into the variables for the 
study year periods (2015-2018) and four-hour segments.   
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the time of 
day and the number of E-a occurrences. 
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05: 





















2015 1 26 13 24 50 8 122 
2016 0 55 22 22 69 17 185 
2017 0 33 33 29 50 11 156 
2018 1 30 29 29 39 5 133 
Totals 2 144 97 104 208 41 596 
One-way ANOVA: 






F Statistic P-value 
Treatment 6,676.8333 5 1,335.3667 18.2027 1.7681e-06 
Error 1,320.5000 18 73.3611 
Total 7,997.3333 23 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is lower than 
0.05, suggesting that the one or more treatments are significantly different.  
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS REJECTED 
A statistically significant difference exists between the time of day and the 
number of E-a occurrences. 
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A vs B 8.2894 0.0010053  p<0.01 
A vs C 5.5458 0.0108901  p<0.05 
A vs D 5.9544 0.0059183  p<0.01 
A vs E 12.0255 0.0010053  p<0.01 
A vs F 2.2767 0.5919277 insignificant 
B vs C 2.7437 0.4131370 insignificant 
B vs D 2.3351 0.5698634 insignificant 
B vs E 3.7361 0.1372779 insignificant 
B vs F 6.0128 0.0054239  p<0.01 
C vs D 0.4086 0.8999947 insignificant 
C vs E 6.4798 0.0026964  p<0.01 
C vs F 3.2691 0.2396567 insignificant 
D vs E 6.0711 0.0049689  p<0.01 
D vs F 3.6777 0.1477738 insignificant 
E vs F 9.7489 0.0010053  p<0.01 
It can be concluded that category “E” corresponding with the time slot 16:00 – 
20:00 is statistically significant and corresponds to the afternoon peak period. 
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RSR H09: Zero correlation exists between the number of trains scheduled 
and E-a occurrences. 
To determine if there is any relationship between the number of E-a 
occurrences and train traffic densities, stating the null hypothesis, zero correlation 





2016 185 201745 
2017 156 198740 
2018 133 170822 
Totals 474 571307 
(X-Xbar) (Y-Ybar) Xbar x Ybar (X-Xbar)2 (Y-Ybar)2 
27 11309.33 305352 729 1.28E+08 
-2 8304.333 -16608.667 4 68961952 
-25 -19613.7 490341.67 625 3.85E+08 










“r” = 0.876674 is calculated to be close to 1, therefore a strong positive 
correlation exists. 
The scatterplot for the train traffic densities against the number of E-a 
occurrences is shown in Figure 27: Trains scheduled vs E-a occurrences. The linear 
relationship can clearly be seen and would suggest that as train density increases 
(number of trains scheduled), the number of pedestrian-rail incidents (E-a 
occurrences) would also increase. 
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Figure 27: Trains scheduled vs E-a occurrences 
5.3 THE TEMPORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF RAILWAY THEFT AND 
VANDALISM OCCURRENCES 
Answering research question Q3. 
By year 
A total of 4715 (n=4715) Category 1 and Category 2 occurrences for theft and 
vandalism of railway assets were recorded over the research period. Of all 
occurrences, 87% were on Prasa assets (n=4103), 10.2% on TFR (n=481) and 2.8% 
on the long distance Shosholoza Meyl service (n=131). (See Table 28: Security 
occurrences by operator). The average number of occurrences per year is 1178.75. 
Occurrences on Prasa assets increased by 23% between 2015 and 2018 with a 
high of 1471 (n=1471) occurrences in 2017. Occurrences on TFR assets have 























No. of E-a Occurrences
Trains Scheduled vs E-a Occurrences
Trains Sch
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Table 28: Security occurrences by operator 
Operator 2015 2016 2017 2018 Grand 
Total 
% 
PRASA RAIL 734 996 1471 902 4103 87.0% 
Transnet Freight Rail 44 56 142 239 481 10.2% 
Shosholoza Meyl 25 27 44 35 131 2.8% 
Grand Total 803 1079 1657 1176 4715 100.0% 
By month 
Table 29: Security occurrences by month, combines Category 1 & 2 
occurrences for theft and malicious damage to rail assets. The mean of the totals for 
the month is 393 occurrences with a standard deviation of 43. November has the 
largest number of occurrences (n=458) and February the lowest (n=291). 
Attacks on rolling stock components in section peaks in April (n=132) and 
May (n=148) and train control equipment records the highest number of occurrences 
in November (n=248).  
 Table 29: Security occurrences by month 
Category 





components in section 77 43 51 132 148 118 132 89 116 112 127 106 1251
b
Rolling stock 
components in yards 36 26 46 42 30 31 36 32 45 23 20 37 404
c
Civil infrastructure 
components in section 44 57 49 41 65 44 32 39 41 47 42 57 558
d
Civil infrastructure 
components in yards 
and sidings 3 3 4 3 4 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 28
e
Overhead traction 
equipment in section 13 5 17 6 8 3 4 4 6 6 7 6 85
f
Overhead traction 
equipment in yards and 
sidings 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 2 0 3 13
g
Train control equipment 
(signalling) in section 185 141 185 174 173 180 195 182 194 186 248 189 2232
h
Train control equipment 
(signalling) in yards and 
sidings 3 6 4 6 1 3 5 4 1 6 7 9 55
i
Ancillary equipment 
including public address 
systems, information 
boards, CCTV. 8 10 6 4 6 7 9 11 9 11 4 4 89
Grand Total 369 291 363 408 436 390 414 364 415 395 458 412 4715
Month
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The pareto chart in Figure 28: Pareto chart for occurrences per month, 
graphically illustrates the most problematic months. There is no indication of any 
seasonal trends with November signalling the start of Summer and the second 
highest occurrence month, May, commencing with the start of Winter.  
Figure 28: Pareto chart for occurrences per month 
By day of the week 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences are most prevalent on a Thursday with 527 and 
240 occurrences respectively on the day. The Friday (n=689), Saturday (n=632) and 
Sunday (n=558) weekend-period has a combined occurrence count of 1879 events, 
which amounts to approximately 40% of the total occurrences per week. (See Table 
30: Category 1 & 2 occurrences by day of the week). 
Theft of train control equipment occurs consistently throughout the week 
accounting for nearly half of all occurrences (n=2232). Most train control equipment 
theft takes place on a Friday (n=346). Rolling stock equipment are more at risk on 
Thursdays with 217 occurrences recorded. 
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Table 30: Category 1 & 2 occurrences by day of the week 
By time of the day 
Occurrences of theft and malicious damage show no discernible trends apart 
from a morning pre-peak period between 4AM and 6AM with 552 occurrences. 
Occurrences happen consistently between 6AM and 10PM with only the 4PM to 
6PM period recording lower than 400 occurrences (n=328). (See Figure 29: Category 
1 & 2 occurrences by time of day). The fact that no clear temporal trend exists is an 
indication of the rampant nature of occurrences of theft and vandalism on the rail 
network, with a total of 4715 combined Category 1 and 2 occurrences over the 
research period. The assets most at risk are train control equipment in sections, which 
means that the entire network is potentially a target for criminals. 
Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun Grand Total
a Rolling stock components in section 183 190 192 217 188 145 136 1251
b Rolling stock components in yards 65 64 65 74 55 36 45 404
c
Civil infrastructure components in 
section 79 86 94 88 73 68 70 558
d
Civil infrastructure components in 
yards and sidings 7 5 3 6 0 4 3 28
e
Overhead traction equipment in 
section 11 10 15 11 10 19 9 85
f
Overhead traction equipment in 
yards and sidings 4 1 1 2 1 2 2 13
g
Train control equipment (signalling) 
in section 294 319 315 342 346 337 279 2232
h
Train control equipment (signalling) 
in yards and sidings 7 9 9 7 6 11 6 55
i
Ancillary equipment including public 
address systems, information 
boards, CCTV. 9 14 18 20 10 10 8 89
Grand Total 659 698 712 767 689 632 558 4715
Category 1 + 2
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Figure 29: Category 1 & 2 occurrences by time of day 
5.3.1 Hypothesis tests H010 – H012 
RSR H010: No significant differences exist between the months of the year 
for Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of Category 1 and 2 occurrences taking place over the 12 months of the year, split 
into the variables for the study year periods (2015-2018) and the months of the year 
(January – December). 
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the months of 
the year and the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
















































Category 1 +2 Occurrences by Time of Day
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Observed values: 









Jan 65 106 84 114 369 
Feb 66 54 98 73 291 
Mar 81 70 110 102 363 
Apr 77 82 150 99 408 
May 86 60 189 101 436 
Jun 74 72 136 108 390 
Jul 63 102 147 102 414 
Aug 50 126 131 57 364 
Sep 77 130 110 98 415 
Oct 58 95 133 109 395 
Nov 54 91 184 129 458 
Dec 52 91 185 84 412 
Total 803 1079 1657 1176 4715 
One-way ANOVA: 






F statistic P-value 
Treatment 31,655.7292 3 10,551.9097 18.4293 6.8455e-08 
Error 25,192.7500 44 572.5625 
Total 56,848.4792 47 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is lower than 
0.05, suggesting that the one or more categories are significantly different. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS REJECTED 
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A statistically significant difference exists between the months of the year and 
the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
A Tukey calculation was performed as an ad hoc test but was not conclusive. 
Standardising the scores produces the following Z scores for a mean of 98.229 and a 
standard deviation of 34.414: 
2015 2016 2017 2018 Sum of Z 
Jan -0.9655 0.225803 -0.41347 0.458264 -0.69496325
Feb -0.9365 -1.2852 -0.00666 -0.7331 -2.96146363
Mar -0.5006 -0.82027 0.342033 0.109572 -0.86930944
Apr -0.6168 -0.47158 1.504341 0.022399 0.438286932 
May -0.3553 -1.11085 2.637591 0.080514 1.251902453 
Jun -0.7040 -0.76216 1.097533 0.283918 -0.08475161
Jul -1.0236 0.109572 1.417168 0.109572 0.612633115 
Aug -1.4014 0.806956 0.952245 -1.19802 -0.84025174
Sep -0.6168 0.923187 0.342033 -0.00666 0.641690812 
Oct -1.1689 -0.09383 1.01036 0.312976 0.060536869 
Nov -1.2852 -0.21006 2.492303 0.89413 1.891171791 
Dec -1.3433 -0.21006 2.521361 -0.41347 0.554517721 
The months with values that are above the mean are shaded. The analysis 
would indicate that incidents of theft and vandalism are statistically more prevalent 
in the months of April, May, July, September, October, November and December. 
The month of November has a score significantly above the mean (n=1.89) as the 
worst month for recorded occurrences. Conversely, incidents of theft and vandalism 
are less likely to occur in February, with a Z score of -2.96 (n=-2.96) below the 
mean. 
132 Chapter 5: Data Analysis & Results 
RSR H011: No significant differences exist between the days of the week and 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference between the 
number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences and the days of the week, split into the 
variables for the study-year periods (2015-2018) and the days of the week (Sunday – 
Saturday).   
The null hypothesis is that no significant difference exists between the days of 
the week for the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05: 
Observed values:  
Cat 
1+2 
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Total 
2015 105 103 114 124 138 111 108 803 
2016 116 160 173 174 160 161 135 1079 
2017 207 227 233 243 278 257 212 1657 
2018 130 169 178 171 191 160 177 1176 
Total 558 659 698 712 767 689 632 4715 
One-way ANOVA: 
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Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the treatments are not significantly different for that level of 
significance.  
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
No significant difference exists between the days of the week for the number of 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
RSR H012: No significant differences exists between the time of day and 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 
Using statistical tests to check if there is a significant difference in the number 
of Category 1 and 2 occurrences, happening over the course of a day, split into the 
variables for the study year periods (2015-2018) and four-hour segments.   
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the time of 
day and the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences. 


















2015 71 182 168 157 133 92 803 
2016 89 206 205 204 197 178 1079 
2017 129 316 293 301 277 341 1657 
2018 95 254 238 225 199 165 1176 
Totals 384 958 904 887 806 776 4715 
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One-way ANOVA: 






F statistic P-value 
Treatment 53,953.2083 5 10,790.6417 2.5890 0.0621 
Error 75,020.7500 18 4,167.8194 
Total 128,973.9583 23 
Conclusion from Anova: 
The p-value corresponding to the F-statistic of one-way ANOVA is higher than 
0.05, suggesting that the categories are not significantly different for that level of 
significance. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
A statistically insignificant difference exists between the time of day and the 
number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences. This would suggest that the occurrences of 
theft and vandalism is rife and happens through the day. 
…………………………..………. 
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5.4 THE EFFECT OF OCCURRENCES OF THEFT AND VANDALISM ON 
TRAIN OPERATIONS 
Answering research question Q4. 
Table 31: Train service information, displays the commuter rail yearly train 
service information for the reporting years 2011/12 to 2018/19. The average train set 
availability at March 2019 was at 42, which is 48% of the number of train sets 
required to run an efficient service.  
Delays during the peak period has increased by 24% from 809 delayed services 
in 2011/12 to 1006 delayed services in 2018/19. Similarly, delays during the off-peak 
period has increased by 100% from 1579 delayed services in 2011/12 to 3173 
delayed services in 2018/19. 
The overall train service has deteriorated significantly with only 47.8% of 
trains running on-time during the peak period. 
Table 31: Train service information  
Train Service Information 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Train sets required 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
Average train set availability ** ** 83 85 79 71 49 42 
Train sets correctly configured ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 16 
Delays (Peak) 809 635 857 1058 990 1020 1156 1006 
Delays (Off Peak) 1579 1192 676 2168 2060 2273 3316 3173 
Cancellations (Peak) 145 32 91 154 180 484 895 477 
Cancellations (Off Peak) 103 42 78 143 208 634 1338 1109 
% On Time (Peak) 75.7% 81.5% 75.3% 70.2% 71.7% 66.8% 53.7% 47.8% 
% On Time (Off Peak) 82.6% 87.0% 82.5% 77.6% 78.4% 74.8% 58.9% 54.6% 
** Data not available 
The regional train performance in Table 32: Regional train performance, shows 
the number of scheduled trains at an all-time low of 155502 scheduled trains, at the 
end of the 2018/19 reporting year. The total number of cancelled services increased 
by 181% in 2015/16 from 6829 to 19223 cancelled services. Similarly, the total 
number of delayed services increased from 20129 trains in 2009/10 to 67541 trains in 
2017/18. Overall only 57% of all scheduled services run on-time. 
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Table 32: Regional train performance 
Year Scheduled  Cancelled Delayed % Trains 
cancelled 
  % Trains 
right time 
2009/2010 197,081 2,772 20,129 1.39% 90% 
2010/2011 199,362 7,372 25,470 3.78% 87% 
2011/2012 195,193 4,731 38,532 2.43% 80% 
2012/2013 194,971 1,265 29,731 0.65% 85% 
2013/2014 204,087 3,408 41,028 1.67% 79% 
2014/2015 206,599 5,421 51,421 2.61% 74% 
2015/2016 205,713 6,829 48,477 3.33% 76% 
2016/2017 200,957 19,223 51,765 9.59% 71% 
2017/2018 198,477 37,542 67,541 18.87% 57% 
2018/2019 155,502 24,761 62,218 16.12% 52% 
Patronage and ticket issue data is summarised in Table 33: Patronage & ticket 
issues), for the reporting years 2011/2012 till 2018/19. Patronage has shrunk by -
75% from a high of 185520887 (n=185520887) in 2013/14 to a low of 46986046 
(n=46986046) in 2018/19. Similarly, ticket sales show a decline for the same period 
of -64% from a high of 32478907 (n=32478907) to a low of 11715433 
(n=11715433) ticket issues. Metro Plus ticket issues have fallen by 79% from its 
high in 2013/14 of 4240058 (n=4240058) ticket issues to only 872537 (n=872537) 
issues in 2018/19. 
Table 33: Patronage & ticket issues 
Patronage & Ticket Issues - Yearly Trend 
CATEGORY 2011/2012 2012/2013 2013/2014 2014/2015 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 
Patronage 173,969,013  180,409,642  185,520,887  174,934,932  162,997,599  127,745,294  75,121,677  46,986,046  
Total Issues 32,784,367 31,231,302 32,478,907 31,246,175 28,932,898 24,254,440 15,899,058 11,715,433  
Single Issues 22,925,133 22,392,198 23,148,588 22,821,546 21,398,231 18,660,559 12,740,582 9,766,107  
Return Issues 5,014,577 4,390,964 4,521,096 4,078,683 3,568,382 2,655,918 1,567,230 960,867  
Weekly 
Issues
3,283,755 2,747,602 2,913,518 2,614,357 2,284,824 1,613,818 812,786 522,512  
Monthly 
Issues
1,560,902 1,700,538 1,895,705 1,731,589 1,681,461 1,324,145 778,460 465,947  
Chapter 5: Data Analysis & Results 137 
5.4.1 Hypothesis tests H014 – H016 
RSR H014: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences 
and trains scheduled. 
To determine if there is any relationship between the number of Category 1 and 
2 occurrences and trains scheduled, stating the null hypothesis; zero correlation 
exists between the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences and the number of trains 
scheduled. 
Therefore: 
Year Cat 1 + 2 
Trains 
Scheduled 
2016 1079 44309 
2017 1657 43673 
2018 1176 34835 
Totals 3912 122817 
(X-Xbar) (Y-Ybar) 
Xbar x 
Ybar (X-Xbar)2 (Y-Ybar)2 
-225 3370 -758250 50625 11356900 
353 2734 965102 124609 7474756 
-128 -6104 781312 16384 37258816 










“r” = 0.301416, therefore a weak to moderate positive correlation exists. The 
scatterplot in Figure 30: Trains scheduled vs occurrences scatterplot, displays this 
weak-to-moderate positive linear relationship. The weak positive correlation is 
inconclusive, and it cannot be inferred with any confidence that there is a linear 
relationship between Category 1 and 2 occurrences and the number of trains 
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scheduled. This could indicate that other factors may be influencing the number of 
trains scheduled, and not solely occurrences of theft and vandalism. 
Figure 30: Trains scheduled vs occurrences scatterplot 
RSR H015: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences 
and trains cancelled. 
To determine if there is any relationship between the number of Category 1 and 
2 occurrences and trains cancelled, stating the null hypothesis; zero correlation exists 
between the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences and the number of trains 
cancelled. 
Therefore: 
Year Cat 1 + 2 
Trains 
Cancelled 
2016 1079 17817 
2017 1657 27568 
2018 1176 34076 
Totals 3912 79461 
(X-Xbar) (Y-Ybar) 
Xbar x 
Ybar (X-Xbar)2 (Y-Ybar)2 
-225 -8670 1950750 50625 75168900 
353 1081 381593 124609 1168561 
-128 7589 -971392 16384 57592921 
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“r” = 0.2686487, therefore a weak positive correlation exists. 
The scatterplot in Figure 31: Trains cancelled vs occurrences scatterplot) 
displays this weak positive linear relationship, with points loosely distributed around 
the trend-line. The weak positive correlation is inconclusive, and it cannot be 
inferred with any confidence that there is a linear relationship between Category 1 
and 2 occurrences and the number of trains cancelled. 
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RSR H016: Zero correlation exists between Category 1 and 2 occurrences 
and trains delayed. 
To determine if there is any relationship between the number of Category 1 and 
2 occurrences and trains delayed, stating the null hypothesis; zero correlation exists 
between the number of Category 1 and 2 occurrences and the number of trains 
delayed. 
Therefore: 
Year Cat 1 + 2 
Trains 
Delayed 
2016 1079 50358.656 
2017 1657 59984.69 
2018 1176 69587.34 
Totals 3912 179930.69 
(X-Xbar) (Y-Ybar) 
Xbar x 
Ybar (X-Xbar)2 (Y-Ybar)2 
-225 -9618.239 2164103.8 50625 92510526 
353 7.7949974 2751.6341 124609 60.761985 
-128 9610.4442 -1230137 16384 92360638 










“r” = 0.1573825, therefore a weak positive correlation exists. 
The scatterplot in Figure 32: Trains delayed vs occurrences scatterplot displays 
this weak-to-moderate positive linear relationship, with points loosely distributed 
around the trend-line. The weak positive correlation is inconclusive, and it cannot be 
inferred with any confidence that there is a linear relationship between Category 1 
and 2 occurrences and the number of trains delayed. 
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5.5 THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATIONS OF CATEGORY E-A 
OCCURRENCES 
Answering research question Q5. 
Commuter routes account for 94% of all pedestrian-rail occurrences in the 
research region, compared to 60% as found by (Savage, 2015) with the balance of 
occurrences belonging to the freight and long-distance rail operators. A total of 75% 
of occurrences were recorded at stations and 25% along line sections, compared to 
the 60% unintentional deaths at crossings and stations and 48% unintentional deaths 
along line-sections found by (Savage, 2015). 
Table 34: Category E-a top 20 locations, shows the top 20 locations that have 
the most E-a occurrences over the research period. The section of the line between 
Bonteheuwel Station and Khayelitsha Station has seven stations within the top 10 
worst locations. Interestingly, Philippi, Nyanga and Nolungile Stations all show zero 
E-a occurrences for 2018. Similarly, for the year 2018, Bonteheuwel and Heideveld
Stations show an improvement by recording only four E-a occurrences between 
them. 
The first area, along the Philippi to Nyanga Station corridor is the site where 
the entire corridor was walled off with a concrete fence. This countermeasure has 
proved effective in reducing the number of E-a occurrences to zero in 2018. The 
second area at Bonteheuwel Station, part of the notorious Bonteheuwel-Lavistown-
Netreg split that has been subject to intense enforcement measures to combat 
rampant theft of rail assets in the area. The enforcement measures may have had a 
positive effect on the number of pedestrian-rail occurrences as well. 
Northern Line stations also feature prominently with Parow, Elsies River, 
Bellville and Kuils River Stations all recording more than nine occurrences over the 
period. Closer to the CBD, Salt River, Woodstock and Esplanade Stations are hot-
spot areas for E-a occurrences. In Stellenbosch Municipality, Du Toit and Klapmuts 
Station areas are worst performing and in the Drakenstein Municipality, Mbekweni 
Station has nine occurrences. The network wide hot-spot map for E-a occurrences is 
shown in Figure 33 Category E-a occurrences hot-spot map. 
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Table 34: Category E-a top 20 locations 
Station Area 2015 2016 2017 2018 Totals % Cum 
% 
1 Philippi Station 6 10 11 0 27 4.5% 4.5% 
2 Nyanga Station 6 9 7 0 22 3.7% 8.2% 
3 Bonteheuwel Station 5 7 6 2 20 3.4% 11.6% 
4 Kraaifontein Station 3 3 6 8 20 3.4% 14.9% 
5 Heideveld Station 2 5 7 2 16 2.7% 17.6% 
6 Nolungile Station 4 6 5 0 15 2.5% 20.1% 
7 Woodstock Station 3 4 2 6 15 2.5% 22.7% 
8 Khayelitsha Station 4 3 6 1 14 2.3% 25.0% 
9 Nonkqubela Station 3 5 3 1 12 2.0% 27.0% 
10 Bellville Station 1 3 4 2 10 1.7% 28.7% 
11 Langa Station  2 3 4 1 10 1.7% 30.4% 
12 Elsies River Station 1 4 1 3 9 1.5% 31.9% 
13 Kuils River Station 3 2 3 1 9 1.5% 33.4% 
14 Mbekweni Station 1 1 0 7 9 1.5% 34.9% 
15 Parow Station 4 3 2 0 9 1.5% 36.4% 
16 Salt River Station 1 3 1 4 9 1.5% 37.9% 
17 Du Toit Station 2 3 2 1 8 1.3% 39.3% 
18 Esplanade Station 2 3 1 2 8 1.3% 40.6% 
19 Klapmuts Station 2 1 1 4 8 1.3% 41.9% 
20 Lentegeur Station - 
Philippi Station 
3 0 2 3 8 1.3% 43.3% 
.
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Figure 33 Category E-a occurrences hot-spot map 
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5.6 THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATIONS OF FATALITIES AND INJURY 
OCCURRENCES 
Answering research question Q6. 
Fatalities 
The top five locations for pedestrian-rail fatalities have all recorded more than 
10 fatalities over the research period. Nyanga (n=18), Kraaifontein (n=15), 
Heideveld (n=13) and Philippi (n=13) and Khayelitsha (n=11) Stations are the worst 
performing. (See Table 35: Category E-a fatalities – Top 20 location). The fatality 
rate for the stations listed above have all shown improvement in 2018 with all 
stations recording zero fatalities for the year, apart from Kraaifontein Station where 
the fatality rate has increased to six (n=6) over 2018.  The section of line between 
Kraaifontein Station and Muldersvlei Station also shows an increase in fatalities in 
2018, indicating that this is becoming a high-risk area.  
Table 35: Category E-a fatalities – Top 20 location 
Station Area 2015 2016 2017 2018 Totals % Cum 
% 
1 Nyanga Station 6 6 6 0 18 5.5% 5.5% 
2 Kraaifontein Station 3 1 5 6 15 4.5% 10.0% 
3 Heideveld Station 2 6 5 0 13 3.9% 13.9% 
4 Philippi Station 2 6 5 0 13 3.9% 17.9% 
5 Khayelitsha Station 3 3 5 0 11 3.3% 21.2% 
6 Bonteheuwel Station 4 5 1 0 10 3.0% 24.2% 
7 Bellville Station 1 2 2 2 7 2.1% 26.4% 
8 Lentegeur Station - Philippi Station 3 0 2 2 7 2.1% 28.5% 
9 Kraaifontein Station - Muldersvlei 
Station 
1 1 1 3 6 1.8% 30.3% 
10 Kuils River Station 2 1 2 0 5 1.5% 31.8% 
11 Langa Station  1 1 3 0 5 1.5% 33.3% 
12 Netreg Station 2 2 1 0 5 1.5% 34.8% 
13 Nolungile Station 1 2 2 0 5 1.5% 36.4% 
14 Nyanga Station - Philippi Station 1 3 0 1 5 1.5% 37.9% 
15 Ysterplaat Station 0 3 1 1 5 1.5% 39.4% 
16 Blackheath Station - Kuils River 
Station 
0 0 1 3 4 1.2% 40.6% 
17 Cape Town Station 1 3 0 0 4 1.2% 41.8% 
18 Elsies River Station 1 1 1 1 4 1.2% 43.0% 
19 Klapmuts Station 2 0 0 2 4 1.2% 44.2% 
20 Koeberg Road Station 1 1 2 0 4 1.2% 45.5% 
The network wide E-a fatalities hot-spot map is shown in Figure 34: Category 
E-a fatalities hot-spot map.
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Figure 34: Category E-a fatalities hot-spot map 
Chapter 5: Data Analysis & Results 147 
Injuries 
The worst locations for injuries related to E-a occurrences are shown in Table 
36: Category E-a injuries top 20 locations. Philippi Station has the greatest number 
of occurrences (n=14) but shows an improvement in 2018 with zero (n=0) 
occurrences. Woodstock Station in the City as well as the section of line running 
through Paarl have the highest number of injuries (n=4 each) for 2018. Woodstock 
Station is a popular boarding and alighting station for fare evaders. Kenilworth 
Station also has four (n=4) injury occurrences in 2018 after having recorded zero 
(n=0) injuries the previous reporting years. The network wide E-a injuries hot-spot 
map is shown in Figure 35: Category E-a injuries hot-spot map. 
Table 36: Category E-a injuries top 20 locations 
Station Area 2015 2016 2017 2018 Totals % Cum 
% 
1 Philippi Station 4 4 6 0 14 5.7% 5.7% 
2 Bonteheuwel Station 1 2 4 2 9 3.6% 9.3% 
3 Nolungile Station 3 4 2 0 9 3.6% 13.0% 
4 Woodstock Station 1 4 0 4 9 3.6% 16.6% 
5 Du Toit Station 2 3 2 1 8 3.2% 19.8% 
6 Dal Josafat Station - Mbekweni 
Station 
0 1 1 4 6 2.4% 22.3% 
7 Nonkqubela Station 1 3 2 0 6 2.4% 24.7% 
8 Bellville Station 0 1 4 0 5 2.0% 26.7% 
9 Elsies River Station 0 3 0 2 5 2.0% 28.7% 
10 Esplanade Station 2 2 1 0 5 2.0% 30.8% 
11 Heideveld Station 0 1 2 2 5 2.0% 32.8% 
12 Maitland Station 2 2 0 1 5 2.0% 34.8% 
13 Parow Station 3 2 0 0 5 2.0% 36.8% 
14 Stikland Station 1 2 1 1 5 2.0% 38.9% 
15 Blackheath Station  1 0 3 0 4 1.6% 40.5% 
16 Brackenfell Station  0 0 1 3 4 1.6% 42.1% 
17 Kenilworth Station 0 0 0 4 4 1.6% 43.7% 
18 Kraaifontein Station 0 2 0 2 4 1.6% 45.3% 
19 Langa Station  1 1 1 1 4 1.6% 47.0% 
20 Melton Rose Station 1 0 2 1 4 1.6% 48.6% 
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Figure 35: Category E-a injuries hot-spot map 
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5.7 THE SPATIAL CONCENTRATIONS OF CATEGORY 1 AND 2 
OCCURRENCES 
Answering research question Q7. 
An analysis of the top 40 locations for theft and vandalism for 2018 reveals 
that 45% of occurrences took place at stations and 55% along line sections. Terminal 
stations, and stations that have a siding, yard or depot attached are regularly targeted, 
with Cape Town, Bellville, Kraaifontein, Wellington and Chris Hani Stations all 
featuring in the top 10. 
The hot-spot locations for the combined Category 1 and Category 2 
occurrences for theft and malicious damage to rail infrastructure is shown in Table 
37: Combined Category 1 & 2 occurrences – Top 20 locations. Cape Town and 
Paarden Eiland Stations account for the most occurrences overall within the CBD 
region (n= 354 and n=247 respectively).    
Table 37: Combined Category 1 & 2 occurrences – Top 20 locations 
Locations 2015 2016 2017 2018 Totals % Cum 
% 
1 Cape Town Station 55 106 117 76 354 7.5% 7.5% 
2 Paarden Eiland Station 40 112 82 13 247 5.2% 12.7% 
3 Bonteheuwel Station - Netreg Station 33 84 83 15 215 4.6% 17.3% 
4 Bellville Station 7 16 101 34 158 3.4% 20.7% 
5 Bonteheuwel Station - Lavistown 
Station 
31 45 56 8 140 3.0% 23.6% 
6 Nyanga Station - Philippi Station 33 30 50 18 131 2.8% 26.4% 
7 Chris Hani Station 7 19 78 19 123 2.6% 29.0% 
8 Kraaifontein Station 10 20 56 27 113 2.4% 31.4% 
9 Kapteinsklip Station 6 11 71 16 104 2.2% 33.6% 
10 Belhar Station - Lavistown Station 37 32 29 4 102 2.2% 35.8% 
11 Heideveld Station - Nyanga Station 21 43 31 6 101 2.1% 37.9% 
12 Wellington Station 12 12 52 24 100 2.1% 40.0% 
13 Cape Town Station - Woodstock 
Station 
10 28 25 36 99 2.1% 42.1% 
14 Heideveld Station - Netreg Station 15 20 31 17 83 1.8% 43.9% 
15 Salt River Station 17 15 29 18 79 1.7% 45.6% 
16 Lentegeur Station - Philippi Station 28 20 12 15 75 1.6% 47.2% 
17 Worcester Station 3 9 20 22 54 1.1% 48.3% 
18 Bonteheuwel Station - Langa Station 4 12 26 9 51 1.1% 49.4% 
19 Langa Station - Mutual Station 3 5 25 18 51 1.1% 50.5% 
20 Langa Station - Pinelands Station 4 9 22 16 51 1.1% 51.6% 
The Central Line grouping of stations between Langa and Chris Hani 
cumulatively account for 1125 (n=1125) occurrences. The second largest grouping 
are those within the CBD accounting for 779 (n=779) occurrences. The third group 
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contains Bellville and Kraaifontein Stations who combined have 271 (n=271) 
occurrences.  
The network wide combined Category 1 and 2 occurrences hot-spot map is 
shown in Figure 36: Category 1 + 2 medium and high occurrences hot-spot map. 
Individual hot-spot maps for all sub Category 1 and sub Category 2 occurrences were 
produced, and these are attached to this document in Appendix D. 
5.8 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMBINED CATEGORY E-A, 1 
AND 2 SPATIAL CONCENTRATIONS 
Answering research question Q8. 
Each location will be viewed in more detail with a description of the type of 
occurrences specific to the individual areas. The overall combined Category E-a, 
Category 1 and Category 2 hot-spot areas for the region is shown in Figure 37: All 
category hot-spot map – Metro. 
Breede Valley 
The stations and section between Worcester and Chavonnes Stations have      
26 Category 2-a occurrences mostly train windows being broken as a result of stone-
throwing. (See Figure 38: All category hot-spot map – Breede Valley). 
There are 16 occurrences of theft of train control equipment (see Table 38: 
Breede Valley occurrences) with the most targeted assets being cabling, relay rooms 
and electrical substations.  
Table 38: Breede Valley occurrences 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-e 1-g 1-i 2-a 2-c 2-g E-a Grand Total
Chavonnes Station 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 5
Chavonnes Station - Worcester 
Station 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 5
Worcester Station 6 1 4 5 9 1 23 3 2 2 56
Grand Total 6 1 4 5 16 1 26 3 2 2 66
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Figure 36: Category 1 + 2 medium and high occurrences hot-spot map 
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Figure 37: All category hot-spot map – Metro 
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Figure 38: All category hot-spot map – Breede Valley 
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Cape Flats 
The Cape Flats section is discussed in three areas as shown in Figure 39: All 
category hot-spot map – Cape Flats.  
Area 1 – Netreg Station to Philippi Station 
Occurrences of theft of train control equipment is rife with 224 (n=224) 
incidents involving mainly the theft of signal cabling. (See Table 39: Cape Flats 
occurrences – Area 1). Track boxes and equipment inside apparatus cases also 
targeted. 
The second most targeted group for incidents of theft are civil infrastructure 
components in section (Category 1-c) which include the theft of railway clips and 
springs, track box cages, transformers, apparatus cases and doors.  
113 (n=113) E-a occurrences were recorded with Philippi and Nyanga Station’s 
accounting for more than half (n=62).  
Table 39: Cape Flats occurrences – Area 1 
Area 2 - Philippi Station to Chris Hani Station 
Category 1-a occurrences for theft of rolling stock components in section has 
99 (n=99) occurrences over the period with 90 (n=90) of those recorded at Chris 
Hani Station. A review of the descriptions provided in the data shows that a number 
of incidents uses the term “...stolen on route from Chris Hani”, indicating that Chris 
Hani was the station where the train started its journey but is not necessarily an 
indication of exactly where the crime took place. The same applies to Category 2-a 
occurrences for Chris Hani Station. This significantly skews the data for Chris Hani 
Station. 
Location 1-a 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-f 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-c 2-e 2-g 2-i E-a Grand Total
Heideveld Station 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 16 25
Heideveld Station - Netreg Station 1 19 0 6 0 35 0 0 4 6 6 6 0 1 84
Heideveld Station - Nyanga Station 0 9 0 3 0 72 0 0 2 2 1 12 0 8 109
Netreg Station 8 3 0 3 0 1 0 0 6 1 0 3 0 8 33
Nyanga Station 0 3 0 0 0 5 3 0 5 0 0 3 1 25 45
Nyanga Station - Philippi Station 4 10 0 4 0 82 0 0 7 8 0 16 0 14 145
Philippi Station 1 1 1 0 1 3 4 0 6 0 0 3 0 37 57
Philippi Station - Stock Road Station 1 2 0 1 0 25 0 0 1 1 0 8 0 4 43
Grand Total 16 51 1 17 1 224 7 1 33 18 7 51 1 113 541
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Nolungile, Khayelitsha and Nonkqubela Stations fair the worst for E-a 
occurrences with 41 (n=41) incidents. A review of the E-a occurrences showed that 
there were 20 fatalities and 17 injuries at the three stations concerned. (See Table 40: 
Cape Flats occurrences – Area 2). 
Table 40: Cape Flats occurrences – Area 2 
Area 3 – Philippi Station to Kapteinsklip Station 
Similarly, to Chris Hani Station, Kapteinsklip is also a terminal station and all 
journey crimes get logged to it, without knowing where exactly the incident took 
place en route to its destination. Category 1-g occurrences related to train control 
equipment has 80 (n=80) recorded incidents with majority of them taking place in 
section between Lentegeur and Philippi Stations, which also has eight (n=8) 
Category E-a occurrences. (See Table 41: Cape Flats occurrences – Area 3). Seven 
fatalities were recorded between Lentegeur and Philippi Stations with six of the 
seven fatalities all as a result of being struck by a train.   
Table 41: Cape Flats occurrences – Area 3 
Location 1-a 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-i 2-a 2-c 2-e 2-g 2-h 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Chris Hani Station 90 1 1 0 1 1 24 4 0 1 0 0 1 2 126
Chris Hani Station - Kuyusa Station 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 7
Khayelitsha Station 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 14 1 27
Khayelitsha Station - Kuyusa Station 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 1 8 0 0 3 0 18
Khayelitsha Station - Nonkqubela Station 0 3 0 0 9 0 2 1 0 8 0 0 3 1 27
Kuyasa Station 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 7
Mandalay Station 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 10
Mandalay Station - Nolungile Station 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 1 2 17
Mandalay Station - Stock Road Station 0 6 0 2 24 0 0 2 0 12 0 0 1 0 47
Nolungile Station 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 2 22
Nolungile Station - Nonkqubela Station 0 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 10
Nonkqubela Station 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 12 3 20
Stock Road Station 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 5 0 12
Grand Total 99 13 1 2 54 4 34 15 1 41 1 4 66 15 350
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-e 2-g 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Kapteinsklip Station 58 0 0 1 0 5 3 0 34 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 104
Kapteinsklip Station - Mitchell's Plain 1 0 11 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 1 31
Lentegeur Station 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 14
Lentegeur Station - Mitchell's Plain Station 0 0 7 0 0 16 0 0 2 1 0 1 6 0 0 0 33
Lentegeur Station - Philippi Station 0 0 7 0 2 47 0 0 4 0 1 1 13 0 8 1 84
Mitchell's  Plain Station 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 6
Grand Total 60 1 26 1 2 80 6 2 41 1 2 2 27 3 14 4 272
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Ikapa 
The results for the Ikapa area are divided into six areas as shown in Figure 40: 
All category hot-spot map – Ikapa. 
Area 1 – Cape Town Station to Salt River Station, Cape Town Station to 
Ysterplaat 
With Cape Town being a terminal station, all journey crimes on rolling stock 
are attributed to the location the theft or damage was discovered. Cape Town Station 
therefore has a disproportionate number of Category 1-a (n=181) and Category 2-a 
(n=145) occurrences. (See Table 42: Ikapa occurrences – Area 1). 
The area includes the major train staging yard at Paarden Eiland which is the 
location for all Category 1-b occurrences of theft of rolling stock components in yard 
(n=186). 
Theft and damage of train control equipment has 145 and 42 occurrences 
recorded mainly between Cape Town and Salt River Stations. 
Woodstock Station has 15 Category E-a occurrences, including four fatalities 
and nine injuries. 
Table 42: Ikapa occurrences – Area 1 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-d 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-d 2-g 2-h 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Cape Town Station 181 0 2 0 15 0 1 145 0 2 0 6 0 2 7 9 370
Cape Town Station - Esplanade Station 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Cape Town Station - Paarden Eiland Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Cape Town Station - Woodstock Station 1 1 2 0 70 0 0 5 3 0 0 17 0 0 4 2 105
Esplanade Station 4 12 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 8 2 37
Esplanade Station - Paarden Eiland Station 0 0 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 12
Esplanade Station - Ysterplaat Station 1 0 5 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 11
Paarden Eiland Station 8 186 0 0 1 2 0 1 48 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 251
Paarden Eiland Station - Ysterplaat Station 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 7
Salt  River Station 2 45 1 1 3 2 0 3 19 0 1 2 0 0 9 0 88
Salt River Station - Woodstock Station 0 0 4 0 32 0 0 3 0 1 0 9 0 0 7 2 58
Woodstock Station 2 0 1 0 6 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 15 1 29
Ysterplaat Station 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 2 21
Grand Total 203 244 22 1 145 4 2 167 72 6 1 42 1 3 62 20 995
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Area 2 – Salt River Station to Mutual Station, Ysterplaat Station to Mutual 
Station, Maitland Station to Pinelands Station 
Category 1-g and 2-g related to the theft and damage of train control equipment 
feature most prominently with 86 and 31 occurrences respectively. Control 
equipment theft regularly occurs in the sections between Maitland Station and 
Woltemade Station (n=23), Woltemade Station to Ysterplaat Station (n=12) and 
Mutual Station to Ysterplaat Station and Ndabeni Station to Pinelands Station with 
10 occurrences each. (See Table 43: Ikapa occurrences – Area 2). 
A total of eight (n=8) E-a occurrences were recorded at Mutual Station, six 
(n=6) at Maitland Station and five (n=5) at Koeberg Road Station. Combined the 
number of fatalities at the three stations amounted to nine (n=9), with eight (n-=8) 
injuries. 
Table 43: Ikapa occurrences – Area 2 
Area 3 – Athlone Station to Hazendal Station 
A total of 32 (n=32) occurrences of train control equipment theft was recorded 
in the line section between Hazendal and Pinelands Stations. 
(See Table 44: Ikapa occurrences – Area 3). 
Location 1-a 1-c 1-d 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-g 2-h E-a Undefined Grand Total
Koeberg Road Station 3 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 5 3 17
Koeberg Road Station - Maitland Station 0 5 0 9 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 1 0 20
Maitland Station 1 4 0 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 23
Maitland Station - Mutual Station 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Maitland Station - Ndabeni Station 1 5 0 7 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 18
Maitland Station - Woltemade Station 0 13 0 23 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 3 0 49
Mutual Station 6 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 8 1 21
Mutual Station - Thornton Station 0 5 0 5 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 14
Mutual Station - Woltemade Station 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 10
Mutual Station - Ysterplaat Station 2 5 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 23
Ndabeni Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 3
Ndabeni Station - Pinelands Station 0 2 0 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Pinelands Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 0 4
Woltemade Station 1 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 11
Woltemade Station - Ysterplaat Station 0 7 0 12 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 0 0 26
Grand Total 15 53 3 86 2 5 14 1 11 31 1 28 6 256
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Table 44: Ikapa occurrences – Area 3 
 
Area 4 – Langa Station to Lavistown Station 
A total of 765 occurrences have been recorded in this area in total. The section 
of track between Bonteheuwel and Netreg Stations are the most active with 
222 occurrences in the section alone, with the main target for theft and malicious 
damage being train control equipment, with 141 occurrences. (See Table 45: Ikapa 
occurrences – Area 4). 
A significant number of E-a occurrences involving a member of public being 
struck by a train has been recorded at Bonteheuwel (n=20) and Langa (n=10) 
Stations, with a total of 15 fatalities and 13 injuries between the two stations 
combined. 
Table 45: Ikapa occurrences – Area 4 
Location 1-c 1-g 2-a 2-g 2-h E-a Undefined Grand Total
Athlone Station 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 4
Athlone Station - Crawford Station 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 4
Athlone Station - Hazendal Station 1 9 1 0 0 0 0 11
Hazendal Station 0 5 0 1 1 1 1 9
Hazendal Station - Pinelands Station 4 32 0 8 0 4 0 48
Grand Total 6 50 3 10 1 5 1 76
Location 1-a 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-c 2-d 2-e 2-g 2-h 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Belhar Station 1 0 5 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10
Belhar Station - Lavistown Station 2 12 0 0 77 0 0 1 1 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 101
Bonteheuwel Station 3 2 2 0 5 1 1 2 1 1 0 5 2 1 20 7 53
Bonteheuwel Station -  Netreg Station 6 19 0 4 141 0 0 6 9 0 5 25 0 0 1 6 222
Bonteheuwel Station - Langa Station 2 7 0 0 21 0 0 6 2 0 0 13 0 0 3 2 56
Bonteheuwel Station - Lavistown Station 2 7 0 0 117 0 0 2 2 0 0 10 0 0 2 1 143
Langa Station 3 1 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 0 10 3 27
Langa Station -  Pinelands Station 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Langa Station - Mutual Station 1 3 0 0 37 0 0 3 1 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 53
Langa Station - Pinelands Station 1 3 0 0 38 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 0 0 1 2 54
Lavistown Station 13 1 0 0 12 0 0 8 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 2 41
Grand Total 34 55 7 4 453 3 1 33 18 1 5 81 3 1 42 24 765
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Area 5 – Thornton Station to Parow Station 
Elsies River and Parow Stations both have nine (n=9) Category E-a 
occurrences with eight (n=8) fatalities and 10 injuries combined. (See Table 46: 
Ikapa occurrences – Area 5). 
Table 46: Ikapa occurrences – Area 5 
Area 6 – Century City Station to Acacia Park Station 
Theft (Category 1-g) and malicious damage (Category 2-g) to train control 
equipment combined has 44 out of the total of 61 occurrences, with more than half 
taking place between Acacia Park and Century City Stations (n=26). (See Table 47: 
Ikapa occurrences - Area 6). 
Table 47: Ikapa occurrences - Area 6 
Location 1-a 1-c 1-e 1-f 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-c 2-e 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Elsies River Station 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 9 1 19
Elsies River Station - Parow Station 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 0 3 1 4 3 0 30
Elsies River Station - Tygerberg Station 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Elsies River Station - Vasco Station 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 14
Goodwood Station 4 0 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 5 1 17
Goodwood Station - Thornton Station 0 6 0 0 11 0 0 1 1 0 7 0 0 26
Goodwood Station - Vasco Station 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 11
Parow Station 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 0 0 9 1 19
Parow Station - Tygerberg Station 1 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 12
Thornton Station 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 4
Tygerberg Station 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 1 0 0 0 3 3 14
Grand Total 7 25 2 2 43 1 9 9 8 1 20 33 7 167
Location 1-a 1-c 1-e 1-g 2-a 2-c 2-e 2-g 2-h 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Acacia Park Station - Century City Station 1 26 1 1 8 1 1 39
Acacia Park Station - Monte Vista Station 1 1 2
Century City Station 3 4 1 1 1 10
Century City Station - Kentemade Station 1 1 1 3
Kentemade Station 1 1 1 1 4
Monte Vista Station 2 1 3
Grand Total 3 2 2 34 4 1 1 10 1 1 1 1 61
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North 
Area North has 2 hot-spot areas: Area 1 – Bellville and Area 2 – Kraaifontein. 
(See Figure 41: All category hot-spot map – North).  
Area 1 – Bellville Station and surrounds 
The area around Bellville Station includes the Bellville Staging Yard as well as 
the Belcon Terminals used mainly by TFR and covers a broad expanse of land. A 
review of the occurrence descriptions for Bellville Station, indicates that a number of 
route crimes are allocated to Bellville Station, without a definite location of the 
incident. This is true for several TFR occurrences. Bellville Station (and surrounds) 
account for 173 occurrences with 108 and 61 of those applicable to Prasa and TFR 
respectively. (See Table 48: North occurrences – Area 1). Out of 13 E-a occurrences, 
10 (n=10) occurred at Bellville Station with seven (n=7) fatalities and five (n=5) 
injuries. One specific incident included three (n=3) injuries and one (n=1) fatality. 
Table 48: North occurrences – Area 1 
Area 2 – Kraaifontein Station and surrounds 
Kraaifontein Station and surrounds includes the Kraaifontein yard which 
explains the occurrences of theft (n=18) and damage (n=17) to rolling stock 
components in yard while trains are staged. A review of the descriptive text indicates 
the target assets to be grid and motor covers, cables and light fittings.  Kraaifontein 
Station has 20 E-a occurrences over the period with 15 fatalities and four (n=4) 
injuries. (See Table 49: North occurrences – Area 2). 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-d 2-e 2-g 2-h 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Bellville Station 47 8 7 4 1 24 9 6 33 3 4 1 1 4 4 2 10 5 173
Bellville Station - Avondale Station 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Bellville Station - Brackenfell Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Bellville Station - Kuils River Station 1 0 3 0 1 9 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 28
Bellville Station - Oosterzee Station 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4
Bellville Station - Sarepta Station 1 0 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 6 0 0 0 1 16
Bellville Station - Stikland Station 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 10
Bellville Station - Tygerberg Station 0 0 8 0 0 12 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 25
Grand Total 49 8 20 4 3 55 9 6 36 3 9 1 1 29 4 2 13 6 258
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Table 49: North occurrences – Area 2 
Paarl 
The hot-spot route in the Drakenstein Municipality includes the stretch of rail 
line between Paarl and Wellington Stations. The line passes by the informal 
settlement along Mbekweni where nine (n=9) E-a occurrences have been recorded of 
which there were four (n=4) fatalities. (See Figure 42: All category hot-spot map - 
Paarl and Table 50: Paarl occurrences). 
Shosholoza Meyl and Prasa rolling stock are routinely victims of stone 
throwing incidents as they pass through Wellington, with 45 Category 2-a 
occurrences. All three (n=3) E-a occurrences at Wellington resulted in a fatality. 
Table 50: Paarl occurrences 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-e 1-g 1-h 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-e 2-g 2-i E-a Undefined Grand Total
Brackenfell Station 1 0 1 0 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 2 19
Brackenfell Station - Eikenfontein Station 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Brackenfell Station - Kraaifontein Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
Brackenfell Station - Stikland Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3
Eikenfontein Station 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 0 6
Eikenfontein Station - Kraaifontein Station 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 1 10
Kraaifontein Station 13 18 3 1 20 0 2 28 17 1 9 1 20 7 140
Kraaifontein Station - Muldersvlei Station 0 0 1 0 7 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6 0 19
Kraaifontein Station - Stikland Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Grand Total 14 18 6 1 37 1 2 41 17 1 11 1 44 11 205
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-e 2-f 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Huguenot Station 0 0 1 2 2 10 2 15 0 0 1 2 3 1 39
Huguenot Station - Paarl Station 0 1 0 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 17
Mbekweni Station 0 0 0 0 1 7 0 15 0 0 0 0 9 32
Mbekweni Station - Wellington Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 3 5
Paarl Station 0 0 1 0 2 26 1 3 1 1 0 3 3 41
Wellington Station 22 4 0 1 1 14 0 45 4 1 0 8 3 103
Grand Total 22 5 2 3 6 68 3 83 5 2 1 14 24 1 239
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Figure 41: All category hot-spot map – North 
1 
2 
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Figure 42: All category hot-spot map - Paarl 
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Southern 
The hot-spots on the Southern Line fall in 3 main areas. See Figure 43: All 
category hot-spot map – Southern. 
Area 1 – Retreat Station 
The area around Retreat Station includes the Retreat Staging Yard. Three 
fatalities and one injury make up the four (n=4) Category E-a occurrences at Retreat 
Station. (See Table 51: Southern occurrences – Area 1). 
Table 51: Southern occurrences – Area 1 
Area 2 – Harfield Road Station to Plumstead Station 
The section of the line between Wittebome and Kenilworth Stations recorded 
31 out of the 51 Category 1-g occurrences for theft of train control equipment. 
Kenilworth Station has five (n=5) E-a occurrences with two (n=2) fatalities and 
four (n=4) injuries, while Wittebome Station has three (n=3) E-a occurrences one of 
which was a fatality involving a 15-year-old school boy. (See Table 52: Southern 
occurrences – Area 2). 
Table 52: Southern occurrences – Area 2 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-e 1-g 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-c 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Retreat - Heathfield 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4
Retreat - Steenberg 0 0 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8
Retreat Station 5 4 0 0 0 1 11 6 2 0 4 1 34
Retreat Station - Steenberg Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Retreat -Steenberg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Grand Total 5 4 5 2 2 1 12 6 2 4 4 1 48
Location 1-c 1-g 1-i 2-c 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Harfield Road Station 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Harfield Road Station - Kenilworth Station 2 9 0 0 1 0 0 12
Kenilworth Station 0 7 0 0 1 5 1 14
Kenilworth Station - Wynberg Station 2 14 0 0 6 0 0 22
Plumstead Station 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
Plumstead Station - Steurhof Station 0 2 0 1 2 1 0 6
Plumstead Station - Wittebome Station 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Steurhof Station 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 2
Wittebome Station 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 4
Wittebome Station - Wynberg Station 1 17 0 0 10 0 0 28
Wynberg Station 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 3
Grand Total 6 51 1 1 22 13 1 95
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Area 3 - Wetton Station to Ottery Station 
Rail clips and springs, point machine wiring and transformers were some of the 
targeted civil infrastructure assets targeted under Category 1-c which recorded 17 
(n=17) occurrences. The section of track between Ottery and Wetton Stations 
recorded the most occurrences (n=26). (See Table 53: Southern occurrences – Area 
2). 
Table 53: Southern occurrences – Area 2 
Stellenbosch 
The routes within Stellenbosch Municipality has 2 main hot-spot areas. 
(See Figure 44: All category hot-spot map – Stellenbosch). 
Area 1 – Klapmuts Station to Muldersvlei Station 
Most of the Category 1-a occurrences (n=11) cannot be accurately allocated to 
Muldersvlei Station as they are route crimes and the incidents were recorded as either 
“…on route to Muldersvlei..” or “…discovered at Muldersvlei…”. Theft and damage 
of train control equipment is most prominent at Klapmuts (n=37) and Muldersvlei 
(n=18) Stations. (See  
Table 54: Stellenbosch occurrences – Area 1). Eight (n=8) Category E-a 
occurrences were recorded at Klapmuts Station of which four (n=4) occurrences 
resulted in fatalities and three (n=3) in injuries. 
Location 1-c 1-g 2-a 2-c 2-g 2-h Grand Total
Ottery Station 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Ottery Station - Southfield Station 1 7 3 0 4 0 15
Ottery Station - Wetton Station 10 10 0 1 5 0 26
Wetton Station 3 0 1 0 1 1 6
Grand Total 17 17 4 1 10 1 50
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Table 54: Stellenbosch occurrences – Area 1 
 
Area 2 – Stellenbosch Station to Du Toit Station 
Theft of train control equipment occurs mostly between Du Toit Station and 
Vlottenburg Station with a combined 40 occurrences along the route. (See Table 55: 
Stellenbosch occurrences – Area 2). 
Du Toit Station has the most incidents involving a person struck by a train 
(n=8) with all eight occurrences resulting in injuries with no fatalities. 
The section of the track between Du Toit and Koelenhof Station has three 
(n=3) E-a occurrences resulting in three fatalities, one of which was that of a 14-
year-old boy. 
Table 55: Stellenbosch occurrences – Area 2 
 
 
Location 1-a 1-g 2-a 2-b 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Klapmuts Station 1 37 2 0 10 8 2 60
Klapmuts Station - Muldersvlei Station 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
Klapmuts Station - Paarl Station 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4
Muldersvlei Station 11 18 7 1 6 4 1 48
Grand Total 12 56 10 1 16 16 4 115
Location 1-a 1-c 1-d 1-e 1-g 1-i 2-a 2-b 2-g E-a Undefined Grand Total
Du Toit Station 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 8 1 12
Du Toit Station - Koelenhof Station 0 3 0 2 1 0 6 1 0 3 0 16
Du Toit Station - Stellenbosch Station 0 0 0 0 15 0 2 0 1 1 0 19
Stellenbosch Station 3 0 1 0 12 1 2 0 4 3 1 27
Stellenbosch Station - Vlottenburg Station 0 1 0 0 13 0 1 0 2 0 0 17
Grand Total 3 4 1 2 41 1 14 1 7 15 2 91
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Figure 45: All category hot-spot map – Swartland 
 
Trespassing on the tracks at     
Klapmuts Station in           
Stellenbosch Municipality 
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Swartland 
Malmesbury Station is a terminal station for the commuter rail service operated 
by Prasa to the Swartland Municipality. Trains will occasionally be staged there 
which leaves them vulnerable to criminals. Route crimes under Category 1-a cannot 
confidently be ascribed to Malmesbury Station as they are recorded at the destination 
terminal station and not necessarily where the incident occurred. Kalbaskraal Station 
consists only of a platform nosing/edge and despite its quiet location, it has two 
(n=2) pedestrian-rail incidents. (See Table 56: Swartland occurrences and Figure 45: 
All category hot-spot map – Swartland). 
Table 56: Swartland occurrences 
 
 
5.9 SUMMARY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SPATIAL 
CONCENTRATIONS OF THE THE COMBINED CATEGORY E-A, 1 
AND 2 OCCURRENCES 
The combined Category E-a, 1 and 2 occurrences for 2018 produce the 
following hot-spot areas: 
Area 1 – Bonteheuwel to Mutual Stations  
Area 2 – Netreg to Stock Road and Lentegeur Stations 
Area 3 – Bellville to Kraaifontein Stations 
Area 4 – Paarl to Wellington Stations 
Area 5 - Cape Town to Salt River and Esplanade Stations 
Area 6 - Klapmuts to Muldersvlei Station 
Reviewing the occurrence data individually for pedestrian-rail incidents as well 
as that for theft and vandalism has shown that there are a number of overlaps, i.e. a 
location that has high pedestrian-rail occurrences is also likely to have high incidents 
of theft and vandalism. 
Location 1-a 1-b 1-c 1-g 1-i 2-a E-a Grand Total
Kalbaskraal Station 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 8
Malmesbury Station 6 7 2 0 1 1 0 17
Grand Total 6 7 3 2 2 3 2 25
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The areas above are characterised by common traits, including:  
- Widespread trespassing with a myriad of pedestrian desire lines crossing the 
railway line, with the railway acting as a barrier to pedestrian movements; 
- Residential areas synonymous with social problems, including gang activity, 
high crime rates and high unemployment levels; 
- Informal settlement encroachment in areas; 
- High occurrences of train control equipment theft and pedestrian-rail 
incidents; and   
- Heavily trafficked areas such as public transport interchanges, and areas 
containing rail depot and siding areas. 
A review of the location data would suggest that Matzopoulos & Lerer, (1998) 
was correct when they suggested that the level of poverty of communities is a major 
factor of railway injury occurrences. This could now be extended to include not only 
railway injury but also occurrences of railway theft and vandalism. The highest 
number of occurrences are recorded as the rail line passes through Coloured and 
Black townships within the City of Cape Town and neighbouring municipalities. 
The townships are characterised by dense populations as stated by Radbo et al., 
(2005); Silla and Luoma, (2012) and commonly the rail line acts as a barrier between 
places of residence and places of work or shopping supporting findings by Silla and 
Luoma, (2008).   
In Section 5.2 the relationship between pedestrian-rail incidents and train 
traffic density was discussed. It was inferred that the likelihood of a pedestrian-rail 
incident is increased with an increase in train traffic. What we have now learnt is that 
pedestrian-rail incidents on train lines with a less frequent service is equally risky for 
trespassers and would now move a bit closer to the statement from Savage, (2015) 
that lines with infrequent services are “more” problematic but rather, equally 
problematic. Locations such as Klapmuts and the Paarl line to Wellington are 
evidence of this. 
Evidence from the quantitative analysis confirms criminal actions including 
theft and vandalism as a motive for trespassing as found by Havarneanu, (2017); 
Savage, (2007) and Ryan, (2012). Theft of train control equipment has reached 
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epidemic proportions as well as theft of other metal components such as apparatus 
doors, track box cages with substations and transformer units commonly targeted. 
After analysis of the quantitative data, one critical element is highlighted; 
pedestrian-rail incident data and theft and vandalism occurrence data, even when 
coupled with data provided on death and mortality statistics from mortuaries, merely 
provides a glimpse into the full scale of trespassing across the rail network. If any 
meaningful impact is to be made in reducing trespassing numbers, and the associated 
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Chapter 6: Case Study - Rail Enforcement 
Unit 
The Case Study evaluation of a specific countermeasure is carried out in detail 
in this chapter. The case study includes a quantitative analysis to provide empirical 
evidence of the measure’s effectiveness. The research question (Q9) and hypotheses 
(H016 and H017) relating to the case study will be dealt with in this section, as well 
as an analysis on the effectiveness of the countermeasure. 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
The establishment of a Rail Enforcement Unit (REU) saw collaboration 
amongst both local and provincial government and the railway operator to respond to 
incidents of crime and vandalism currently being experienced on the Metrorail 
network. The partnership between the City of Cape Town (the City), the Western 
Cape Government’s Department of Transport and Public Works (the Department) 
and PRASA, was established as the SAPS Rapid Rail Police have been unable to 
effectively respond to the challenges the railway system currently face. 
The REU builds on the successes of the City of Cape Town’s “Copperheads” 
Metals Theft Unit that was established to address attacks on city infrastructure. The 
unit currently operates under the direct command and control of the City of Cape 
Town’s Safety and Security Directorate’s Law Enforcement Services.  While it 
cannot be expected that the REU fully resolve the serious issues facing rail, it is 
hoped that it can be an effective part of a broad and comprehensive solution to the 
current rail crisis. 
The pilot includes the training and deployment of a force of 100 Law 
Enforcement/Metals Theft Officers, with 60% allocated to commuter safety and 40% 
allocated to infrastructure protection.  These officers are deployed across the 
Metrorail network with their primary focus on crime and vandalism hot-spots. 
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6.2 METHODOLOGY TO EVALUATE THE PILOT MEASURE 
The following methods were used to evaluate this measure: 
Qualitative interviews with enforcement officials and rail security staff – Semi-
structured interviews were carried out based on the Trespass Countermeasure 
Evaluation Form. The interviews were analysed and categorised into main themes. 
Quantitative analysis of railway safety and security occurrences from 
27 October 2018 till 28 February 2019 (the pilot period). RSR incident and 
occurrence data was analysed for PRASA events and limited to those locations 
occurring within the City of Cape Town boundary. The dataset was compared to an 
equivalent four-month period prior to the commencement of the REU operations for 
the period from 27 June 2018 till 26 October 2018 (the control period). 
6.3 DEFINITION OF TARGET INCIDENTS 
The intention is for the unit to address both the ongoing attacks on rail 
infrastructure and improve security for passengers. 
The objectives of the project are: 
- To support SAPS Rapid Railway Police, through PRASA, to ensure
improved commuter safety and reduction of personal crime on the rail
network.
- To deliver effective and efficient enforcement toward infrastructure
theft and vandalism with operations informed by crime intelligence
data.
- To ensure a reduction in the incidents of vandalism and theft within the
PRASA domain.
6.4 SIZE OF THE PROBLEM 
This section presents an analysis of safety and security incidents and 
occurrences for the control period 27 June 2018 till 26 October 2018 to illustrate the 
nature of the problem. The issues could be summarised as inadequate security for 
passengers and rail assets, rampant crime against commuters, delayed trains and 
disrupted services, and train “rage” attacks on rail infrastructure by commuters 
frustrated with the level of service. 
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6.4.1 Control period - Total number of occurrences 
There was a total of 580 combined safety and security occurrences in the 
control period leading up to the start of the pilot, with an average of 116 occurrences 
per month. The highest number of occurrences were in July (n=155), September 
(n=155) and October (n=150). The trend over the period can be seen in Figure 46: 
Control period – Total occurrences. 
Figure 46: Control period – Total occurrences 
6.4.2 Control period – Security occurrences 
There was a total of 441 security occurrences in the control period. Table 57: 
Control period - Top 10 security occurrences, below shows that the top four 
occurrence categories account for nearly half the number of occurrences. Category 1-
g, theft of train control equipment (signalling) in section (n=95), 2-g, malicious 
damage (vandalism) of rolling stock components in yards and sidings (n=48), 2-a, 
Malicious damage (vandalism) of rolling stock components in section (n=44) and 
1-c, Theft of civil infrastructure components in section (n=32) recorded the highest
number of occurrences for crimes against rail property. 
Personal safety on trains and stations (Categories 7 and 8) combined, account 
for 33.6% amongst the top 10 occurrence categories with robberies and assaults 
being the most prevalent. 
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Table 57: Control period - Top 10 security occurrences 
Rank Category Total 
1 1-g












Aggravated robbery - trains
39 
5 1-c







Aggravated robbery – stations
23 
8 7-g






Common robbery - stations
20 
6.4.3 Control period – Safety occurrences 
There were 139 safety-related occurrences in the period leading up to the start 
of the pilot. The top 10 safety occurrence categories are shown in Table 58: Control 
period – Top 10 safety occurrences.  
Category E-a occurrences where a member of the public is struck by rolling 
stock on a running line, had the highest occurrences (n=42). Associated with this are 
the number of fatalities and injuries over the control period at 30 and 188, 
respectively. See Figure 47: Control period – Fatalities and injuries. Thirteen 
fatalities were recorded in September, with the average at six fatalities per month 
over the period. 
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Table 58: Control period – Top 10 safety occurrences 
Rank Category Total 
1 E-a
Member of the public is struck by rolling stock on a running line
42 
2 H-b
Passenger fell on the platform whilst entraining/detraining a
stationary or moving train
39 
3 F-a
Person fell or was pushed from inside a moving or stationary train
15 
4 G-a




Signal passed at danger (SPAD) on a running line
8 
6 I-b
Occurrence resulting in injuries and fatalities to passengers due to
infrastructure
defects in a passenger area of the station
8 
7 H-a
Passenger fell between the train and the platform whilst
entraining/detraining a stationary or moving train
5 
8 A-b
Collision of rolling stock with an obstruction on a running line
4 
9 J-d
Electrical shock to the member of the public
2 
10 B-a
Derailment of rolling stock on a running line
1 
Figure 47: Control period – Fatalities and injuries 
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6.4.4 Control period – Location analysis 
Occurrences are widespread across the network with the top 20 locations 
shown in Table 59: Control period – Top 20 locations. Distinct hot-spots can be 
identified by grouping stations that are geographically close to each other as follows: 
- Cape Town – Woodstock – Salt River – Maitland,
- Heideveld – Nyanga – Philippi, and
- Bellville – Elsies River – Vasco.
Table 59: Control period – Top 20 locations 
Rank Location No of Occurrences 
1 Cape Town 34 
2 Bellville 20 
3 Cape Town - Woodstock 18 
4 Salt River 13 
5 Philippi 11 
6 Lavis Town 10 
7 Nolungile 10 
8 Eerste River 9 
9 Kuils River 8 
10 Elsies River - Vasco 7 
11 Maitland 7 
12 Salt River - Woodstock 7 
13 Woodstock 7 
14 Ysterplaat 7 
15 Heideveld 6 
16 Kenilworth 6 
17 Langa 6 
18 Nyanga - Philippi 6 
19 Blackheath - Meltonrose  5 
20 Elsies River 5 
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6.5 EFFECT ON INCIDENTS 
6.5.1 Evaluating the effectiveness of the specific countermeasure strategy 
Answering research question CASE Q9. 
Pilot period - Total number of occurrences 
There was a total of 632 combined safety and security occurrences in the 
control period leading up to the start of the pilot, with an average of 126.4 
occurrences per month. The trend over the period can be seen in Figure 48: Total 
occurrences over evaluation period. 
Figure 48: Total occurrences over evaluation period 
The number of occurrences over the pilot period has increased from 580 events 
in the control months. To compare the control to the pilot period an occurrence rate 
is proposed as follows:  
Occurrence Rate =  
No. of Incidents
Relevant Population Size
For the occurrence rate a value of 100 000 is proposed. For the population size, 
the total patronage for 2018/19 is 46 986 046. 
 The occurrence rate for the control period is thus calculated to be 1.23. The 
occurrence rate for the pilot period is calculated to be 1.35. This works out to a 9.8% 
increase in total occurrences. 
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Pilot period – security occurrences 
There was a total of 474 security incidents in the pilot period compared to 
441 security incidents in the control period. Table 60: Occurrences comparison over 
the evaluation period, shows the number of occurrences and the differences between 
the control and pilot periods. A negative number indicates a drop in occurrences and 
a positive number an increase in occurrences. Overall the security occurrences 
increased by 33 cases. 
Category 1-g, theft of train control equipment (signalling) in section, remains 
high with 129 occurrences. Categories 1-a and 2-a both show a decrease in 
occurrences and indicates that rolling stock has become a less attractive target for 
theft and vandalism.  
Personal safety on trains remain a concern with incidents of aggravated 
robbery on stations and trains increasing. Figure 49: Control v pilot period – Top 10 
security occurrences), shows the comparison between the control and pilot period 
occurrences graphically. 
Figure 49: Control v pilot period – Top 10 security occurrences 
1-g 2-g 2-a 7-f 1-c 7-d 8-f 7-g 8-d 8-g
Control 95 48 44 39 32 24 23 21 21 20
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Table 60: Occurrences comparison over the evaluation period 
Occurrence Category Control Pilot Difference 
1-a Theft of rolling stock components in section 18 8 -10
1-b Theft of rolling stock components in yards 
(staged) 
4 6 2 
1-c Theft of civil infrastructure components in 
section 
32 29 -3
1-d Theft of civil infrastructure components in 
yards and sidings 
1 2 1 
1-e Theft of overhead traction equipment in 
section 
6 1 -5
1-g Theft of train control equipment (signalling)
in section
95 129 34 
1-h Theft of train control equipment (signalling) 
in yards and sidings 
2 8 6 
1-i Theft of ancillary equipment including public 
address systems, information boards, 
CCTV 
8 9 1 
2-a Malicious damage (vandalism) of rolling 
stock components in section 
44 23 -21
2-b Malicious damage (vandalism) of rolling 
stock components in yards and sidings 
4 7 3 
(staged) 6 7 1 
2-c Malicious damage (vandalism) of civil 
infrastructure components in section 
0 2 2 
2-d Malicious damage (vandalism) of civil 
infrastructure components in yards and 
3 7 4 
sidings 0 1 1 
2-e Malicious damage (vandalism) of overhead 
traction equipment in section 
48 45 -3
2-f Malicious damage (vandalism) of overhead 
traction equipment in yards and sidings 
0 2 2 
2-g Malicious damage (vandalism) of train
control equipment (signalling) in section
2 2 0 
7-d Assault 24 32 8 
7-f Aggravated robbery 39 34 -5
7-g Common robbery 21 22 1 
7-h Theft 7 7 0 
8-a Murder 1 1 0 
8-b Attempted murder 1 2 1 
8-c Rape 1 0 -1
8-d Assault 21 20 -1
8-f Aggravated robbery 23 27 4 
8-g Common robbery 20 21 1 
8-h Theft 3 7 4 
9-a Murder 0 1 1 
9-c Rape 1 1 0 
9-d Assault 3 5 2 
9-f Aggravated robbery 2 5 3 
9-g Common robbery 1 1 0 
TOTALS 441 474 33 
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CASE H016: No significant difference exists between Category 1 and 2 
occurrences before and after implementation of the countermeasure. 
Using the t-test to check if there is a significant difference in the number of 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences before and after implementation of the 
countermeasure, split into the variables for the “control” and “pilot” periods and the 
various occurrence categories. 
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the number of 
Category 1 and 2 occurrences before and after implementation of the measure. 
For a 95% confidence level and an alpha level of 0.05: 
Occurrence Cat Control Observed Values Pilot Observed Values 
1-a 18 8 
1-b 4 6 
1-c 32 29 
1-d 1 2 
1-e 6 1 
1-g 95 129 
1-h 2 8 
1-i 8 9 
2-a 44 23 
2-b 4 7 
2-c 6 7 
2-d 0 2 
2-e 3 7 
2-f 0 1 
2-g 48 45 
2-h 0 2 
2-i 2 2 
Totals 273 288 
F Test = 0.430249 
T Test = 0.73633 
In both instances if P > α then null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Therefore; 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
No statistically significant difference exists between the number of Category 1 
and 2 occurrences before and after implementation of the countermeasure. 
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Pilot period – safety occurrences 
There were 141 safety related occurrences in the pilot period up from 
139 safety occurrences during the control period. The difference in the control and 
pilot periods are shown in Table 61: Safety occurrences comparison over the 
evaluation period. Category E-a, occurrences where a member of the public is struck 
by rolling stock on a running line remains high with an increase to 46 occurrences. 
 Table 61: Safety occurrences comparison over the evaluation period 
Occurrence Category Control Pilot Difference 
E-a
Member of the public is struck by rolling
stock on a running line
42 46 4 
F-a
Person fell or was pushed from inside a
moving or stationary train
15 7 -8
G-a
Passengers travelling outside the
designated passenger area of the train
11 16 5 
TOTALS 68 69 1 
The number of fatalities and injuries over the pilot period increased to 37 and 
203 occurrences respectively. There was a marked increase in injuries in February 
(68 occurrences from 32 the previous month). See Figure 50: Fatalities and injuries 
over the evaluation period. Fourteen Fatalities were recorded in December, with the 
average at 7.4 fatalities per month over the period (up from six fatalities per month 
for the control period). 
Figure 50: Fatalities and injuries over the evaluation period 
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CASE H017: No significant difference exists between Category E-a 
occurrences before and after implementation of the countermeasure. 
Using the t-test to check if there is a significant difference in the number of 
Category E-a occurrences before and after implementation of the countermeasure, 
split into the variables for the “control” and “pilot” periods and the months under 
consideration.    
The null hypothesis that no significant difference exists between the number of 
Category E-a occurrences before and after implementation of the measure. 










Month 1 9 13 
Month 2 8 13 
Month 3 10 7 
Month 4 13 13 
Totals 40 46 
F Test = 0.60316 
T Test = 0.476484 
In both instances if P > α then null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Therefore; 
NULL HYPOTHESIS IS NOT REJECTED 
No statistically significant difference exists between the number of Category E-
a occurrences before and after implementation of the measure 
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6.5.2 Pilot period – Location analysis 
Occurrences continue to be widespread across the network with the top 
locations shown in Table 62: Pilot period – Top 20 locations, with the relative 
movement showing either an increase or decrease in occurrences. 
Table 62: Pilot period – Top 20 locations 
Location No. of Occurrences - 
Pilot 
Movement 
Cape Town 31  
Bellville 29  
Kraaifontein 16 new 
Cape Town - Woodstock 12  
Heathfield 12  
Salt River 11  
Kenilworth - Wynberg 10 new 
Maitland 10  
Langa 9  
Langa - Bonteheuwel 9 new 
Phillipi - Stock Road 9 new 
Parow - Tygerberg 8 new 
Bellville - Kuilsriver 7 new 
Eerste River 7  
Eikenfontein 7 new 
Esplanade 7 new 
Langa - Mutual 7 new 
Nonkqubela 7 new 
Paarden Eiland 7 new 
Woodstock 7  
Like the control period, the occurrences are widespread. Only nine locations 
from the control period remain in the top 20, with 11 new locations. This could be an 
indication of geographical displacement as a number of new locations are close to 
those that have recorded high occurrences in the past. For example, Kuilsriver 
Station is no longer in the top 20 but the section of track between Bellville and 
Kuislriver Station now is. The hot-spot locations shift slightly to: 
- Cape Town – Woodstock – Paarden Eiland - Salt River – Maitland,
- Mutual - Langa – Bonteheuwel, and
- Kraaifontein - Bellville – Kuilsriver – Eerste River.
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6.6 COSTS 
The costs for the project for a year are split equally between the 3 contributing 
stakeholders.  The costs include salaries, overtime, uniform, protective gear, radios, 
firearms and training. The annual costs, although not relevant to the study, provides a 
useful insight into the expenses involved and is summarised in Table 63: Rail 
Enforcement Unit cost breakdown. 
Table 63: Rail Enforcement Unit cost breakdown 





Training and deployment of 100 personnel 




4 Senior Inspectors 








Transporter Lease 6 R1,800,000.00 R6,600,000.00 
Bukkie Lease 15 R3,600,000.00 
Motorbike Purchase 10 R1,200,000.00 
Training Requirements 
Tactical and Street Survival Techniques 50 R4,872.00 R11,807.00 
Peace Officer & Traffic Warden Training 50 R6,935.00 
Sundries 
Protective Gear 50 R8,271.00 R18,799.00 
Equipment 50 R1,652.00 
Motorbike Equipment 10 R8,876.00 
TOTAL R46,797,073.00 
6.7 SUMMARY ANALYSIS: HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE SPECIFIC 
COUNTERMEASURE STRATEGY? 
Armed, security patrols remain a popular choice by government officials, 
politicians and railway operators as an appropriate response to counter criminal 
behaviour on the rail network. This despite, literature, cautioning about the limits of 
its effectiveness as a singular response. 
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In evaluating the counter-measure, several factors need to be considered. These 
are discussed next. 
Geographical displacement of crime 
On evaluation of the control and pilot data, the total number of occurrences 
increased by 9.8% from the previous three months. This provides a slightly distorted 
view on the effectiveness of the initiative. The location data of the occurrences was 
evaluated in tandem with the empirical data and evidence of geographic 
displacement of crime is evident. Geographic displacement occurs when a 
countermeasure is successfully implemented at a specific location, and criminals 
move to other areas to offend. 
Of the top 20 locations for occurrences in the control period, only nine 
locations were in the top 20 locations in the pilot period, with 11 new locations. 
Another telling feature is that the 11 new locations are close to the original hot-spots, 
where crimes have taken place before. 
Enforcement measures are temporary by their very nature and due to the large 
area that needs to be covered it is inevitable that criminals will alter their tactics and 
either wait till the enforcement subsides or they will move to a less risky area. 
Diffusion of benefits 
Diffusion occurs when the positive knock-on effects of a countermeasure 
affects areas not originally targeted. The rail operator has indicated that where the 
REU has been active, a marked increase in fare revenue and ticket sales was recorded 
at the target stations. The commuter’s perception on safety has also improved, but 
without a Customer Satisfaction Survey being carried out, this cannot be verified. 
Overall statement on effectiveness 
The countermeasure is directed at crime and must only be evaluated for its 
effect on crime on rail infrastructure, for which it is believed that it is an effective 
measure, but for a limited period and at the specific location where the patrols are 
deployed. The effectiveness of enforcement countermeasures on trespassing in 
general and its effect on reducing pedestrian-rail incidents is uncertain; for this case 
study it has proved ineffective in this regard.  
Due to the vast expanse of the rail network and the limited resources available, 
enforcement and security type initiatives are by their nature, temporary. No 
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enforcement response can be everywhere, all the time. This limited review proves 
that enforcement countermeasures need to be considered in combination with other 
measures to ensure its durability and reduce significant temporal displacement. 
In summary, the REU has shown limited effectiveness over the short 
evaluation period. A more detailed evaluation is recommended over a minimum 
period of one year, also taking into effect the diffusion of benefits of the project.  
Recommendations for improvement 
The REU has encountered a number of problems during the pilot period, most 
of which is typical when a new cross-organisation agreement is entered into. 
Differing financial reporting year periods, funding constraints, recruitment 
bureaucracy, and the temporary nature of the project all limit the project’s success. A 
firm commitment from all stakeholders as well as a longer project period would 
bring more stability to the project. 
Effective co-operation with the police is essential. The SAPS RRPU plan their 
responses based on reported crime whilst the rail protective officers plan their 
responses using incident data. Joint planning is recommended so that both data sets 
are considered, and the appropriate responses devised. 
Finally, it is recommended that the use of CCTV technology be employed 
more widespread across the network to enable continuous monitoring, with coverage 
of stations, line sections as well as high value targets such as substations and signal 
equipment. 
………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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Figure 51: Rail Enforcement Unit officers at Cape Town Station 
Figure 52: An assortment of weapons and drugs confiscated on a typical patrol 
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Chapter 7: Expert Interviews and Site Visits 
This chapter details the results of the qualitative analysis of this research. 
Section 7.1 presents the findings from the subject matter experts interviewed to 
expand on the results from iii.). 
 A number of locations were selected for further investigation and validation of 
the results from the quantitative analysis as well as the information gathered during 
the interviews. Section 7.2 describes the findings from several site visits carried out 
to confirm and validate information from the literature review, data analysis and 
interviews carried out. Thirteen sites were visited and the Site Inspection Field Notes 
along with photographs are included as Appendix F. 
Finally, Section 7.3 provides an analysis of the chapter. 
7.1 EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were carried out with select individuals as subject matter experts to 
provide another layer of information to expand on what was discovered thus far from 
the literature reviews and quantitative data analysis. With very little information 
provided in the literature about the effectiveness of countermeasures, a specific focus 
of the interviews was to gather opinions on various measures implemented and to 
garner firsthand experience on what works and what does not. The interviews were 
also used to determine opinions on where the worst locations for trespassing are on 
the network to further inform the Site Visit element of this research. 
The following sections discuss the results from the interviews under a number 
of themes. These are: Section 7.1.1, general trespasser characteristics; Section 7.1.2, 
reasons for trespassing, and Section 7.1.3 the findings around trespassing hot-spots. 
Trespassing countermeasures will be discussed in Section 7.1.4; and the final theme 
will be priority focus areas in Section 7.1.5. 
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7.1.1 Theme 1 – General trespasser characteristics 
Number of trespass occurrences 
Respondents were asked how many instances of trespassing they believe occur 
daily on the rail network. 
Four out of five respondents answered that trespassing is a major problem and 
the numbers are too high to count. The Nomzamo informal crossing was cited as an 
example where more than 3000 pedestrians cross the railway in one direction, with 
all-day movements in both directions. Brackenfell Station was also used to describe 
the phenomenon of accessing the station via the platform ends, where up to 2000 
people do so in the morning peak alone. 
What became clear was that trespass incidents related to crime could be 
quantified but the numbers of people trespassing with no criminal intent are “not 
regularly counted or quantified”. One respondent believed that there are a number of 
contributory factors that would ensure continued growth in railway trespassing 
numbers, these being i) the need to access services and the lengthy time it takes to 
correct spatial inadequacies; ii) the poor state of the country’s economy, meaning 
that people will walk more to save money and more will attempt to use the train 
without paying fares; iii) the time saving to be gained from taking a short-cut; and 
lastly, iv) “behavioural decay”. More people are finding it acceptable to break the 
rules where even “ladies with dresses” would not think twice about taking a short-cut 
across the tracks. 
With regards to quantifying trespass numbers, pedestrian-rail accident data are 
not thought to be a reliable indicator.  High trespassing locations could have very low 
fatalities or none at all. 
Time of day 
Respondents were asked what time of the day they believed trespassing to be 
more prevalent.  
Overall, trespassing was considered to occur throughout the day with 
discernible peaks in the morning (6h00 – 9h00) and afternoon (16h00 – 19h00) 
periods.  
Respondents agreed that peak flows depended on the location of the trespass 
site: its location relative to the major trip attractors, and the land-use surrounding the 
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site.  If one considers Cape Town as an example, the further the ‘origin’ stations are 
from the city, the earlier the peak times would be. Stations closer to the city would 
have later peak times. The location of industrial areas around stations would also 
have concentrations of people trespassing around ‘clock-in’ times between 7h00 and 
8h00 and then again in the evenings between 17h00 and 18h00. Similarly, the 
location of schools around stations would influence the peak trespassing times 
resulting in an early afternoon peak period starting from around 14h30. Where 
trespassing sites are located close to shopping areas and public transport facilities, all 
day activity is common. 
One respondent highlighted a specific time of the day posing a risk for 
pedestrian-rail incidents, which is the period after train services have ended, i.e. after 
22h00. During this time, trains do not pick up passengers and may be en route to a 
staging yard; it is at this time that trespassers least expect trains and may become 
involved in a train incident. 
Another respondent suggested that people will avoid trespassing at night as 
most locations are not very well lit, making it ideal hide-out places for criminals, and 
would choose a “safer” crossing point instead. “Safer” in this context does not refer 
to the likelihood of being involved in a train collision but rather the likelihood of 
being a victim of crime. 
Gender and age group 
Respondents were asked whether trespassers were likely to be either male or 
female and whether more children, adolescents or adults would trespass. 
Trespassers were thought more likely to include both males and females, but 
with a larger proportion of males. One respondent cited an example at Cape Town 
Station, where larger number of trespassers enter the railway reserve to avoid paying 
fares and walk longitudinally down the track to either Woodstock or Esplanade 
Station to board a train. In this specific example, trespassers were more likely to be 
male as they were more physically capable to climb over cable runs and navigate 
crossing multiple rail lines, in probably one of the most high-risk areas for a 
pedestrian-train incident. Trespassers were also considered more likely to be adults. 
Children would more commonly trespass if there was a school near a railway line or 
rail station. Children were seldom victims of railway incidents. 
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7.1.2 Theme 2 – Reasons for trespassing 
Respondents were asked about what they believed to be the main reasons for 
trespassing. 
Four primary reasons were identified: 
i.) The shortest and most convenient route 
“In the worst areas for trespassing, you will find that stations are much 
farther apart, with less formal crossing opportunities. The alternate 
route is not only a major diversion but is very unsafe for personal 
safety.” A respondent pointed out that large numbers of people use the 
rail reserve as a pedestrian corridor and walk along routes in parallel 
with the rail tracks. Reasons commonly cited for using a short-cut 
include there being no formal crossing point available or the formal 
pedestrian route is deemed as unsafe. 
A respondent identified a general issue, that not enough is being done 
to ensure people are able to access basic services and the role of 
transport corridors as barriers to movement. This is a problem which 
affects not only rail but can be found on major road arterials and 
freeways. “The N1, N2, R300 all have people crossing them (at 
informal points)” for basic needs. 
ii.) Fare evasion 
“Fare evasion is large before big destination stations, such as Cape 
Town.” Trespassers will avoid paying train fare and avoid station ticket 
inspectors by simply walking along the tracks to the next station. 
“People will detrain and walk along the tracks,” to exit somewhere 
along the rail reserve, normally through a hole in the fencing. 
iii.) Deteriorating social and behavioural attitudes 
One respondent specifically highlighted the issue of deteriorating social 
norms, where it has become acceptable to break rules and the law if it 
can be justified. “Bad behaviour in the road environment spills over 
into the rail environment”, where people are becoming increasingly 
willing to take risks. In the rail environment this is exacerbated by the 
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fact that bad behaviour is copied by others, “…. when I see other 
people doing something, then I can also do it”. It was also felt that 
trespassing was becoming more common-place amongst “middle-
income and educated communities”. 
Another respondent suggested that a number of station precinct areas 
have “been left to deteriorate and have become little crime infested 
slums.” Commuters could justify their behaviour by taking an alternate 
route across the tracks to avoid these “no-go zones” where they risk 
being robbed. 
iv.) Encroachment 
The erection of informal dwellings and structures on railway property 
was mentioned by two respondents and described in slightly different 
ways. The first mentioned the increase in the “number of homeless 
people using the railway reserve to build make-shift shelters.” The 
second respondent described a more organised erection of informal 
dwelling and used the location at Philippi Station as an example, where 
an informal settlement has spread in a rail staging yard area and shacks 
are being built “right on the tracks”. 
v.) Other 
A number of other reasons for trespassing were discussed such as 
suicides, thrill-seeking and graffiti but these were not believed to be a 
major problem. 
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7.1.3 Theme 3 - Trespassing hot-spots 
Several specific locations were used by respondents as examples to describe a 
particular phenomenon taking place. These locations are listed in Table 64: 
Trespassing locations. 
Table 64: Trespassing locations discussed during interviews 
Location Description 
Cape Town Station Fare evasion, High numbers of trespassing, 
Station precinct degradation 
Esplanade Station Fare evasion, High numbers of trespassing 
Staging yards Graffiti 
Philippi Station and Staging Yard Encroachment 
Nyanga Station – Philippi Station High numbers of trespassing 
Van Der Stel Station – Strand Station High numbers of trespassing 
Salt River Station – Woodstock Station High numbers of trespassing 
Muizenberg Station – St. James Station Formal at-grade pedestrian crossing 
Bonteheuwel Station High numbers of trespassing 
Kuils River Station High numbers of trespassing 
Eerste River High numbers of trespassing 
Heideveld Station Formalised pedestrian bridge 
Blackheath Station Trespassing 
Nyanga Station Concrete walling 
Du Toit Station – Koelenhof Station High numbers of trespassing 
Parow Station Trespassing, Station precinct degradation 
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7.1.4 Theme 4 – Trespassing countermeasures 
Respondents were asked to discuss what they believed where the most 
effective countermeasures to reduce trespassing and suggest strategies where 
appropriate. 
Fencing 
“Fencing as the first line of defence must be broadly expanded to secure the 
network entirely.”  Nearly all respondents agreed that fencing can be a very effective 
countermeasure. The type of fencing needs to correspond to the level of risk of the 
surrounding area and currently no guidance document on a fencing specification 
exists.  
The most successful fencing project identified by a respondent was that 
installed between Nyanga and Philippi Stations. The fence consists of a concrete wall 
which has proven to be very effective in reducing trespassing and has till now 
resisted any damage from vandalism. The fence is, however, “visually unappealing” 
and reinforces the “barrier” effect and is considered as a “last resort” option. 
Irrespective of the type of fence installed, it was agreed that a robust 
maintenance programme is essential. One respondent identified ownership issues 
around maintenance responsibilities between railway operators and local authorities, 
which hampers immediate responses to issues such as vandalised fences. 
Technology 
Detection and surveillance technology incorporating CCTV and drones was 
identified as an effective countermeasure, especially when used in combination with 
enforcement measures. 
It was also suggested that technological advancements in the fields of crime 
analysis, target hardening of high-risk assets as well as modern rail signalling 
systems be explored. Theft of signal cables was one of the most concerning issues 
affecting railway safety and has the biggest knock-on operational effects. “The 
manual train authorisations procedure used in the event of a signalling system being 
disrupted is problematic and has contributed to railway incidents countrywide.” 
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Improved visibility 
Improving visibility and detection at high risk locations with improved lighting 
and removal of dense track-side vegetation was suggested. 
Patrols and enforcement 
Patrols and enforcement were deemed to be a very effective countermeasure, 
but issues were raised around its sustainability. Staffing and capacity issues often 
limit the effectiveness of such measures and “as soon as the patrols move off the 
behaviour returns”. 
Closer cooperation with the SAPS RRPU and the railway operators’ protective 
services, leading to more joint deployments, more visibility on the network and 
“following through on opened criminal dockets” was deemed essential by one 
respondent.  
Enforcement outside of the railway environment was also highlighted. The 
example used was where mini-bus taxi’s would “legitimise” unlawful pedestrian 
behaviour by picking up and dropping off passengers at commonly used trespass 
locations. It was felt that municipal traffic officials need to do more to regulate the 
mini-bus taxi industry and punish such practice. 
Education and awareness campaigns 
While one respondent felt that awareness, education and media campaigns 
were ineffective countermeasures, others suggested that such campaigns be targeted 
at specific audiences. The demographics at a specific location need to be studied and 
an awareness campaign developed specifically for the target audience. “It’s no use 
doing a media campaign on the internet or at a school when you should be going into 
shebeens and taverns instead”. The importance of evaluating the effectiveness of 
awareness campaigns was also raised.  
One respondent suggested a campaign targeted at individuals wearing 
headphones or earphones to make them more aware of the dangers of not being able 
to hear oncoming danger and quoted a train driver who had a near-miss incident 
where a trespasser narrowly missed being hit by a train and not hearing the train’s 
warning siren. 
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An informed Judiciary 
With regards to railway crime, it was felt that the judiciary needs to be 
educated on rail law and the issues facing the rail industry. “Crime against railway 
infrastructure is still seen as a minor crime and dedicated courts would facilitate the 
prosecution of criminals, which is essential to deter crime on the network,” was the 
opinion of one respondent. 
Prosecuting trespassers is, however, not recommended, especially where no 
criminal intent is shown, as the sheer numbers of trespassers would make this 
logistically a very high-resource activity. 
Pedestrian grade separation 
Pedestrian bridges are not considered as an effective countermeasure as they 
are costly to build and maintain, and “could become white elephants if not sited 
correctly.” The importance of considering pedestrian movements in the design 
process when considering grade-separation is of vital importance.   
Currently no warrants exist to guide the planning of pedestrian grade-separated 
crossings, and it was suggested that a standard be developed to guide the spacing of 
formal crossing opportunities along transport corridors to provide more such crossing 
opportunities. 
A proposal to formalise certain high-traffic informal at-grade pedestrians 
crossings was suggested by two respondents. The example of a formalised pedestrian 
at-grade crossing near Muizenberg Station was highlighted. The current railway 
operator’s policy prevents the formalisation of at-grade pedestrian crossings. It is 
believed that this stance is not practical, nor does it reduce risk and that “the 
technology exists to make it a safe option”.  
“The solutions are there. We must consider what will work in our local context 
considering human behaviour and the growing lack of compliance with basic rules 
and laws.” 
 The construction of new subways as a grade-separation option will only be 
considered by communities, “if it can be proved that the existing subways on the 
network can be properly managed.” Subways are known for being crime hot-spots, 
being poorly maintained and with poor drainage, they regularly flood after heavy 
rains, making them unusable to pedestrians. 
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7.1.5 Theme 5 – Priority focus areas 
Respondents were asked what areas on the network should be prioritised for 
immediate response. Some of the responses were: 
“You need to focus on where you have control. Secondly, there needs to be a 
focus on securing fare revenue. Trespassing at and near stations need to be 
prioritized for these reasons.” 
“The main priority should be to eliminate illegal movements onto stations via 
the platform ends. If this can be eliminated this will have a knock-on effect on 
trespassing in section areas.” 
“We also need better cross stakeholder involvement. These aren’t only rail or 
transport problems but societal issues. Unemployment, crime, homelessness; these 
aren’t rail issues, but it affects rail.” 
“The broken window principal needs to be applied to our station precinct 
areas.” 
Respondents were unanimous that the priority focus area for immediate 
attention should be to secure the station precinct area and specifically access to 
stations. This would eliminate many illegal pedestrian movements as well as improve 
revenue collection at stations. 
7.1.6 The impacts of a pedestrian-train fatality 
The interviews highlighted an often-overlooked element of railway trespassing 
and pedestrian-rail incidents; these are the effect that such occurrences have on train 
drivers. 
 Trespassing has been highlighted as a big concern to train drivers. Trespassers 
are oblivious to the risks involved and their behavior is a major cause of on-the-job-
stress for train drivers. 
The impact of a rail fatality on train drivers not only affects the mental well-
being of the individual, but also has the knock-on effect of affecting operational 
planning. Train drivers are often unable to return to work after a fatality and could 
only return once cleared after a series of psychological assessments. The pool of 
available train drivers is constantly diminishing and bureaucratic delays in the 
recruitment process hampers the timeous filling of vacant positions. This often 
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means that current rostered train drivers must do longer or more shifts, which can 
cause further stress on the train drivers. Recently there have also been a number of 
attacks on train drivers which further compounds the difficult conditions train drivers 
currently work under. 
7.2 SITE VISITS 
The locations visited are listed in Table 65: Site visit locations, along with the 
reasons for selecting the specific sites. The major criteria for selecting the sites were 
as follows: 
- Several sites outside of the City of Cape Town were selected so that the
problem in neighbouring municipalities could be assessed.
- Sites identified as hot-spots from the quantitative analysis phase.
- Sites specifically mentioned during the expert interview stage.
- Safety and accessibility.
- Sites selected based on personal knowledge of known trespassing.
 Table 65: Site visit locations 
Location Reason for Site Selection 
Elsies River Station Example of an “unfriendly” subway, discouraging use 
of the formal rail crossing point. 
Elsies River Station – Parow 
Station 
High number of occurrences involving pedestrian-train 
incidents. 
Parow Station – Tygerberg 
Station 
High number of occurrences involving pedestrian-train 
incidents. 
Parow Station High number of occurrences involving pedestrian-train 
incidents. 
Station precinct area identified as a crime hot-spot. 
Mbekweni Station Location in Drakenstein Municipality with high 
number of occurrences involving pedestrian train 
incidents. 
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Location Reason for Site Selection 
Dal Josafat Station – Mbekweni 
Station 
Location in Drakenstein Municipality with high 
number of occurrences involving pedestrian train 
incidents. 
Klapmuts Station Location in Stellenbosch Municipality with high 
number of occurrences involving pedestrian train 
incidents. 
Du Toit Station – Koelenhof 
Station 
Location in Stellenbosch Municipality with a known 
informal at-grade pedestrian crossing. 
Strand Station – Van der Stel 
Station 
Location with a known trespassing hot-spot. 
Netreg Station – Heideveld 
Station 
Example of a universally accessible grade-separated 
pedestrian crossing. 
Nyanga Station – Philippi 
Station 
Hot-spot area with high number of occurrences 
involving pedestrian train incidents as well as 
occurrences of theft and vandalism. 
Example of concrete fencing installed as a 
countermeasure. 
Bonteheuwel Station High number of occurrences involving pedestrian-train 
incidents as well as occurrences of theft and 
vandalism. 
Kraaifontein Station High number of occurrences involving pedestrian-train 
incidents. 
7.2.1   Location analysis 
Trespassing or evidence of trespassing was identified at all 13 locations visited. 
(See Table 66: Site visit – Nature of trespassing). Five of the locations were at train 
stations including the area immediately adjacent to the stations and eight locations 
were along line sections. Encroachment was identified at four of the locations with 
the shacks adjacent to the tracks between Mbekweni and Dal Josafat Stations in Paarl 
posing the most significant risk. The shacks were not only located to nearly within 
the kinematic envelope of the train but there was also evidence of human waste, 
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water waste and litter which could undermine the structural integrity of the rail 
ballast. See Figure 53: Encroachment of shacks in Mbekweni, Paarl. Loitering was 
evident at two of the locations, where people were inside the rail reserve for no 
apparent reason. 
Table 66: Site visit – Nature of trespassing 
Location Trespassing Encroachment Loitering 
Bonteheuwel Station ✓
Du Toit Station - Koelenhof Station ✓ ✓
Elsies River Station ✓
Elsies River Station - Parow Station ✓
Heideveld Station - Netreg Station ✓
Klapmuts Station ✓
Kraaifontein Station ✓ ✓
Mbekweni Station ✓
Mbekweni Station - Dal Josafat Station ✓ ✓
Nyanga Station - Philippi Station ✓
Parow Station ✓ ✓
Strand Station - Van der Stel Station ✓ ✓
Tygerburg Station - Parow Station ✓ ✓
Total 13 4 2 
Figure 53: Encroachment of shacks in Mbekweni, Paarl 
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An informal MBT ranking facility was situated immediately alongside one 
location at the Khayamandi Mall informal crossing, near Du Toit Station.              
(See Figure 54: Site visit – Khayamandi Mall informal crossing). 
Outside the Nomzamo informal crossing, the arterial road, M153, Strand Main 
Road, is along a taxi route and MBT operators collect and pick-up passengers at this 
location. Both locations recorded the greatest number of trespassers during the site 
visit. 
The only location visited adjacent to an informal settlement was that at 
Mbekweni in Paarl. An attempt was made to visit the staging yard at Philippi Station, 
but being unfamiliar with the area, this could not be done safely. (See Table 67: Site 
visits – Adjacent land-use). 
Table 67: Site visits – Adjacent land-use 





Bonteheuwel Station ✓ ✓ 
   










Elsies River Station - Parow 
Station 
✓ ✓ 
   














   
Mbekweni Station 
    
✓ 
Mbekweni Station - Dal Josafat  
Station 
   
✓ 




   
Parow Station 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
 









   
Grand Total 4 9 3 3 2 
*Informal MBT pick-up and collection point 
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Figure 54: Site visit – Khayamandi Mall informal crossing 
 
A 15-minute all-direction pedestrian count was completed at each location to 
give an indication of the numbers of trespassers. (See Table 68: Site visits – 
15minutes trespass counts). The Nomzamo location between Strand and Van der Stel 
Stations (n=384), as well as the Khayamandi Mall location between Du Toit and 
Koelenhof Stations (n=303) recorded the highest number of pedestrians. A 
significant number of trespassers were counted at Kraaifontein (n=54) and Klapmuts 
(n=25) Stations. The counts were all completed during off-peak times.  
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Table 68: Site visits – 15minutes trespass counts 
Location Trespass 15min Count 
Strand Station - Van der Stel Station 384 
Du Toit Station - Koelenhof Station 303 
Kraaifontein Station 54 
Klapmuts Station 25 
Tygerburg Station - Parow Station 15 
Bonteheuwel Station 12 
Mbekweni Station 9 
Elsies River Station 7 
Elsies River Station - Parow Station 7 
Mbekweni Station - Dal Josafat Station 3 
Parow Station 3 
Heideveld Station - Netreg Station 0 
Nyanga Station - Philippi Station 0 
Grand Total 822 
 
Direct pedestrian crossing action was witnessed at nine of the locations and 
longitudinal movement at nine locations. Trespassing to access the station via the 
platform-end was witnessed at five of the locations including Du Toit Station, Elsies 
River Station, Klapmuts Station, Mbekweni Station and Kraaifontein Station. 
Trespassers were mainly adult males and females with just under half of the 
sites also having child trespassers. See Table 69: Site visit – Demographic data. A 
few of trespassers were elderly (male and female) and a man with a walking stick 
was witnessed trespassing during the visit to Klapmuts Station. (See Figure 55) 
 
Figure 55: Klapmuts Station – Elderly man with walking stick using a short cut across the 
tracks 
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Table 69: Site visit – Demographic data 
Location Adult Child Male Female Elderly Cyclists Homeless 
Bonteheuwel Station ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
Du Toit Station - Koelenhof 
Station 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Elsies River Station ✓ 
 
✓ 
    





    
Klapmuts Station ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
Kraaifontein Station ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
   
Mbekweni Station ✓ 
 
✓ ✓ 
   
Mbekweni Station - Dal 
Josafat Station 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
   





Strand Station - Van der 
Stel Station 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 





   
Grand Total 11 6 11 9 4 2 2 
A number of the locations visited had formal, alternate crossing points, with 
most locations (n=8) having a formal pedestrian overbridge. Two locations had 
subways/underpasses at Elsies River and Klapmuts Stations, both of which were not 
very “friendly” for pedestrians. See Table 70: Site visits – Closest formal crossing 
point. 
Eleven (n=11) of the locations had fencing installed either partially or fully and 
nearly all fencing was vandalised several points along its length to facilitate access to 
the railway reserve. The only fence that showed resistance to vandalism was the 
section of concrete fencing between Nyanga and Philippi Station. This concrete wall-
fence was also the most obtrusive and imposing.  
Klapmuts Station has a significant level difference between the tracks and 
street including a rock-filled gabion used as an earth retaining structure, which could 
be considered as a landscaping barrier. See Figure 56: Site visits – The level 
difference between the street and track at Klapmuts Station. This measure was 
largely ineffective as pedestrians created a pathway through the obstruction to access 
the tracks. 
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Table 70: Site visits – Closest formal crossing point 











Du Toit Station - Koelenhof 
Station 
   
✓ 
Elsies River Station ✓ 
   
Elsies River Station - Parow 
Station 
   
✓ 














Mbekweni Station - Dal Josafat 
Station 
   
✓ 













Tygerburg Station - Parow Station 
   
✓ 
Grand Total 2 8 1 4 
 
 
Figure 56: Site visits – The level difference between the street and track at Klapmuts Station 
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7.3 ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS AND SITE VISITS  
The interviews, although only with a limited number of individuals, provided 
an additional level of information that provided context to the quantitative analysis as 
well as information on the effectiveness of various countermeasures. The site visits 
were used to validate and verify the information and provide an insight into actual 
witnessed behaviour. 
7.3.1 General analysis 
Trespassing is more widespread and commonplace than initially thought. A 
finding from the expert interviews was that the actual number of people trespassing 
is unprecedented and apart from a few very high traffic locations where counts have 
been carried out, the actual numbers of trespassers across the network is unknown. 
At the 13 sites visited, the average number of people trespassing was 63 persons/15-
minutes or 252 persons/hour. The occurrence data which captures an element of 
trespassing, only represents a fraction of the problem as confirmed by (Silla & 
Kallberg, 2015) and (Savage, 2007).  
The locations that have recorded the highest number of trespassers are 
characterised by direct pedestrian crossing action at one primary location. The 
trespassing behaviour at all other locations are characterised by random pedestrian 
movements, using diagonal or longitudinal paths across and along the tracks. 
Trespassers frequently use the platform ends to gain access to the stations. These 
findings support the research carried out by (Mvinjelwa et al., 2019). 
The “typical” trespasser does not exist. Trespassers included both male and 
females, young and old, the physically fit and those less mobile such as trespassers 
carrying shopping bags or babies on their arms. We need to however distinguish 
between the motives for trespassing. One respondent during the expert interviews 
summed it up as follows: “We specifically don’t call it trespassing but ‘informal 
crossing of railway lines’.” This decriminalises the pedestrian whose sole aim is to 
cross the tracks in an “illegal but justifiable” manner as denoted by (Skládaná, et al., 
2018). 
It is difficult to determine whether an individual trespassing on the railway, is 
doing so with a criminal intent. Certain locations have been identified as fare evasion 
hot-spots (RSSB, 2018; Matzopoulos & Lerer, 1998; Mvinjelwa et al., 2019), where 
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it is clear that large numbers of trespassers do so to avoid ticket inspectors. From the 
study carried out in 2015 by (DelMistro & Khanye, 2015), where it was estimated 
that 7% of passengers travelled without a train ticket, based on the number of 
trespassers at fare evasion hot-spots, this number would seem to be increasing. 
 Nearly all trespassing acts witnessed during the site visits were without 
criminal intent (Havarneanu, 2017) and purely to take a short-cut along well-trodden 
pedestrian desire lines (Skládaná et al., 2018; Silla & Luoma, 2008; Ryan, 2012; 
Savage, 2007; RSSB, 2018). 
The interviews confirmed the quantitative analysis finding that suicides are not 
a major contributor to railway fatalities, compared to that in Europe where suicides 
contributed to 72% of all fatalities (Ryan et al., 2018). 
Contrary to the findings of (Silla & Luoma, 2008), trespassers were regularly 
seen in groups at several of the sites visited. A reason given for this is that “bad 
behaviour will often be copied by others” but another may be that the actual 
behaviour has been reinforced to the degree that it has become second nature and 
deemed to be acceptable practice. Walking in groups is also a common characteristic 
in school children pedestrian behaviour and this was evident in the rail environment 
as well where train stations have schools close by.    
Unlawful occupation or encroachment into the railway reserve is widespread. 
These encroachments generally display itself on three levels: 
- The first happens as a result of the expansion of informal settlements adjacent
to railways. This is becoming more commonplace as a combination of critical 
housing shortages in cities and lack of employment opportunities in rural areas have 
led to the rapid expansion of informal settlements. Corrugated steel and wooden 
dwellings are erected for permanent/long term purposes. The dwelling arrangements 
may be well organised and planned or they could be dense where space is limited. 
The layouts are usually co-ordinated by a community facilitator, leader or chief. 
Examples of these types of encroachments are at Philippi, Langa and Mbekweni 
areas. 
- The second type of encroachment consists of ramshackle shelters of a less
formal nature. These shelters could consist of tents or flimsily constructed with 
cardboard and bits of plastic sheeting. Shelters would occasionally use the natural 
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shelter provided by trackside vegetation or be situated along the railway reserve 
boundary fencing or walls. The location of these “dwellings” are unstructured, 
haphazard and scattered, and are commonly found under bridges and highway 
flyovers, on the fringes of rail stations, abutments and any place along the rail 
reserve that provides any sort of natural cover or protection. These encroachments 
are widespread and have been seen all across the network. 
- The third type of encroachment witnessed was fly-tipping, where the rail
reserve is used as a rubbish dump and the tracks as a toilet and washing area 
(Srivastava, 2015). A number of features were identified that are common to areas of 
unlawful occupation as listed by (Poya & Mathebula, 2013) including pollution and 
sewage, fencing vandalised and removed, and numerous pedestrian pathways 
crossing the tracks.  
A direct consequence of water and sewage waste being disposed of on the 
tracks as well as the physical act of the foot traffic of hundreds of pedestrians lead to 
the erosion and eventual structural damage to the track foundation and formation 
layers. The most apparent example of this was at the Nomzamo location between 
Strand and Van der Stel Stations, where railway sleepers are used to shore up the 
track ballast. (See Figure 57: Railway sleepers used to shore up track ballast at the 
Nomzamo informal crossing). 
Figure 57: Railway sleepers used to shore up track ballast at the Nomzamo informal crossing 
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Apart from rubbish and waste being strewn inside the railway reserve, the 
general station and track-side environment is in a poor condition. Trackside 
vegetation is left to grow unabated across the network, impairing visibility for both 
trespassers and train drivers and hampers surveillance and detection of criminal 
activity. A number of station precinct areas are reduced to slums, with the areas 
overtaken by transients, informal traders and rampant drug use.  
7.3.2 Countermeasure effectiveness 
Two clear countermeasure approaches became apparent from the expert 
interviews, one with a focus on trespassers as pedestrians and the other with a focus 
on trespassers as criminals. There are some countermeasures which would be equally 
effective with both pedestrians and criminals, such as fencing, while other 
countermeasures may be more specific to either pedestrians, such as grade-
separation, or specific to rail crime, such as drones and CCTV.  
The human behaviour element and the erosion of social norms in society in 
general are a concern that hamstrings the effectiveness of engineering measures. The 
human behavior element, as with all elements of life in modern day South Africa, is a 
complicated problem to deal with, which not only affects rail but may be a spill-over 
from non-compliance in general society. This is evident in the road environment; 
unacceptable road user behavior is rapidly becoming a common practice and road 
users need to be forced to behave in a certain way. In the rail environment then, the 
only effective engineering measures are the type which forces a certain behaviour. 
People cannot be expected to simply comply with rules and standards and where 
given a choice, they would most likely still choose the risky and unsafe option. What 
became apparent from the interviews was that the solution to trespassing cannot be 
down to only the railway operator and needs a coordinated multi-stakeholder 
approach.  
During the site visits, while witnessing the behaviour of pedestrians crossing 
the tracks at the busiest locations, trespassers were not specifically looking out for an 
oncoming train before or during the act of crossing the tracks. Trespassers seemed 
oblivious to the dangers and will purposely avoid safer, formal crossing options 
where they were available. 
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The number of fences vandalised, with holes cut through them to create access 
points are an indication of the intention of the pedestrian to overcome or bypass the 
first engineering measure as an entry to the railway reserve. Fencing is largely 
ineffective as a barrier as most fencing is easily vandalised (and not maintained) to 
make access to the rail reserve. The only fence that has shown any longevity is the 
one installed between Nyanga and Philippi Stations and consists of a solid concrete 
wall construction. The maintenance of fencing is deemed critical to maintain the 
effectiveness of the countermeasure. 
Existing formal crossings, such as subways, pedestrian overbridges and formal 
pedestrian routes are seldom used by pedestrians to cross the railway. From personal 
experience, majority of the available formal crossing options are a significant 
diversion from the main pedestrian desire lines, feel unsafe to use from a personal 
safety perspective and are poorly maintained. 
Specific countermeasures targeted at rail crime have seen a number of 
combined measures implemented at high crime hot-spot areas. 
Hot-spot policing strategies is recognised by Braga et al., (2012) and Telep & 
Weisburd, (2012) as an effective crime fighting strategy. These measures include the 
use of special armed tactical response units guided by drone surveillance systems and 
backed up by sophisticated crime analytics and crime intelligence. 
These measures in combination have proven to be very effective where 
targeted interventions were made. The sustainability of enforcement focused 
measures are under scrutiny as their effects are short-lived and are resource heavy, 
placing huge burdens on operational expenditures of railway operators. 
The strategy supporting greater controls around station access and kerbing 
illegal access onto stations from the platform-end ramps is widely supported. 
Measures focused around platform-end trespassing would greatly reduce trespass 
numbers at a number of locations as well as counter fare evasion. 
Finally, there are at least 2 examples where the formalisation of an at-grade 
pedestrian crossing would greatly improve conditions for pedestrians and reduce the 
risks to rail operations. These locations are at the Nomzamo crossing in Strand and 
the Khayamandi mall crossing in Stellenbosch.  Both these locations have thousands 
of pedestrians crossing the tracks daily and current rail policy prevents any 
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meaningful change being implemented. A risk-based approach should be used to 
evaluate sites such as these taking into consideration the duty-of-care of the railway 
operator and local municipalities in safe-guarding human life. International best 
practice guidelines exist to enable an effective at-grade solution to be developed at 
both these sites. See Figure 58: Double maze layout at a busy at-grade crossing in 
New Zealand and Figure 59: Layout plans for maze approaches for examples of how 
at-grade crossings are treated in New Zealand. 
Figure 58: Double maze layout at a busy at-grade crossing in New Zealand 
Source: (Koorey, et al., 2017) 
7.3.3 The impact on train drivers 
Apart from the impact to train operations, the psychological impact of 
pedestrian-rail fatalities requires more attention. With a growing number of 
pedestrians as trespassers on the tracks, train drivers are increasingly being placed 
under significant stress. This stress is likely to impact the train driver’s ability to 
concentrate, make decisions and his general emotional well-being.   
The benefit of implementing measures to reduce trespassing and related 
incidents extends to the well-being of rail staff and the knock-on impact on train 
operations. 
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Figure 59: Layout plans for maze approaches 
Source: (Koorey, et al., 2017) 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This chapter will provide a summary of everything covered by this research 
report. The key findings are discussed in Section 8.2 along with recommendations, 
and practical suggestions for implementation. Topics for suggested further research 
is described in Section 0. The concluding remarks are discussed in Section 8.4, and 
completes this dissertation. 
8.1 SUMMARY 
The work undertaken as part of this research sought to provide a detailed 
description of railway trespassing focused on the commuter rail service area in the 
greater City of Cape Town functional region. Occurrences of pedestrian-rail fatalities 
as well as incidents of theft and vandalism to rail infrastructure are commonplace and 
occur with alarming regularity, leading to unnecessary loss of life and crippling the 
functioning of the rail system. 
A detailed literature review was completed to provide a comprehensive 
overview of current knowledge on all aspects pertaining to railway trespassing as 
well as the methods and tools that are currently in use for the prevention of such 
railway trespassing. The literature review highlighted a number of limitations in the 
current knowledge around which this research was formulated. 
This research contributes to the current field of knowledge by: 
- presenting the characteristics of railway trespassing in a developing country
context in an African city,
- describing the situation not only in the City of Cape Town but also
considering all neighbouring municipalities that share the commuter rail
service,
- considering all manifestations of trespassing as well as a specific focus on
trespass related crime on rail infrastructure, and
- providing an evaluation on the efficacy of a countermeasure currently being
implemented with support from empirical evidence on its effectiveness.
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The research details the scale of the problem using a mixed-method, sequential 
exploratory research approach with a quantitative and a lesser, qualitative element. 
The quantitative analysis focuses on railway mortality and recorded deaths as well as 
railway safety and railway security incidents data.  A specific focus of the analysis 
was on pedestrian-rail fatalities and injuries as well as occurrences of theft and 
vandalism to railway infrastructure. 
The qualitative element consisted of a multi-pronged approach consisting of a 
select number of interviews with subject matter experts which was followed up by 
site visits used to verify and validate the information from the quantitative analysis as 
well as the expert interviews. The site visits allowed observations to be made 
whereby the behaviour of trespassers could be witnessed first-hand. 
The final element entailed an evaluation of a specific enforcement 
countermeasure that involved multi-organisation co-operation to respond to the 
increasing levels of trespass-related crime on the rail network. The pilot project 
called the Rail Enforcement Unit was evaluated for its efficacy. 
The results of the quantitative analysis are presented in iii.) with a full analysis, 
containing a discussion, interpretation and evaluation of the results of the 
quantitative analysis. Analysis of the case study evaluation and expert interviews and 
site visits are discussed at the end of the relevant chapters. 
8.2 KEY FINDINGS 
8.2.1 Key finding 1: Characteristic of the typical pedestrian-rail incident 
The mortality data is the only reliable source of demographic information for 
deaths attributed to a rail-related trauma. The typical pedestrian-rail incident victim 
is male, between the ages of 20 and 59 years of age. Incidents are widespread with 
no clear temporal pattern other than an indication that incidents are more prevalent 
during the evening peak period, i.e. between 16:00 and 20:00. 
8.2.2 Key finding 2: Coloured and black townships most at risk 
Analyses of the data confirms that the geographical locations for the highest 
number of pedestrian-rail occurrences, are where the rail line passes through black 
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and coloured townships on the Cape Flats. Locations that have high pedestrian-rail 
occurrences are also likely to have high incidents of theft and vandalism. 
8.2.3 Key finding 3: Schools close to railway lines must be a focus area 
Railway-related deaths are rare among children. Fatalities increase 
dramatically from the age of 19 years. The transition from adolescent to adult, is 
therefore, critical to reinforcing safe behaviour, especially targeting older primary 
school and high school learners, where schools are located close to the railway. 
Learners from schools situated close to the railway are also more accustomed 
to trespassing, and trespassing behaviour is treated as “normal”. 
8.2.4 Key finding 4: Intelligent crime responses are required 
Pedestrian-rail occurrences, as well as occurrences of theft and vandalism, 
display a diffused temporal pattern, i.e. no seasonal or weekly variations exist. 
All types of occurrences are more likely to happen in the morning and 
afternoon peak periods, although they occur regularly throughout the day. Criminals 
prefer operating under cover of darkness before the morning and after the afternoon 
peak periods when a reduced train service is operational. 
The fact that no clear temporal trend exists is an indication of the rampant 
nature of occurrences of theft and vandalism on the rail network. Countermeasure 
strategies which are time-based, such as patrols and enforcement measures, will need 
to be carefully strategised to vary between high visibility operations and more 
aggressive surveillance and detection tactics. Longer-term monitoring and 
surveillance techniques involving CCTV and improved lighting must be considered. 
8.2.5 Key finding 5: The highest priority rail corridor - The Central Line 
Pedestrian-rail occurrences are likely to increase when a normal train service is 
resumed on the rail network. This is applicable to urban and township areas where 
the communities adjacent to railway lines are more densely populated. More trains 
would mean more opportunities for incidents. This is especially relevant to the 
Central Line, which currently operates a much-reduced service, and has seen a 
reduction in the number of pedestrian-rail incidents because of this. 
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At the time of writing, the Central Line has had its rail service suspended due 
to theft and vandalism of critical signalling and electrical track equipment. It is 
planned to restore a reduced service by early 2021.  
8.2.6 Key finding 6: Current available data is not fully adequate 
Trespassing is more widespread and commonplace than initially thought. The 
expert interviews and site inspections confirm that the actual number of people 
trespassing is unprecedented, and apart from a few very high-traffic locations where 
pedestrian counts have been carried out, the actual numbers of trespassers across the 
network is unknown. The occurrence data which only captures an element of 
trespassing, represents but a fraction of the problem. 
8.2.7 Key finding 7: The three manifestations of railway trespassing 
Three main forms of trespassing can be confirmed: 
- Informal crossing of the railway (or using a longitudinal path along the
tracks), purely as a means of taking a short-cut with no criminal intent.
- Deliberate trespassing onto the non-public side of railway property for
criminal intent which includes fare evasion, theft, vandalism and graffiti.
- Deliberate unlawful occupation on railway property for the purpose of setting
up an informal shelter or dwelling in the rail reserve. Encroachment in the
form of fly-tipping was also witnessed at several trackside locations.
8.2.8 Key finding 8: Fare evasion and revenue protection 
Fare evasion is commonplace and a major cause of trespassing. Fare evaders 
are commonly encountered at the main destination stations closer to the CBD, but the 
origin stations should also be targeted for interventions to encourage behavioural 
change. The platform-ends are commonly used to gain access to the stations and 
clearly needs to be a focus for the railway operator to secure its station precinct. 
8.2.9 Key finding 9: Vegetation management is lacking 
The unchecked growth of track-side vegetation impairs visibility for both 
trespassers and train drivers and hampers surveillance and detection of criminal 
activity. 
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8.2.10 Key finding 10: Lack of awareness around the dangers of trespassing 
Trespassers were regularly seen in groups of two or more at several sites. This 
suggests that the actual behaviour has been reinforced to the degree that it has 
become second nature and deemed to be acceptable practice. Many pedestrians 
crossing the railway would not check to see if a train is approaching. 
8.2.11 Key finding 11: Solutions require a multi-stakeholder approach 
Behavioural and societal issues including unemployment, drug abuse, and 
gangsterism have been identified as issues that cannot be put down to the railway 
operator to solve, and needs a coordinated, multi-stakeholder approach. These 
societal-issues render engineering solutions largely ineffective. 
8.2.12 Key finding 12: The case for formalising at-grade pedestrian crossings 
Expert interviews and the site visits revealed at least two examples where the 
formalisation of an at-grade pedestrian crossing would greatly improve conditions 
for pedestrians and reduce the risks to rail operations. These locations are at the 
Nomzamo crossing in Strand and the Khayamandi mall crossing in Stellenbosch.  
Both these locations have thousands of pedestrians crossing the tracks daily. 
International best practice guidelines exist to enable an effective solution to be 
developed. An engineering safety management approach to decision making is 
required to assist the railway operator to meet its legal requirements as well as 
determine the most appropriate safe and workable solution. 
8.2.13 Key finding 13: A fence is only as effective as its maintenance regime 
Irrespective of the fence type, it is important that the fence be maintained to an 
acceptable standard to maintain the effectiveness of the countermeasure. 
Fences are also critical to ensure compliant use of existing formal crossings 
such as subways, pedestrian overbridges and formal pedestrian routes. 
Currently the most effective fence installed is the concrete barrier fence 
installed along sections of the Central Line, which has reduced the number of 
pedestrian-rail fatalities to zero along the length of the fenced section. The fence 
however, reinforces community segregation. 
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8.2.14 Key finding 14: Current hot-spot areas to be monitored 
Analysing the occurrence data identifies six hot-spot areas that can be 
characterised as follows: 
Area 1 – Bonteheuwel to Mutual Stations 
Area 2 – Netreg to Stock Road and Lentegeur Stations 
Area 3 – Bellville to Kraaifontein Stations 
Area 4 – Paarl to Wellington Stations 
Area 5 - Cape Town to Salt River and Esplanade Stations 
Area 6 - Klapmuts to Muldersvlei Station 
8.2.15 Key finding 15: Countermeasure combinations are key 
Countermeasures, when implemented as a basket of measures, has proven to be 
most effective. Walling, drones, CCTV and enforcement measures have been used to 
great effect on the Central Line. The Rail Enforcement Unit is an effective short-term 
countermeasure mainly against railway infrastructure theft and vandalism. 
Geographic displacement of crime is evident and in accordance with Key finding 
no.4, deployment tactics should be varied and the possibility of introducing 
supporting longer-term measures will improve its longer-term sustainability.  
8.2.16 Key finding 16: Train driver well-being is vital 
The psychological well-being of train drivers caused by pedestrian-rail incidents as 
well as near-misses cannot be overlooked. Measures to support this critical resource 
need to be explored in more detail. 
8.2.17 Recommendations  
Based on the research carried out, the following practical recommendations are 
made: 
Focusing on trespassing without criminal intent 
Develop a strategy centred around preventing unlawful station access and 
encouraging the use of formal crossing opportunities. These include: platform-end 
ramp treatments, station precincts to be securely fenced, pedestrian subway 
refurbishments, formalising at-grade pedestrian crossings where warranted and 
implementing education programmes at schools. 
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Focusing on trespassing with criminal intent 
Develop a strategy centred around increasing the effort of crime, increasing the 
risk of getting caught and decreasing the reward. These include: target hardening of 
all high-risk assets, extensive, real-time CCTV monitoring on all high-risk assets and 
improved tactical response units deployed from satellite stations around the network. 
Focusing on unlawful occupation 
Develop a strategy centred around a multi-stakeholder partnership approach 
with provincial and local government, homeless shelters, police, NGOs and social 
services organisations. A monitoring mechanism is required to detect and report 
unlawful occupation as early as possible, the use of homeless shelters must be 
promoted and incentivised, and community-led resettlement action plans must be 
trialled at key locations. 
General treatments 
Track-side vegetation clearing, improved lighting and a rigorous fencing and 
fencing maintenance programme are vital to securing the network. Another key 
strategy has to be focused on station precinct regeneration; target “broken-window” 
issues around station precincts, loitering, drug dealing and usage, littering, urinating 
and other anti-social behaviour. 
Train driver support 
A comprehensive programme looking into the mitigation of risk factors that 
can increase the negative effects of pedestrian-rail incidents for train drivers should 
be developed. Prevention and intervention programs should consider the diversity of 
reactions from train drivers including: characteristics of the employee, coping 
mechanisms, the type of incidents, and the support and care received. 
It is also recommended that the rail operator embark on targeted identification 
and training of new train drivers to ensure a sustainable supply of skilled rail staff. 
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8.3 TOPICS RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Topic 1 
It is a common view held (verified by the expert interviews) that educational 
and awareness campaigns in a South African context are not an effective trespassing 
countermeasure. It has been suggested that communication-based measures need to 
be correctly targeted to ensure its effectiveness. More research is needed where 
targeted educational campaigns, carried out at schools that are in close proximity to a 
rail station, are evaluated to determine if the desired outcomes are achieved by 
decreasing unsafe crossing of the railways.  
Topic 2 
More research is needed around uncovering the motives for trespassing from 
actual trespassers and discovering their opinion on what countermeasures are likely 
to be effective. Understanding unsafe behaviour and the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of engineering controls from those that commonly trespass could 
provide a new level of information to inform countermeasure strategies. 
Topic 3 
Available occurrence data records only safety and security incidents. Little is 
known of the full extent of illegal occupation or encroachment onto railway property. 
A multi-stakeholder framework needs to be developed to resolve current hot-spots 
and adopt a more proactive approach to prevent this phenomenon from increasing. 
Topic 4 
It has been suggested that should station-precinct areas be secured, thereby 
preventing platform-end station access, that this would greatly reduce the rate of 
trespassing. More research is required on developing and trialling effective 
countermeasures to prevent platform-end trespassing in a South African context. 
Topic 5 
The impact of pedestrian-rail near-misses and fatalities, on the psychological 
wellbeing of train drivers needs to be explored in greater detail. The effects on rail 
staff, safe rail operations as well as organisational efficiency of this safety critical 
role is not researched enough. 
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8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research provides a comprehensive description of railway trespassing and 
its main manifestations within the commuter rail network in the City of Cape Town 
Functional Region. 
The research provides evidence in the form of occurrence data analysed to 
describe the demographic, temporal and spatial characteristics of the main 
consequences of railway trespassing as it affects railway operations, i.e. pedestrian-
rail incidents and occurrences of theft and vandalism to railway infrastructure. 
Interviews with subject matter experts and site visits confirms the validity of 
the data analysed and also reveals three primary motives for trespassing: 
- trespassing without criminal intent: pedestrians using the myriad of well-
trodden footpaths as short-cuts to reach their destinations,
- trespassing with criminal intent: those seeking to steal and damage rail
infrastructure and includes those who travel without paying fares, and
- unlawful occupation on railway property: those who erect shelters inside or
encroaching on the railway reserve as well as fly-tipping.
Each motive described above is uniquely different, but all involve the initial act 
of trespassing. Categorising trespassing in this manner allows for more effective, 
targeted countermeasure strategies to be developed. 
What has become clear, is that the nature of problems experienced on the rail 
network is essentially not a railway problem. The most affected areas the railway 
passes through are those that are afflicted with high poverty levels, high 
unemployment, crime, gangsterism and drug use. The railways, as a socio-technical 
system has a symbiotic relationship with its environment, and it is only natural that 
societal issues spill over into the railway environment. 
This does not mean that the problems the railways face are insurmountable - 
rather, in order to develop effective countermeasures, one has to look beyond the 
typical engineering measures. All environmental and social factors need to be fully 
considered as part of a systems approach to problem solving. It cannot be expected 
that the railway operator cure all of society’s ills and a multi-organisational approach 
and effort is required to ensure a safer rail environment.  
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About the questionnaire 
Hello, my name is Faizel Williams, and I am conducting research towards a Master of 
Science Degree in Transportation Engineering. I am researching the occurrence of railway 
trespassing in the Metrorail environment and would like to invite you to participate in the 
project. 
Collision between trains and pedestrians is a leading fatal train-related accident type 
worldwide and therefore many studies have argued that trespassing is one of the most 
important railway safety issues. The participants for this survey are selected on the basis of 
their expert knowledge and experience on the subject matter and has the following objectives: 
i. To identify the most problematic sites for trespassing,
ii. To learn more about specific trespassing characteristics,
iii. To seek opinion on the effectiveness of preventive measures and strategies to
prevent trespassing.
Participation in the survey is voluntary and anonymous, and in order to participate, all that is 
required is for you to complete a brief questionnaire.  
The data gathered from this exercise will be used to inform my research and could help 
practitioners, operators and researchers to better understand railway trespassing and could aid 
in developing effective countermeasures to combat trespassing. 
What to do with your completed questionnaire 
Please return your completed questionnaire to me as soon as you have completed it, or within 




11 Leeuwen Street 
Cape Town 
8001 
Investigating Rail Trespassing Occurrences Questionnaire 
Thank you very much for your help in 
completing this questionnaire 
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Background Details 
1. How long have you worked in your current role
in the Western Cape region (to the nearest year)?
2. Which area / corridor / service lines / stations / districts are you primarily assigned
to?
Trespassing 
3. How many instances of trespassing in the rail reserve or via platform ends do you
believe to occur daily?
(one person trespassing = one trespassing event)
Please choose one option.
1 None 
2 Very little – Less than 10 per day 
3 Seldom – More than 10 but less than 30 per day 
4 Regularly – Between 31 and 70 events per day 
5 Very regularly – Between 71 and 100 events per day 
6 Too many to count – More than 100 events per day 
Do you wish to comment specifically about this? 
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4. Is there a specific time of day in which trespassing is more prevalent?
Please tick as appropriate.
1 04h30 – 06h00 
2 06h00 – 09h00 
3 09h00 – 16h00 
4 16h00 – 19h00 
5 19h00 – 22h00 
Do you wish to comment specifically about this? 






Both male and female but more males 
4 
Both male and female but more females 
5 
Equally both male and female 








7. Are there any specific features or trends of trespassers you think should get a
mention? E.g. schoolchildren, drunkards, homeless, tourists, drug addicts, graffiti
artists, thrill seekers etc.
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Using a shortcut – formal crossing 
available close-by 
     A 
Using a shortcut – no formal 
crossing available 
     B 
Formal crossing is deemed unsafe       
Fare evasion      C 
Vandalism to rail infrastructure      D 
Theft of rail infrastructure      E 
Other criminal activity      F 
To commit suicide      G 
Thrill seeking      H 
Socialising      I 
Graffiti      J 
Encroachment (establishment of an 
informal dwelling or abode) 
     K 
       
 






















10. Rank up to 10 of the worst line sections (sections between stations) for trespassing 









































Risk assessments / HazLoc studies      A 
Collaboration between 
organisations 
     B 
Patrols and enforcement      C 
Improved police support (crime 
investigation and intelligence)  
     D 
Effective judicial entities to 
prosecute trespassers 
     E 
Fencing and barriers      F 
Landscaping      G 
Detection and surveillance 
technology 
     H 
Lighting      I 
CCTV      J 
Signage      K 
Awareness and media campaigns      L 
Education at schools      M 
Thoughtfully designed and located 
pedestrian overbridges 
     N 
Thoughtfully designed and located 
pedestrian subways  
     O 
Formalising informal at-grade 
crossings 










13. Are you able to name example sites/locations where counter-measures have 










14. What in your view should be prioritized for immediate response as it affects railway 
operations? Choose only one option. 
1  Trespassing at and around stations 
2  Trespassing along line sections 
3  Trespassing at grade-crossings 
4  Encroachments 







15. Are there any other comments you would like to make on this subject or bring to the 

















Thank you for completing this questionnaire 
Should you wish to discuss any matter with me in person, please get in touch with me on 







Appendix B – Site Inspection Protocol 
Date: Time: Location: 
Weather:  
Describe nature of problem (trespass, suicide, 




Describe surrounding area (schools, hospitals, 
residential, shopping etc.) 





Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
Describe specific features of trespassers 




What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, pedestrian crossing, 
where is it located) 
What existing physical measures are in 
place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  























Appendix C – Case Study Protocol 
Trespass Countermeasure Evaluation Form 
Title of measure 
Locations implemented 
Type of measure 
Mark ‘X’ in only one box in each category 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Social Primary Reducing attractiveness 
Physical Secondary Obstruct access 
Technical Tertiary Influence determination 
Behavioural Early warning 
Reduce impact of collision 
Description of measure 
Describe relevant features of the measure: What is done? In what environment? What is the scale of 
implementation? 
Definition of target incidents 
Provide brief verbal description of target incidents and consider all relevant categories listed below. 
Suicide / Trespass 
Pre-crash behaviour 
Age of target 
Specific target area 
Time of day 
Urban or rural 
Size of the problem 
Provide baseline incidents or occurrences data in the target group based on the SANS categories in a 1-year period 
before implementation.
Effect on incidents and occurrences 
Provide percentage reduction in the number of target incidents or occurrences data in the target group based on 
the SANS categories in the period post implementation. State duration of evaluation period. 
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Durability of effects 
Estimate if the effects are likely to remain stable, increase or decrease with time, and why. What should be done to 
maintain the effect over a longer term?
Cost and benefits 
If possible, provide estimate of the ratio costs/benefits (C/B) and explain how this estimate was derived (e.g. refer 
to documented study, list the main types of costs that influence this ratio). Consider implementation, maintenance 
and organisational costs. 
Integration with other policy measures 
Consider following issues: How the measure interacts, interfaces or integrates with other preventative measures? 
Constraints or obstructions for implementation? Preconditions for implementation? How the measure can impact 
other measures? Does the effectiveness of the measure depend on implementation of other measures - if yes, 
which? Are there 
organisational or communication issues that need to be solved? 
Impact on railway operations 
How does the measure impact on the running of trains (reliability of train service, availability of track)? Is it possible 
to quantify these impacts? What could or should be done to mitigate any undesired impacts? 
Impact on people and jobs 
Consider people in and outside railway industry. How would implementation of the measure affect people and their 
jobs? Consider issues like loss of jobs, training and education, safety and health, number of staff needed, impacts on 
organisations. 
Technological issues 
Consider following issues regarding necessary technology: Is it available and reliable? If not, is it likely that the 
situation will be improved in near future? Is it compatible with current infrastructure design and relevant standards? 
Environment 
Consider issues like emissions, energy, scenery, wildlife, impacts on people near the track, short and long term 
effects. 
Acceptance 
Estimate how relevant groups of people (e.g. staff, passengers, train operators, infrastructure managers, people 
living near tracks) accept the measure? What are the likely reasons for non-acceptance? Explain the basis of the 
estimate(s). 
Transferability issues 
What needs to be considered when applying the measure to another kind of environment (or country) or in 
different scale? What are the necessary preconditions for successful implementation of the measure in different 
environments or scale? How could the problems concerning transferability be solved? 
Additional information 
Describe any other relevant issues concerning successful implementation of the measure that are not mentioned 
above. 
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Appendix D – Incident and Occurrence Maps 
All Category Hot-spot Map Metro 
Category 1 Composite – Medium and High Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-a Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-b Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-c Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-d Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-e Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-f Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-g Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-h Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1-i Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2 Composite – Medium and High Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-a Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-b Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-c Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-d Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-e Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-f Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-g Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-h Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 2-i Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category 1+2 Composite – Medium and High Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category E-a Occurrences Hot-spot Map 
Category E-a Fatalities Hot-spot Map 









































Appendix E – Interview Records 
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Interview 1 




2. How many instances of trespassing in the rail reserve or via platform ends do you
believe to occur daily?
Trespassing is an everyday occurrence. The instances of trespassing are too numerous to
count.
3. Is there a specific time of day in which trespassing is more prevalent?
It depends on the location. It can vary between all day and at peak periods in the morning
and afternoon.
Trains move about after the official service ends after 10PM and before the first service
starts so this period is when people least expect trains to be about.
4. Are trespassers likely to be male or female?
Both male and female but more males.
5. Are trespassers likely to be children, adolescents or adults?
Mostly adults. It depends also on the location and if there are schools nearby.
6. Are there any specific features or trends of trespassers you think should get a
mention? E.g. schoolchildren, drunkards, homeless, tourists, drug addicts, graffiti
artists, thrill seekers etc.
Suicides do happen but very seldom. We don’t have a huge suicide problem. There is a
growing problem of people using the rail reserve to build informal dwellings.
People just don’t realise that a train takes a long time to stop. 
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7. What you believe to be the main reasons for trespassing.
Shortcuts
Large numbers trespass to avoid paying fares. Fare evasion is large before big destination
stations, e.g. trains coming in to Cape Town, Esplanade is an example of this where
people detrain and walk along the tracks to Cape Town.
I don’t think people trespass to vandalise specifically. Theft is definitely a big reason to
trespass and vandalism is almost as a result of certain actions of theft.
Suicide isn’t a huge problem.
Thrill seeking isn’t a huge problem.
Socialising is a very strong reason for trespassing. Especially when we talk about access.
Access to recreation, shops, visiting etc.
Graffiti is more of a problem in areas where trains are staged not a big problem on other
parts of the network.
Encroachment is an increasing problem. An example of this is at Philippi Station. This
area is critical for staging purposes and can hold 32 trains. If we could use this area
effectively it would greatly improve operational efficiency. People are building shacks
right on the tracks at this location.
8. Where are the worst stations or line sections for trespassing incidents?
Nyanga – Philippi
Van der Stel – Strand
Salt River - Woodstock
9. Please rate what in your opinion are the best counter-measures to reducing
trespassing.
Fencing.
Detection and surveillance technology.
Lighting.
CCTV
Signage not effective. 
Awareness campaigns and media campaigns not effective. 
Education at schools not effective. 
Pedestrian bridges are not effective. People just walk under them. 
An example of a formalized at-grade crossing where we have improved conditions can be 
found at Muizenberg. This was an existing crossing that we relocated slightly to 
accommodate a municipal project. 
10. Do you have any other suggestions for reducing trespassing in the rail environment?
Maintenance of rail assets are important. Fences need to be maintained.
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11. Are you able to name example sites/locations where counter-measures have
successfully been implemented and where you have noticed a marked drop in
trespassing?
We had a visiting group from the Guardian Angels on how they tackled crime.
12. What in your view should be prioritized for immediate response as it affects railway
operations?
You need to focus on where you have control. Secondly, there needs to be a focus on
securing fare revenue.
Trespassing at and near stations need to be prioritized for these reasons.
13. Are there any other comments you would like to make?
The effect of a pedestrian train fatality on train drivers cannot be under-estimated. As
well as the knock-on effect of operational planning and driver rostering.
A large portion of train drivers are currently on stand-by, pending a psychological
assessment and may or may not return to work. Very few drivers have a clean record
where they haven’t been involved in a fatality. The current process after a fatal incident
needs to be reviewed as the current situation is very difficult for operational planning.
Only when a driver is boarded (declared unfit for further duty) can the vacant driver
position be filled. The recruit will first have to undergo extensive training before they can
be licensed as a train driver. There is a gap between the opening of the vacant position
and the filling of the position. We need to be able to fill the positions for stand-by drivers
to ensure continuity. Train drivers are too willing to accept being boarded and not return
to work and this adds to the delays in the process of concluding the process. It could take
months before a position is cleared to be filled and, in the meantime, operational roster
planning remains a challenge. Working drivers then are forced to do longer shifts and a
lot of over-time, which can cause further stress on drivers.
The situation for drivers is also unsafe and they need to be escorted at certain high-risk
locations. Conditions for train drivers are deteriorating.
14. Personal thoughts
Trespassing and the act of pedestrians moving from point A to point B is the biggest
concern to train drivers. Trespassers are oblivious to the risks involved and their
behaviour is a major cause of on-the-job-stress for train drivers.
What came across strongly from this interview was the impact of rail fatalities on train
drivers. The well-being of train drivers is often over-looked, and they are expected to
carry on with their duties as per normal even under extreme conditions of duress. This










The role of MBT industry as facilitators to unlawful pedestrian behaviour needs to be 
addressed. They pick up passengers at points along the railway reserve where trespassers 
frequent, thereby almost legitimising the behaviour. Municipal traffic officials need to do 
more to police areas within their jurisdiction. 
Trespassing is a major issue and railway operator is not capacitated to fully deal with the 
problems it experiences as part of its day-to-day operations. The railway operator is short 
on critical staff in several safety critical positions. 
Judiciary needs to be educated on the issues facing the rail industry and rail laws. Crime 
against railway infrastructure is still seen as a minor crime. Dedicated courts would 
facilitate the prosecution of criminals, which is essential to deter crime on the network. 
It is essential that an effective maintenance regime exists to immediately respond to 
maintenance issues such as vandalised fences, littering etc. Issues around maintenance 
rights of way between the municipalities and the railway operator need to be resolved so 
clear accountability is ensured. This is especially relevant with street-to-street grade 
separated crossings which can go into disrepair because no one takes maintenance 
responsibility. 
The use of modern technology in terms of railway safety and especially rail signalling 
systems needs to be expedited so that the occurrence and the impacts of signalling theft is 
reduced. This is the singlest most concerning issue affecting railway safety and has the 
biggest knock-on operational effects. Manual authorizing used in the event of the 
signalling system being disrupted is problematic and has contributed to railway incidents 
countrywide.  
3. Personal thoughts
Railway safety inspectors seem exasperated by the lack of a coordinated effort to tackle
rail issues. It would seem that the railway operator sees the regulator as an adversary
rather than an important stakeholder sharing a common vision.
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Interview 3 
1. Area of expertise.
Non-motorised transport: pedestrian movements
Trespassing 
2. How many instances of trespassing in the rail reserve or via platform ends do
you believe to occur daily?
Too many to count.
Based on survey information at Nomzamo in the morning peak period, we have
3000 people crossing in one direction and all-day movements in both directions as
well as the afternoon flows.
Rail hot-spot study found approximately 2000 people accessing the station via the
platform end at Brackenfell Station, in the morning peak alone. Fencing has been
removed or vandalised to allow access to the rail reserve. Includes people going to
work and school.
Taxi drop off areas and building contractors pick-up and drop off passengers at these
locations.
We call them “informal” crossings.
3. Is there a specific time of day in which trespassing is more prevalent?
Morning and afternoon peaks but throughout the day. 6Am to 9AM. Very much
location specific depending on where the peak flows are; the further away, the
earlier the peak. Areas closer to town will have a later peak. People working close to
where they live, will display a later morning peak. School children leaving school in
the afternoon will display an early afternoon peak. So, it very much depends on each
specific location.
People often cross in areas not very well lit. People will avoid crossing when dark 
due to the high risk of becoming a victim of crime and may choose a safer 
alternative. 
4. Are trespassers likely to be male or female?
Both male and female but more males.
I suspected an increase in female fatalities due to them not being as streetwise or
agile.
Areas around Cape Town station for example, there are several lines and high train
traffic and it requires a certain amount of dexterity to cross at these locations.
Trespass number have increased significantly of late and I suspect most of them are
fare evaders. That specific area maybe has 95% of males due to the physical
requirements of trespassing at that location.
Data sets should reflect, gender as well as race. Race is a sensitive subject, but it is
important when considering education and communication strategies to ensure that
the targeting of those measures is appropriate.
Appendices 291 
5. Are trespassers likely to be children, adolescents or adults?
Majority adults but you will see children as well.
Bonteheuwel: opposite an industrial area, will have mostly adults going to work.
It depends largely on the demand for movement, the trip attractors.
I only know of 2 cases where children were involved in rail accidents, i.) Military
Road level crossing and the ii.) Pedestrian bridge near Faure/Firgrove. Children
don’t often become victims of railway incidents. It’s a rarity, as most cases
movements are internal to townships.
6. Are there any specific features or trends of trespassers you think should get a
mention? E.g. schoolchildren, drunkards, homeless, tourists, drug addicts,
graffiti artists, thrill seekers etc.
If you look at the section of railway in the Southern Suburbs from Salt River to
Plumstead, and if you consider the length of the railway and the number of formal
crossing opportunities. In this area you have very little informal movement. There
are also a number of level crossings on the Southern Line.
In other corridors, the stations are much further apart, with less formal crossing
opportunities, less road bridges. People still need to cross and therefore you get a
higher rate of informal crossing. Bonteheuwel, again a case in point, people have no
criminal intent, they just wish to cross the railway to reach places of work and shops.
Nomzamo as well, please just take the shortest route, literally across the railway line.
The alternate route is not only a major diversion but is very unsafe for personal
safety. People just follow a desire line.
The numbers of people trespassing are not regularly counted or quantified. Part of
the work we have done is that we did feasibility studies at 15 hot-spot locations. Of
them, pedestrian bridges were only warranted at 7 of the locations. Because of a
combination of low pedestrian numbers and in other cases the pedestrian movement
is direct platform access. This is a railway operator problem and if addressed would
make a significant impact on trespassing. Access control and fencing outside stations
need to be addressed.
A large number of people use the rail reserve as a walking corridor with no intention
to cross but as a walking path. Informal crossing of railway line becomes a habitual
and a behavioural issue. When you see one person cross then it makes it ok for
others to cross as well. It is a behaviour which has been perpetuated on a daily basis.
People moist at risk are new users who aren’t as savvy.
No warrants for pedestrian bridges exist at present. A number of case studies have
been documented abroad but no formal warrants that indicate the criteria for
implementing a pedestrian bridge.
People wearing headphones need to be targeted as they don’t hear the approaching
train. This has been experienced in road fatalities as well. Train drivers have
indicated that in a number of cases they have sounded their siren to warn
pedestrians, but they were unable to hear because of the headphones. Bodies were
found with earphones. A communication message could be “Don’t use headphones
when crossing the railway line”.
When we started identifying hot-spot locations, rail commuter forum members were
questioned as to why people cross the railway, and the answer was as simple as
having a need to collect firewood, i.o.w. a very basic need had to be fulfilled.
Trespassing is becoming more commonplace even amongst the so-called middle
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class. We are witnessing this behavioural change occurring. It is becoming a 
common-practice and carried out by people from a middle-income and educated 
communities. Kuils River is an example. At Eerste River station, people alighting 
the train, would cross in front of the train before it departs as a quicker route. People 
become familiar and are experienced train users, there is a certain level of 
confidence. The behavioural issues are growing, people don’t think there is anything 
wrong with crossing the tracks illegally, or dangerously. 
7. What you believe to be the main reasons for trespassing.
Short-cuts. No formal crossing nearby or where there is a formal crossing nearby.
Heideveld. Pedestrian bridge is an example; people still use a short cut under the
bridge. The problem is the fencing has been vandalized and people still cross
unsafely. Impenetrable walls are required at locations such as these.
Formal crossing deemed unsafe.
Fare evasion. Some stations have very high fare evasion numbers.
Suicide isn’t a major factor. It does occur but is a low percentage of fatalities.
Socialising: At Blackheath Station people would commonly sit on the edge of the
platform to rest.
Thrill-seeking. Especially during school holiday.
The challenge with engineering solutions close to pedestrian desire lines, it comes
down to the human behaviour issue again, “when I see other people doing
something, then I can also do it”, behaviour is copied from others. Some may not
know it’s illegal or that they can be fined. People who purposefully vandalise
fencing, clearly know they are doing something wrong. You can’t go breaking down
fencing. People who follow later can claim they didn’t know. Announcements are
made at Cape Town Station to warn of the dangers.
The rail reserve is a continuation of the road environment for a pedestrian.
Pedestrian compliance with road rules is also deteriorating. Behaviour in road
environment spills over into the rail environment. People would perceive the rail
environment to be safer than the road environment, so could be willing to take more
risks.
Typical hot-spot locations with high fatalities are where the tracks curvature
prevents good sight distances for the pedestrians. So, they not able to see the
approaching trains.
Levels of risk taking witnessed: Calculated gambles based on a stationary train
knowing that it would be a while before the train arrives and calculating the speed
and judging the approach distance of a moving train. People also jump into moving
trains.
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8. Where are the worst stations or line sections for trespassing incidents?
Woodstock Station, morning and afternoon peak.
Esplanade Station: increasing amount of people alighting at Esplanade and walking
into town along the tracks. Reverse behaviour in the afternoon. Definite fare
evasion.
15 hot-spot locations identified in report carried out. Hot-spots are defined as areas
with high pedestrian numbers. Each hot-spot was investigated and found to fall into
2 categories: its proximity to a station for platform access and informal street-to-
street access.
9. Please rate what in your opinion are the best counter-measures to reducing
trespassing.
Prosecuting trespassers: this isn’t really what we should be doing to pedestrian
trespassers. Especially with no criminal intent on the part of the trespasser.
One of the lessons we have learned is that whenever there is an incident, the knee-
jerk reaction is to build a pedestrian bridge, which is both costly to build and 
maintain, apart from the fact that they could become white elephants if not correctly 
sited. It is important to consider the pedestrian movements at hot-spot locations with 
a good understanding of what the movements are at each individual location. 
Pedestrian movement should guide your interventions. 
Successful interventions include patrol and enforcement although this isn’t always 
sustainable due to staffing and capacity issues. As soon as the patrols move off the 
behaviour returns. Its effective where it is at a point in time but due to the size of the 
network, you cannot be everywhere all the time. It becomes unsustainable. 
Crime investigation and intelligence is critical. 
Fencing and barriers. Very effective. Wall south of Nyanga as an example, although 
not visually very appealing. No visibility. This type of fencing is a last resort 
scenario. 
Fencing no matter what type, needs to be maintained. 
Palisade fencing isn’t very effective and is easily vandalized. Clear-view fencing 
more effective. Fencing can be effective but must be considered according to the risk 
of the area.  
Subways are an issue. They will only be accepted by communities if it can be proved 
that the existing subways on the network can be properly managed. Crime, lighting, 
littering, drainage issues must be designed. 
Elsies River and Bellville subways are awful. Elsies River subway is especially bad. 
Bellville is longer but has a lot of people. Elsies is a quiet subway. 
Targeted communication and education campaigns. 
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10. Do you have any other suggestions for reducing trespassing in the rail
environment?
Walls and a considered fencing programme.
A guidance on a fencing specification would be useful.
Pedestrian desire lines need to be considered. One must consider that more people
will try and save money by walking for certain legs of their journey, especially the
last and first mile, especially if it is a walkable distance. People will walk more.
Items to consider, desire/need to cross, cost saving, time saving and behavioural
decay.
11. Are you able to name example sites/locations where counter-measures have
successfully been implemented and where you have noticed a marked drop in
trespassing?
Nyanga
Access control at Woodstock and Bellville Stations
It’s difficult when you are dealing with human behaviour and compliance. We keep
on trying to find engineering solutions to social problems.
12. What in your view should be prioritized for immediate response as it affects
railway operations?
Trespassing at grade crossings show low pedestrian fatalities.
Encroachments are an increasing problem but very complicated to solve.
Suicides prevention programs would be the lowest priority purely because of the low
numbers.
The main priority should be to eliminate illegal movements onto stations via the
platform ends. If this can be eliminated this will have a knock-on effect on
trespassing in section areas.
Platform ends aren’t ramped but sometimes they have informal gravel ramps or
stepping stones placed by commuters to make access easier.
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13. Are there any other comments you would like to make? 
Pedestrian bridges not always the answer to trespassing. 
 
Fencing is effective but needs to be maintained. Vandalised fencing needs to be 
repaired before bad behaviour sets in. 
 
Accident locations need to be geolocated as part of accident reports, so the exact 
locations can be identified. 
 
Accident locations almost always have no relation to trespass numbers. High 
trespassing locations could have very low or no fatality rates. 
 
Formalising informal at-grade crossings need to be considered as a solution. The rail 
operator needs to reconsider its policy on this. The technology exists to make it a 
safe option. Not formalizing crossings such as the one at Nomzamo is even more 
risky. 
 
We specifically don’t call it trespassing but “informal crossing of railway lines”. 
14. Personal thoughts 
Very insightful interview. What became apparent to me from this interview was that 
the solution to trespassing cannot be down to any specific party on its own and needs 
a coordinated approach. The human behaviour element, again, as with all elements 
of life in modern day South Africa, is a complicated problem to deal with, which not 
only affects rail but may be a spill-over from non-compliance generally. We see this 
in road safety, where road users must be forced to behave in a certain way. 
Similarly, the only effective engineering measures are the type which forces a 
certain behaviour. Where people have a choice, they would most likely still choose 
the risky option. 
 
Another key point from this is the numbers of trespassers counted at the hot-spot 
sites. The pedestrian numbers are unprecedented. It cannot be acceptable that 
beurocracy dictate engineering risk when it comes to the proposal to formalize 
certain at-grade crossings. Risk based decision making must be employed here. 
 
I especially appreciated the fact that the term “trespasser” isn’t used to criminalise 







1. Area of expertise. 
Railway security manager 
Open discussion 
2. Key notes 
 
Better co-working with the RRPU is still lacking. More should be done to foster 
joint deployment and operations, more visibility on trains and following through 
on opened criminal dockets. SAPS still only plan their interventions based on 
reported crime. 
 
Advancements in technology need to be explored with regards to target-
hardening. Hi-tech advancements in crime analysis are currently being deployed 
to provide new intel into crime patterns. Analysis has shown that there is a direct 
linkage to gang hot-spot areas as well as scrap metal dealers. This is very 
effective but also very expensive and the current contract with the service 
provider is nearing its end. 
 
Fencing as the first line of defence must be broadly expanded to secure the 
network entirely. 
 
Poor service roads and dense trackside vegetation makes responding to incidents 
difficult and visibility poor. 
 
More target hardening measures need to be implemented on “hot assets”. The 
same type of assets are targeted repeatedly. 
 
Lighting, especially at hot-spots need to be improved to improve visibility and 
detection. 
 
With the recent train arson attacks, additional security measures have been put in 
place at Cape Town Station. Since then, arsonists have now started targeting 
trains before they come into Cape Town and are now starting to attack the rolling 




3. Personal thoughts 
There is currently a lot being done to combat the incidents of crime on the 
network. The railway operator is using sophisticated crime analysis techniques to 
provide insight into crime patterns. This information in combination with a 
dedicated security arm which includes the use of drone surveillance, has proven 
to be very effective at crime hot-spot locations, leading to a number of arrests and 
convictions. There is a certain degree of organization to the crime, especially with 
regards to metal theft.  
The information shared at this stage is very confidential and cannot be fully 
incorporated into the research, and it is worth consideration for further research 
opportunities. 
 
It is again apparent that you have a railway operator who has become a victim of 
a larger social problem, but unlike trespassing in general, the intention is to 
commit a crime which requires a specific intervention. With rail routes passing 
through gang-infested areas and deprived communities, it will remain a soft-target 
for potential criminals. Can we expect a rail operator to be crime fighting experts 
as well? 
 
Continuing organizational issues with the railway operator further complicates 
matters. I had originally intended to interview the manager for protective services 
only to learn that the individual had been put on suspension. At the time, I met 
with the Acting Manager instead, who still is a very capable individual and has 







1. Area of expertise. 
Spatial and urban planning 
Trespassing  
2. How many instances of trespassing in the rail reserve or via platform ends do 
you believe to occur daily? 
Too many to count. We are talking specifically about the type of trespassing 
where the main reason is to either cross the railway purely to get across or to use 
the rail reserve as a corridor. 
3. Is there a specific time of day in which trespassing is more prevalent? 
I have witnessed peak hour flows in the morning and evening, but you will also 
have all day flows at certain locations. Some stations close to schools also have 
peaks around school finishing times. 
Khayamandi mall crossing has thousands of people crossing all day. The location 
of an informal taxi rank on the site adjacent to the crossing as well as it being on 
the main pedestrian route into Stellenbosch, contributes to it being a site that is 
constantly busy throughout the day.  
 
4. Are trespassers likely to be male or female? 
Male and female but more males. 
5. Are trespassers likely to be children, adolescents or adults? 
Depends on the location. Mostly adults.  
If the station is used by nearby schools then you will have a higher ratio of 
children and teenagers. They will walk in large groups as schoolchildren like to 
do. 
You will also see people crossing the tracks with shopping, walking sticks, 
bicycles, prams, it really depends on the location.  




6. Are there any specific features or trends of trespassers you think should get a 
mention? E.g. schoolchildren, drunkards, homeless, tourists, drug addicts, 
graffiti artists, thrill seekers etc. 
There is a growing number of homeless people using the railway reserve to build 
make-shift shelters. I’m not talking about the type you will see with the 
encroachment at Philippi, but rather more informal type shelters that are just high 
enough to crouch in. The rail operator needs to be constantly vigilant to remove 
these shelters as they quickly mushroom. This obviously not a rail problem, and I 
don’t think it’s a housing problem either, these are people living on the fringes of 
society, who refuse to comply to even homeless shelter rules. You will get people 
who get a house from the government and then prefer to live in a shack while 
they rent out their government house. 
 
Station precinct areas: These are areas surrounding train stations. Several station 
areas have been left to deteriorate and have become little crime infested slums. 
Combined with growing informal taxi ranking outside some stations, and 
informal traders these areas have become no-go zones for choice transport users. 
Local authorities need to do more to tidy up these areas. The area outside Parow 
station is an example. The area has become a slum. 
Cape Town station surrounds is equally bad. People openly sell and use drugs in 
the square bordering Adderley Street. I have witnessed on a daily basis people 
smoking tik and using hypodermic needles to inject themselves with heroine, in 
clear view of passers-by. The station deck area is equally bad. I just mention these 
2 but all the major stops and especially those with an interchange, have problems. 
 
7. What you believe to be the main reasons for trespassing. 
This is not only a railways problem, but it can also be seen on major arterials and 
highways. The N2, N1, R300 all have people crossing them. The issue will be 
experienced everywhere a corridor acts as a barrier to the movement of people 
and formal crossing facilities are inadequate. People need to go to the shops, 
school, work, or to reach other transport services, clinics and hospitals. 
8. Where are the worst stations or line sections for trespassing incidents? 
Cape Town Station towards Woodstock and Esplanade. I use the MyCiti and 
witness hordes of people walking longitudinally down the tracks on a daily basis, 
despite the presence of Metro police. These aren’t your Nomzamo’s or 
Khayamandi’s, these are purposefully trespassing in order avoid paying fares at 
Cape Town station. They need to be tackled differently to a pedestrian trying to 
get from point A to point B. 
 
Any area of the track which runs adjacent to informal settlements is going to have 
a problem. When you face something day in and day out you become oblivious to 
the dangers. It becomes part of life.  
 
300 Appendices 
9. Please rate what in your opinion are the best counter-measures to reducing 
trespassing.  
We must be better at how we plan our settlements. Land use and transport 
planning needs to be carried out more comprehensively with more consideration 
for NMT users. The Blue Downs Rail link is a case in point. If this is not dealt 
with correctly it will add to the growing problem.  
 
Education and information strategies need to be reconsidered. Fatality hot-spots 
need to be properly reviewed and strategies devised around them. It’s no use 
doing a media campaign on the internet for example or at schools, when you 
should be going into shebeens and taverns instead. There is also a group that 
won’t read or pay attention to any such campaigns. How do you explain the 
dangers to them? Campaigns must be targeted, and the effectiveness evaluated. 
 
We also need better cross stakeholder involvement. These aren’t only rail or 
transport problems but societal issues. Unemployment, crime, homelessness; 
these aren’t rail issues, but it affects rail. 
10. Do you have any other suggestions for reducing trespassing in the rail 
environment? 
We must have a minimum standard for the spacing of formal crossing 
opportunities along transport corridors and provide more crossing opportunities. 
11. Are you able to name example sites/locations where counter-measures have 
successfully been implemented and where you have noticed a marked drop in 
trespassing? 
International best practice examples are plenty, especially with respect to 
pedestrian and vehicle level crossing guidelines. The technical solutions are there. 
We must consider what will work in our local context considering human 
behaviour and the growing lack of compliance with basic rules and laws.  
12. What in your view should be prioritized for immediate response as it affects 
railway operations? 
From an urban land-use perspective, the broken window principal needs to be 
applied to our station precinct areas. These areas need to be tidied up and become 
no-go zones not for ordinary people but for drug dealers and criminals. The 
positive effect of this clean-up will spill over into the rail environment. The same 
goes for areas along the rail corridor.  
 




13. Personal thoughts 
As a regular user of public transport, I have witnessed the decline in the state of 
the areas around major public transport interchanges. Transients, open drug use 
and litter are common place. 
Further confirmation of social problems spilling into the rail environment. The 
theory that positive changes made outside the rail environment would spill into 







Appendix F – Site Inspection Field Notes 
Legend 




Elsies River Station SV1 
Elsies River Station – Parow Station SV2 
Parow Station – Tygerberg Station SV3 
Parow Station SV4 
Mbekweni Station SV5 
Dal Josafat Station – Mbekweni Station SV6 
Klapmuts Station SV7, SV8 
Du Toit Station – Koelenhof Station SV9 
Strand Station – Van der Stel Station SV10 
Netreg Station – Heideveld Station SV11 
Nyanga Station – Philippi Station SV12 
Bonteheuwel Station SV13 
Kraaifontein Station SV14 
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Date: 23/07/2019 Time: 09h15 Location: Elsies River Station 
Weather: Rain SV1 
Describe nature of problem 




Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Industrial area 
Nearby public transport facility 
Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Subway 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
7 
Describe specific features of 
trespassers (gender, age, drunks, 
homeless etc.) 
Adult men 
What is the nearest safe crossing place? 
(underpass, overpass, pedestrian 
crossing, where is it located) 
Subway 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras, 
security signage, etc.) 
Security presence outside subway entrance but responsible for PT facility. 
General notes on location: 
Visit during off-peak time. No trains arrived during the time of the visit. 
Subway very quiet and although lit was found to be dark. (See Fig.1 and 2) No 
standing water present even though it was raining quit steadily. 
Very unnerving walking down the subway alone. 
Only a few homeless people wandering about at street level. 
At street level I noticed a number of people taking a short-cut at the opposite end of 
the station where a section of the fence had a hole. 
Some trespassers sought access to the station platforms via this point while others 
used it as an entry to walk longitudinally along a path alongside the tracks. 
Google Earth Image 
A – Subway entrance 
B – Location of removed fence 
Fig.1 View down subway
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Fig.2 View down subway entrance at street level
Fig.3 Section of fence removed allowing access to rail reserve and station
Fig.4 Pathway along tracks
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Date: 23/07/2019 Time: 9h38 Location: Elsies River Station – Parow 
Station 
Weather: Rain SV2 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Industrial 
Residential on opposite side of tracks 
Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Open line section 
Partly fenced 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
7  
Describe specific features of 
trespassers (gender, age, drunks, 
homeless etc.) 
Adult males 
What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
None 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras, 
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
General notes on location: 
Trespassers are accessing the tracks at a hole in the fence on the opposite site and 
walking longitudinally/diagonally across the tracks.  
Train witnessed while trespassers on tracks.  Train did not sound horn. 
Dense trackside shrubbery and vegetation. 
Disused track materials spoiled adjacent to tracks.  





Fig.1 Discarded track materials adjacent to running rails 
 








Date: 23/07/2019 Time: 10h00 Location: Parow Station – 
Tygerberg Station 
Weather: Rain SV3 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, suicide, 





area (schools, hospitals, 
residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Define area (station, platform, open line, level 
crossing, other.) 
Line in section 
 
Count frequency of 
trespassing / 15-minute 
interval 
15 
Describe specific features of trespassers (gender, 








where is it located) 
None 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
General notes on location: 
Fencing has been vandalized in several places to allow access to the rail reserve. 
Clear pedestrian desire lines visible, with diagonal paths across the tracks. 
20m from the initial position I first witnessed some trespassers, there are a number of 
informal dwellings along the fence demarcating the railway reserve. Sections of 
fencing is missing adjacent to these shelters allowing access to cross the tracks. 
There were no people outside the shelters at the time of my visit.  





Fig.1 Pedestrian pathway leading to hole in fence 
 




Google Earth Image – Location 2 
 
 








Date:23/07/2019 Time: 10h25 Location: Parow Station 
Weather: Rain SV4 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 




Describe surrounding area (schools, 




Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Station 
Looks like a disused platform section 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
3 trespassers 
3 inhabitants of dwellings 
Describe specific features of trespassers 




What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
Overbridge at Parow Station 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
 
General notes on location: 
There is a fence around the area and an open vehicular gate at the main entrance. The 
fence immediately adjacent to the shelters has a hole where people pass through. 
The general station precinct area is filthy and littered with rubbish. 
There is a MBT rank at the station and the station precinct looks very rundown. 
Informal shelters built in the doorways of shopfronts.  
The shelters photographed are within the rail reserve in a “back of platform” area. 
The shelters look like they have been around for some time and well established. 
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Fig.1 Section of fence removed to allow access to railway area 
Fig.2 Row of informal shelters inside the rail reserve 
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Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 9h30 Location: Mbekweni Station 
Weather: Fine SV5 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area 




Define area (station, platform, open line, 
level crossing, other.) 
Station 
Platform-end 
Count frequency of trespassing / 
15-minute interval
9
Describe specific features of trespassers 
(gender, age, drunks, homeless etc.) 
Adult males 
Adult females 
What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
Pedestrian overbridge at station 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras, 
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
General notes on location: 
High pedestrian traffic along Drommedaris Road, typical of informal settlements. 
Clear desire lines lead up to a “naturally” ramped access to platform end. 
Fence removed for sections. 
A number of trespassers were walking longitudinally along the tracks. 
Google Earth Image 
Fig.1 Pedestrian pathway leading to platform-end access at station 
Fig.2 End of platform providing access to the tracks 
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Fig. 3 Partial fencing allowing access to the tracks and platform-end 
Fig. 4 Pedestrians walking longitudinally along and across the tracks 
Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 9h53 Location: Dal Josafat Station – 
Mbekweni Station 
Weather: Fine SV6 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Encroachment 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Informal settlement 
Rural 
Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Line section 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
3 
Describe specific features of trespassers 




What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
None. Vehicular level crossing a bit 
further south. 
What existing physical measures are in 
place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
None 
General notes on location: 
The line of shacks are to within a few metres from the tracks. Tracks are littered with 
rubbish and the area smells of human excrement. 
Witnessed a woman carrying a little child walking longitudinally along the tracks. 
Google Earth Image 
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Fig.1 Line of shacks encroaching onto the railway reserve 
Fig.2 Track area is littered with rubbish and human waste 
Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 10h30 Location: Klapmuts Station 
Weather: Fine SV7, SV8 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Retail on the opposite side 
Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Station 
Area immediately adjacent to station 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
25 
Describe specific features of trespassers 





What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 




What existing physical measures are in 
place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
Landscaping (rock filled gabions) 
General notes on location: 
The Klapmuts rail line separates the residential area from the shopping area, which 
are on the opposite sides of the tracks. A pedestrian overbridge at the station and an 
underpass at the other end provide formal pedestrian crossing opportunities. The 
pedestrian underpass is situated next to a canal and looks a bit treacherous. 
The fencing is damaged at locations where people can access the station platform. 
Trespassers cross at well-known footpaths to access the station via the platform ends 
as well as cross the tracks to reach the shopping center on the opposite side. Some 
use the station as a thoroughfare to reach the shopping area. 
High pedestrian numbers were witnessed, including people carrying shopping bags, 
little children as well as elderly men and women with walking sticks. 
There is quite a big level difference between the street and track level and the tracks 
are tricky to traverse having to climb over a gabion then step over a row of cabling to 
access the tracks. A section of gabion has been removed to allow easier access.  
On previous occasions during school holidays, I have witnessed children playing on 
the tracks at this location. 
324 Appendices 
Google Earth Image 
Fig.1 View showing the level difference between the street and tracks 
Fig.2 Pedestrians using the platfoirm-end ramps to gain access to the station 
Fig.3 Pedestrians crossing the tracks to reach the opposite side of the station 
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Fig.4 Section of rock-filled gabion removed to create a pathway 
Fig.5 Pedestrian pathway along tracksshowing 
trackside cabling pedestrians need to navigate 
Fig.6 An alternate formal crossing point used 
mainly by pedestrians with baby buggies 
Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 11h15 Location: Du Toit Station – Koelenhof 
Station 
Weather: Fine SV9 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 




Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Line section 
Informal at-grade crossing 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
303 
Describe specific features of trespassers 






What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
None 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
None.  
Informal crossing point has slabs between the tracks to make walking over easier. 
General notes on location: 
Location at Khayamandi Mall. Very high traffic area. More than 300 pedestrians 
counted in a 15-minute period at almost midday. 
Very busy shopping area, MBT informal ran as well as informal traders right next to 
tracks. 
Majority of pedestrians simply just cross the tracks at this location. Some walk 
longitudinally along the tracks to access Du Toit station via the platform ends or 
walk towards Cloetesville. There is also significant loitering on the tracks at this 
location and a bit further up under the bridge and during the visit an individual was 
sitting on the tracks defecating. 
Thick vegetation between tracks at this location. 
Speaking to one of the traders, he asked in Afrikaans “When are we going to 













Fig.2 Heavily used informal pedestrian crossing showing informal traders active on both sides 
 




Fig.4 Dense trackside vegetation 
 




Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 11h50 Location: Strand Station – Van der 
Stel Station 
Weather: Good SV10 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Encroachment 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Major arterials M153, N2 
Define area (station, platform, open line, 
level crossing, other.) 
Line section 
Informal crossing point 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
384 
Describe specific features of trespassers 






What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
Formal pedestrian route nearby. 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
Formal pedestrian route 
Signage 
General notes on location: 
Very high pedestrian traffic. Both directions in the middle of the day. Counted 384 
pedestrians in a 15-minute period. This is the only site that has warning signage 
displayed. 
Location provides access to the Strand Main Road from the Nomzamo residential 
area.  
A formal pedestrian route does exist but is unused as it not only takes pedestrians on 
a major diversion but is also very unsafe and strewn with litter. When asked why no 
one uses the formal route, one pedestrian said, “We get robbed when we walk down 
there, its unsafe, especially when dark.’ 
Most pedestrians make a direct crossing at this location and a smaller number walk 
longitudinally along the tracks to exit the rail reserve through other gaps in the fence 
further up. 
Whilst on site, a rail maintenance crew was inspecting the ballast at this location. 
Sleepers are used to shore up the ballast as the numbers of pedestrian traffic at this 
location causes the ballast to become unstable and could pose a further safety risk.   
After heavy rains there is a lot of standing water present and the area is strewn with 
litter. The area next to Strand main Road, is used by taxis to pick-up and drop 
passengers and there are a number of informal trader’s present. These elements all 
add to further legitimize the crossing.  
A few metres from the crossing towards Van Der Stel Station, there are several 
informal dwellings erected inside the rail reserve. 
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Fig.2 Informal crossing used by both males and females 
 
Fig.3 Sleepers ineffectively being used to retain the track ballast. Evidence of fly-tipping can also be 




Fig.4 A cyclist carrying his bicycle across the tracks. 
  
Fig.5 Fencing vandalized to create access points 
Fig.6 Informal dwellings erected inside the railway reserve 
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Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 11h50 Location: Netreg Station – 
Heideveld Station 
Weather: Good SV11 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, suicide, 
vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area 
(schools, hospitals, residential, 
shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Define area (station, platform, open line, level 
crossing, other.) 
Line section 
Formal grade separated pedestrian crossing 
Count frequency of 
trespassing / 15-minute 
interval 
0 
Describe specific features of trespassers 
(gender, age, drunks, homeless etc.) 
n/a 
What is the nearest safe 
crossing place? (underpass, 
overpass, pedestrian crossing, 
where is it located) 
Location at pedestrian crossing 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras, 
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
Formal crossing 
General notes on location: 
Well-designed grade separated pedestrian crossing with universal access. 
Section of fence on both sides of track removed immediately below the bridge with 
clear pedestrian desire lines. 
I didn’t witness any trespassing while on site, mainly because it was very quiet at 
that time of day. 2 female pedestrians were making use of the formal crossing at the 
time. 
Google Earth Image 








Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 12h46 Location: Nyanga Station – Philippi 
Station 
Weather: Good SV12 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Retail 
Define area (station, platform, open 




Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
0 
Describe specific features of trespassers 




What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
None. 
Road overpass further down. 
What existing physical measures are in place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
 
General notes on location: 
The location is a hot-spot for both fatalities and crime occurrences. The 
countermeasure installed consists of a concrete fence that is used to cordon off the 
entire length of the corridor along this section. 
 
The fence is very robust and seemed free of any defects or damage. 
 
The only entry into the rail reserve is via a gated vehicular access. The gate was open 
at the time of the inspection and it remains so at all times. 
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Google Earth Image 
 
 





Fig.2 Entire section of railway corridor with concrete fencing 
 
342 Appendices 
Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 13h27 Location: Bonteheuwel Station and 
surrounds 
Weather: Good SV13 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Industrial 
Define area (station, platform, open line, 
level crossing, other.) 
Station 
Area immediately surrounding station 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
12 
Describe specific features of trespassers 




What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
Station overbridge 
What existing physical measures are in 
place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  




General notes on location: 
Fencing is broken in several locations with a myriad of pedestrian desire lines across 
the entire area which can be seen from the aerial photograph. 
The main reason is to cross to reach the industrial area at Epping for work and retail 
opportunities. 
During the visit I witnessed pedestrian movement across, diagonally across and 
longitudinally down the tracks. 
Sections along the track has poor drainage and there are areas used as fly-tipping 












Fig.2 Fly-tipping and dense vegetation inside the railway reserve 
 





Fig.4 Extended fencing from platform ends do little to deter trespassing from the platform-ends 
Well-trodden pedestrian desire lines 
leading to the platform end ramps at 
Kraaifontein Station 
Date: 01/08/2019 Time: 14h35 Location: Kraaifontein Station 
Weather: Good SV14 
Describe nature of problem (trespass, 
suicide, vandalism, theft, leisure etc.) 
Trespassing 
Describe surrounding area (schools, 
hospitals, residential, shopping etc.) 
Residential 
Primary school, high school 
Define area (station, platform, open 
line, level crossing, other.) 
Station 
Area immediately adjacent to station 
Count frequency of trespassing / 15-
minute interval 
21 – north end 
33 – south end 
Describe specific features of 




Children (south end – high school 
children, north side – primary and high 
school children) 
What is the nearest safe crossing 
place? (underpass, overpass, 
pedestrian crossing, where is it 
located) 
Overbridge at station 
What existing physical measures are in 
place? (walls, fencing, cameras,  
security signage, etc.) 
Fencing 
General notes on location: 
I was surprised at the amount of pedestrian traffic through this location at this time. 
The primary school and high school children right opposite the north end of the 
station accesses the station via a hole in the fence with a well-used pedestrian desire 
line.  
The paths cross the path diagonally to access the station platform ends. There is also 
a well-trodden foot path longitudinally along the tracks. 
The South side is equally busy. With a lot of school children accessing the railway 
reserve by holes in the fence. 
I suspect that I just missed the peak period for school finishing times. I waited for 
train but gave up after 20 minutes.  
There were several individuals loitering in some bushes inside the railway reserve. I 
couldn’t see what they were doing. 
Very dense vegetation in areas so much so that you cannot see the tracks. 
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Fig.2 Pedestrian desire lines leading to platform-ends 
 




Fig.4 Well-trodden pedestrian pathways leading to the station platform-ends 
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